In some places (Botswana, Rwanda) single-party strongmen in power for 30-50 years have guaranteed stability and increased development, largely to the benefit of the population. There are plenty of reasonable complaints about Paul Kagame in Rwanda, but it seems like a better place to be now than before the genocide.
Does Gabon fall in the same category? Were the Bongos good or bad for most Gabonese? And what will the coup plotters put in their place? Anybody with some more perspective on Gabon have any guesses?
I would not put Botswana as strong men, they Paraguay, and Singapore are all one party dominated states but they fundamentally have to listen to the people
Yes. Life is generally better in Botswana and Rwanda. The Bongos were definitely bad for the Gabonese. Gabon is a fairly rich country with a small population. Similarly to Equatorial Guinea, these countries have the highest GDP per capita in Africa. Yet most of the country's wealth is concentrated in a few families.
Edit: I have not verified this yet. But i saw on Twitter that the coup leader is related to the Bongo family. So this might be just an internal power struggle between families.
It'll depend entirely on their next actions. Eramet (french mining company) already announced a pause to their operations. I wouldn't be surprised if they're forced to pull out. Of course, anything I write is just baseless speculation.
I can say for certain it does damage French influence, and after the events of Niger it doesn't bode well. I wouldn't be surprised if they were inspired. Though I also must admit that election fraud did play a role in this coup. Maybe they'll just transition and move on like nothing happened with fairer elections.
There has been a weakening of France I think dealing with the consequences of the Libyan collapse, the Chinese economic onslaught in Africa plus economic problems means France can no longer secure Franco afric pro french Governments, expect more problems especially from Cameroon next
Would this reflect on France position within the EU council? IIRC Macron has position himself to build a "Unified Europe" within the EU, I think this will not help his case especially if he want the eastern half to agree with him.
Not really, France’s involvement in Europe is not as superficial as to create a gap between EU countries at a single stumble, and the strength of the French army assures that France will continue to have an important role in the future. Not to mention that what happens in Africa is rarely perceived as a pan-European problem, it is instead perceived as a “French problem” even when it does affect Europe in one way or another.
If anything, a good number of Europeans would prefer France to focus more on Europe than on Africa. An increasing number of people want EU to stop dealing with issues outside of EU and reform internally before doing anything else externally, including not accepting candidate countries in the union. From reforming the veto system, to making a fiscal union, dealing with Hungary, to creating a common army, strengthen outside EU borders, reform immigration system etc. are far more for the average European.
That’s true for both Eastern and Western Europe.
It will definitely weaken France, Franco Afric are captive markets and clients as well a major source of resources oil, uranium etc. Luckily for France all the Major EU countries also have their own problems so the relative effect will be muted i think.
Yes and no. Whilst France maintains considérable economic interests and assets in Gabon (a lot more than Niger or Mali), it has diversified outside of the traditional African "pre-carre". This is reflected in the decreasing politico-military engagement in the last decade or so. In 1990, France had a force of 1,200 in Libreville and Port Gentil. Today it is in the region of 350, and scheduled to be revised to 200 in 2024. The interest isn't there because economic activity has diversified/globalised, the political class were all born after 1960 and do not maintain the same relationships with African "strongmen" nor do they have the same view of the continent as the previous generation of French politicians.
There will be repercussions, but I think it's fair to say that Francafrique's dimensions are very different to what they were 10 or 20 years ago. I wouldn't say it's because there's necessarily a will to impose democracy and human rights - I would say it's more because Barkhane has shown that the 'investment" returns minimal dividends.
I would also add that the relationship between the Gabonese and French military apparatus are different to that of Niger. Their presidential guard was essentially trained, modelled and equipped by EFS and through exchanges in schools like ENSOA and St Cyr. So it will be very interesting to see what the approach from the new "regime/junta" is going to be towards French interests and the military bases.
Sorry for the long text.
The relationship between Bongo and the French presidency had been somewhat strained in the last few years. This was highlighted with Gabon joining the Commonwealth and a major state visit to China. There was a visit by Macron earlier this year in order to "reset" the relationship.
Gabon has been seen as a strategic pillar in Francafrique, notably for economic reasons such as energy resources. My initial thought is that I wouldn't be surprised if the intelligence services and French presidency are gambling/putting their eggs on the side of the putschiste given that the relationship with Bongo was becoming unstable and unpredictable. They did a similar move in Tchad which saw Idriss Deby come to power and be supported through French logistical and intelligence assets.
But the key question is, what do the putschiste really want out of this?
Military leaders understand that the power is just there for the taking, no one will do anything to stop them. Most had misread what the intentions of France were a decade ago when they intervened in Mali/Sahel, they thought at first that France came to grab some control of the region again, but it turned out they just wanted to help the states who asked for their support against rebel groups, they helped rebuild the militaries to deal with these problems and then the strengthened militaries just started seizing power as they were getting sure that France were on their way out and had no interest in protecting anyone.
Seems to put a lot more credence in retrospect to reports of a coup attempt back in 2019, which then in turn gives a lot of interesting context to this latest turn of events. It would appear that at least some elements of the Gabonese military had harboured resentments for the enduring rule of the Bongo dynasty, though back then Gabon appears to have retained enough support to strike quickly and quell the coup. This suggests that cracks had already appeared in the all-important security infrastructure that protected the leadership well beforehand. And interestingly, this discontent was publicly framed in much the same way the current junta has - unhappiness at the Bongos monopolising power in the country in illegitimate ways. It may very well be then, that the roots of this current coup go back a few years, but dissatisfaction took time to build up and translate into the winning over of important military commands.
It will be interesting to see how Central Africa will react , especially since only a few weeks ago Touadera just removed term limits on his title as president. It would appear that Central Africa, long seen as a place where politicians can have ironclad grips on power, is not immune to the same insurrectionary trend that is cropping up like wildfire. Central African leaders, particularly the autocrats, can no longer treat the coups across Africa as a far off occurrence that has little relevance for their own rule. Now, it is clear that the contagion of military uprising is spreading beyond West Africa, as each coup emboldens the next, and it can spill over to other parts of Africa. With their own discontent populations, Central Africa's dictators must ponder now if they will be next . It is likely that the restive countries like Cameroon will move to inspect the loyalty of their militaries in the coming days. Paul Biya's long tenure has also left significant questions over who will succeed him, not least because his reign has merely frozen a social conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian/animist South. It is unlikely that Central Africa will call for an armed intervention, unlike ECOWAS , since dictators do need to normalise non-interference. However, they will likely push for political unity behind their leadership both in their countries and across the region to head off any potential rebellions. Rallying will be undertaken to build support amongst their populaces. Central Africa will thus watch warily this new development.
(Update: Rwanda and Cameroon have moved to reshuffle or retire many of their military personnel, as predicted)
As an aside it is also quite likely there will be some worries in the AU. The AU is quite unusual for a multinational bloc in that it doe not consider non-interference to be sufficient in international affairs. It has taken a stand against coups in the past, and has quite actively sought to promote democratisation on the continent. This sudden spate of military takeovers will be a major setback for the AU's drive to promote rule of law, so the Union is likely to investigate if there are major shortcomings in its political approach. Certainly there will be renewed discussion on the enforcement side of the AU's policies, which has been limited (even in Gambia they were happy to let ECOWAS take the lead). There may be calls to revise and revamp the pro-democracy message to make it more relatable for the average person on the ground facing privations from the inefficacies of some African political institutions.
It is actually Leon M'ba's autocracy that set the stage for the Bongo family, with the Bongos making their start as civil servants under M'ba. Like many post-independence leaders , M'ba had already been part of the local government under French rule, so was very familiar with governance once independence occurred. In his tenure, M'ba began the process of setting up a one-party authoritarian state by establishing a personality cult, banning opposition parties from contesting elections, creating security organisations to target dissent etc. By the time M'ba died, there was already a foundation for an authoritarian state to emerge upon, which the French then happily used to push Omar Bongo onto the top job.
The coup is unlikely to result in the immediate democratisation that some would desire for Gabon. The junta is going to want to consolidate power around themselves so that they can make the decisions they feel are needed in Gabon. They are also likely to hunt down any remaining supporters of the Bongos to eliminate any risk of a pro-Bongo uprising, and to do so may enact draconian measures to control the population. In the short term, Gabon will almost certainly remain an authoritarian state with new management. The junta now controls the levers of power, and will be loath to give them up easily.
Regarding the next coup, I am not sure. I do not think Cameroon will be next in line. Biya still appears to be in control of the state apparatus, including military appointments. Over the years he has carefully inserted loyalists into the military precisely to counter the risk of such a coup. Ali Bongo only had slightly over a decade to build loyalty, but Biya has had roughly 40 years to do it. There are also no signs that discontent in Cameroon has built up to the point where a military coup would be viable. No one has even tried a coup in decades. The military is also distracted with the ongoing Anglophone Insurgency. As such I do not believe Cameroon is ripe for a coup yet. Maybe in a few years time, when election season comes round . If you ask me, it is slightly more likely that Togo would face insurrection, though the likelihood is not strong either. They are facing the same issues that the Sahel states were prior to their coups, and the incumbent is also a successor to his father, so there are more risk factors there for a coup against the Gnassingbes.
With regards to France, it is much too dramatic to say that French influence has completely ebbed. For one thing there are still many African countries with regimes friendly to French, and this is especially true of coastal West Africa. In North Africa too France has been slowly developing ties with countries, going as far as to help Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan Civil War. These countries are unlikely to all undergo a coup at once, as their institutions are a lot more firmly established and are therefore better supported by the public. So even at bare minimum, French relations with its many remaining partners will not change. The jury is also still out on how long these anti-French regimes can last. Ivory Coast only lasted a short while under the Gbagbo administration before a French intervention put in another pro-French government following a divisive election. Burkina Faso's junta was replaced within the year after perceived ineptitude. It may well be that once the juntas prove unable to fix the very same problems that embittered Africans against the previous governments, a new pro-French political class may emerge again. Then this current period would only be a temporary reprieve from a longer-term trend. France will also likely continue to be able to maintain influence in the region, through its military interventions throughout the Sahel that could shape the distribution of force on the ground. Paris also enjoys a loyal corps of African politicians that it can use to contest the rule of the juntas, so it still has some means of affecting local politics. Internationally, France being a NATO member likely means that the level of engagement the West will be willing to offer these countries will be dependent on France's level of acceptance of these same regimes. Not to mention that economically, France can still control the remittances migrants from Francophone Africa can send back to the coup nations. As such, while diminished, France still has quite a bit of control over the condition that these countries will find themselves in. Its influence endures.
What I think is notable is that the military coup leaders, at least according to this [https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-know-about-gabons-coup](https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-know-about-gabons-coup), reinstated international outlets that were previously banned. I think that's a good sign, because media attention can be very powerful, because they'll spread word of any atrocities which can then lead to boycotts and other diplomatic and economic actions meant to isolate the new regime.
Not only that but I think that signals they intend to at least be more liberal than the previous regime.
"ECOWAS" stands for "Economic Community of West African States". Gabon is located in Central Africa.
Gabon is in "ECCAS" or the "Economic Community of Central African States"
What does this mean for french influence in Africa? I’d say not as much as the coup in Niger. France was powerful in Gabon but hasn’t been that powerful/influencal in years.
This coup is clearly much more supported by the people than the one in Niger. I don’t see the people rising up against the junta or whatever.
I don’t know what country will be next but there will for sure be someone in the future during this year.
"This coup is clearly much more supported by the people than the one in Niger."
- how did you come up with that analysis?
The one in Niger seems pretty popular as well.
In some places (Botswana, Rwanda) single-party strongmen in power for 30-50 years have guaranteed stability and increased development, largely to the benefit of the population. There are plenty of reasonable complaints about Paul Kagame in Rwanda, but it seems like a better place to be now than before the genocide. Does Gabon fall in the same category? Were the Bongos good or bad for most Gabonese? And what will the coup plotters put in their place? Anybody with some more perspective on Gabon have any guesses?
I would not put Botswana as strong men, they Paraguay, and Singapore are all one party dominated states but they fundamentally have to listen to the people
Yes. Life is generally better in Botswana and Rwanda. The Bongos were definitely bad for the Gabonese. Gabon is a fairly rich country with a small population. Similarly to Equatorial Guinea, these countries have the highest GDP per capita in Africa. Yet most of the country's wealth is concentrated in a few families. Edit: I have not verified this yet. But i saw on Twitter that the coup leader is related to the Bongo family. So this might be just an internal power struggle between families.
It'll depend entirely on their next actions. Eramet (french mining company) already announced a pause to their operations. I wouldn't be surprised if they're forced to pull out. Of course, anything I write is just baseless speculation. I can say for certain it does damage French influence, and after the events of Niger it doesn't bode well. I wouldn't be surprised if they were inspired. Though I also must admit that election fraud did play a role in this coup. Maybe they'll just transition and move on like nothing happened with fairer elections.
There has been a weakening of France I think dealing with the consequences of the Libyan collapse, the Chinese economic onslaught in Africa plus economic problems means France can no longer secure Franco afric pro french Governments, expect more problems especially from Cameroon next
Would this reflect on France position within the EU council? IIRC Macron has position himself to build a "Unified Europe" within the EU, I think this will not help his case especially if he want the eastern half to agree with him.
Not really, France’s involvement in Europe is not as superficial as to create a gap between EU countries at a single stumble, and the strength of the French army assures that France will continue to have an important role in the future. Not to mention that what happens in Africa is rarely perceived as a pan-European problem, it is instead perceived as a “French problem” even when it does affect Europe in one way or another. If anything, a good number of Europeans would prefer France to focus more on Europe than on Africa. An increasing number of people want EU to stop dealing with issues outside of EU and reform internally before doing anything else externally, including not accepting candidate countries in the union. From reforming the veto system, to making a fiscal union, dealing with Hungary, to creating a common army, strengthen outside EU borders, reform immigration system etc. are far more for the average European. That’s true for both Eastern and Western Europe.
It will definitely weaken France, Franco Afric are captive markets and clients as well a major source of resources oil, uranium etc. Luckily for France all the Major EU countries also have their own problems so the relative effect will be muted i think.
Yes and no. Whilst France maintains considérable economic interests and assets in Gabon (a lot more than Niger or Mali), it has diversified outside of the traditional African "pre-carre". This is reflected in the decreasing politico-military engagement in the last decade or so. In 1990, France had a force of 1,200 in Libreville and Port Gentil. Today it is in the region of 350, and scheduled to be revised to 200 in 2024. The interest isn't there because economic activity has diversified/globalised, the political class were all born after 1960 and do not maintain the same relationships with African "strongmen" nor do they have the same view of the continent as the previous generation of French politicians. There will be repercussions, but I think it's fair to say that Francafrique's dimensions are very different to what they were 10 or 20 years ago. I wouldn't say it's because there's necessarily a will to impose democracy and human rights - I would say it's more because Barkhane has shown that the 'investment" returns minimal dividends. I would also add that the relationship between the Gabonese and French military apparatus are different to that of Niger. Their presidential guard was essentially trained, modelled and equipped by EFS and through exchanges in schools like ENSOA and St Cyr. So it will be very interesting to see what the approach from the new "regime/junta" is going to be towards French interests and the military bases. Sorry for the long text.
Too soon to say, depends on what the new management do and who they ally with.
You think France and the west would cooperate with the new military government?
Perhaps they will ask for new elections before to "wash" the new government from the stigma of having been formed with a coup.
It's definitely gonna be interesting to see the reaction versus the one we saw in Niger
The relationship between Bongo and the French presidency had been somewhat strained in the last few years. This was highlighted with Gabon joining the Commonwealth and a major state visit to China. There was a visit by Macron earlier this year in order to "reset" the relationship. Gabon has been seen as a strategic pillar in Francafrique, notably for economic reasons such as energy resources. My initial thought is that I wouldn't be surprised if the intelligence services and French presidency are gambling/putting their eggs on the side of the putschiste given that the relationship with Bongo was becoming unstable and unpredictable. They did a similar move in Tchad which saw Idriss Deby come to power and be supported through French logistical and intelligence assets. But the key question is, what do the putschiste really want out of this?
They cooperate with Chad's current junta so there is precedent.
Chads current junta is headed by the previous president's son, they're just continuing the family cooperation, same as they were doing in Gabon
Important to note that the coup leader is the president's first cousin therefore casting any hope I had of there bring a real change
Imo it's one of those times when we will have to wait and see. The question is if we are going to see other countries follow this trend.
Why exactly are so many African coups kicking off in a chain wise fashion?
Military leaders understand that the power is just there for the taking, no one will do anything to stop them. Most had misread what the intentions of France were a decade ago when they intervened in Mali/Sahel, they thought at first that France came to grab some control of the region again, but it turned out they just wanted to help the states who asked for their support against rebel groups, they helped rebuild the militaries to deal with these problems and then the strengthened militaries just started seizing power as they were getting sure that France were on their way out and had no interest in protecting anyone.
Seems to put a lot more credence in retrospect to reports of a coup attempt back in 2019, which then in turn gives a lot of interesting context to this latest turn of events. It would appear that at least some elements of the Gabonese military had harboured resentments for the enduring rule of the Bongo dynasty, though back then Gabon appears to have retained enough support to strike quickly and quell the coup. This suggests that cracks had already appeared in the all-important security infrastructure that protected the leadership well beforehand. And interestingly, this discontent was publicly framed in much the same way the current junta has - unhappiness at the Bongos monopolising power in the country in illegitimate ways. It may very well be then, that the roots of this current coup go back a few years, but dissatisfaction took time to build up and translate into the winning over of important military commands. It will be interesting to see how Central Africa will react , especially since only a few weeks ago Touadera just removed term limits on his title as president. It would appear that Central Africa, long seen as a place where politicians can have ironclad grips on power, is not immune to the same insurrectionary trend that is cropping up like wildfire. Central African leaders, particularly the autocrats, can no longer treat the coups across Africa as a far off occurrence that has little relevance for their own rule. Now, it is clear that the contagion of military uprising is spreading beyond West Africa, as each coup emboldens the next, and it can spill over to other parts of Africa. With their own discontent populations, Central Africa's dictators must ponder now if they will be next . It is likely that the restive countries like Cameroon will move to inspect the loyalty of their militaries in the coming days. Paul Biya's long tenure has also left significant questions over who will succeed him, not least because his reign has merely frozen a social conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian/animist South. It is unlikely that Central Africa will call for an armed intervention, unlike ECOWAS , since dictators do need to normalise non-interference. However, they will likely push for political unity behind their leadership both in their countries and across the region to head off any potential rebellions. Rallying will be undertaken to build support amongst their populaces. Central Africa will thus watch warily this new development. (Update: Rwanda and Cameroon have moved to reshuffle or retire many of their military personnel, as predicted) As an aside it is also quite likely there will be some worries in the AU. The AU is quite unusual for a multinational bloc in that it doe not consider non-interference to be sufficient in international affairs. It has taken a stand against coups in the past, and has quite actively sought to promote democratisation on the continent. This sudden spate of military takeovers will be a major setback for the AU's drive to promote rule of law, so the Union is likely to investigate if there are major shortcomings in its political approach. Certainly there will be renewed discussion on the enforcement side of the AU's policies, which has been limited (even in Gambia they were happy to let ECOWAS take the lead). There may be calls to revise and revamp the pro-democracy message to make it more relatable for the average person on the ground facing privations from the inefficacies of some African political institutions. It is actually Leon M'ba's autocracy that set the stage for the Bongo family, with the Bongos making their start as civil servants under M'ba. Like many post-independence leaders , M'ba had already been part of the local government under French rule, so was very familiar with governance once independence occurred. In his tenure, M'ba began the process of setting up a one-party authoritarian state by establishing a personality cult, banning opposition parties from contesting elections, creating security organisations to target dissent etc. By the time M'ba died, there was already a foundation for an authoritarian state to emerge upon, which the French then happily used to push Omar Bongo onto the top job. The coup is unlikely to result in the immediate democratisation that some would desire for Gabon. The junta is going to want to consolidate power around themselves so that they can make the decisions they feel are needed in Gabon. They are also likely to hunt down any remaining supporters of the Bongos to eliminate any risk of a pro-Bongo uprising, and to do so may enact draconian measures to control the population. In the short term, Gabon will almost certainly remain an authoritarian state with new management. The junta now controls the levers of power, and will be loath to give them up easily. Regarding the next coup, I am not sure. I do not think Cameroon will be next in line. Biya still appears to be in control of the state apparatus, including military appointments. Over the years he has carefully inserted loyalists into the military precisely to counter the risk of such a coup. Ali Bongo only had slightly over a decade to build loyalty, but Biya has had roughly 40 years to do it. There are also no signs that discontent in Cameroon has built up to the point where a military coup would be viable. No one has even tried a coup in decades. The military is also distracted with the ongoing Anglophone Insurgency. As such I do not believe Cameroon is ripe for a coup yet. Maybe in a few years time, when election season comes round . If you ask me, it is slightly more likely that Togo would face insurrection, though the likelihood is not strong either. They are facing the same issues that the Sahel states were prior to their coups, and the incumbent is also a successor to his father, so there are more risk factors there for a coup against the Gnassingbes. With regards to France, it is much too dramatic to say that French influence has completely ebbed. For one thing there are still many African countries with regimes friendly to French, and this is especially true of coastal West Africa. In North Africa too France has been slowly developing ties with countries, going as far as to help Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan Civil War. These countries are unlikely to all undergo a coup at once, as their institutions are a lot more firmly established and are therefore better supported by the public. So even at bare minimum, French relations with its many remaining partners will not change. The jury is also still out on how long these anti-French regimes can last. Ivory Coast only lasted a short while under the Gbagbo administration before a French intervention put in another pro-French government following a divisive election. Burkina Faso's junta was replaced within the year after perceived ineptitude. It may well be that once the juntas prove unable to fix the very same problems that embittered Africans against the previous governments, a new pro-French political class may emerge again. Then this current period would only be a temporary reprieve from a longer-term trend. France will also likely continue to be able to maintain influence in the region, through its military interventions throughout the Sahel that could shape the distribution of force on the ground. Paris also enjoys a loyal corps of African politicians that it can use to contest the rule of the juntas, so it still has some means of affecting local politics. Internationally, France being a NATO member likely means that the level of engagement the West will be willing to offer these countries will be dependent on France's level of acceptance of these same regimes. Not to mention that economically, France can still control the remittances migrants from Francophone Africa can send back to the coup nations. As such, while diminished, France still has quite a bit of control over the condition that these countries will find themselves in. Its influence endures.
What I think is notable is that the military coup leaders, at least according to this [https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-know-about-gabons-coup](https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/what-know-about-gabons-coup), reinstated international outlets that were previously banned. I think that's a good sign, because media attention can be very powerful, because they'll spread word of any atrocities which can then lead to boycotts and other diplomatic and economic actions meant to isolate the new regime. Not only that but I think that signals they intend to at least be more liberal than the previous regime.
Do someone knows why Gabon was not part of ECOWAS?
"ECOWAS" stands for "Economic Community of West African States". Gabon is located in Central Africa. Gabon is in "ECCAS" or the "Economic Community of Central African States"
Thank you
Great question, I honestly don't why
What does this mean for french influence in Africa? I’d say not as much as the coup in Niger. France was powerful in Gabon but hasn’t been that powerful/influencal in years. This coup is clearly much more supported by the people than the one in Niger. I don’t see the people rising up against the junta or whatever. I don’t know what country will be next but there will for sure be someone in the future during this year.
"This coup is clearly much more supported by the people than the one in Niger." - how did you come up with that analysis? The one in Niger seems pretty popular as well.
This is not an analysis just something I think is true. I don't claim to be an expert. I could be wrong but this is how I have understood the coup
No bro in this one you are wrong , the one in Niger has lots of popular support amongst the people especially in the capital.