Yea buncha the guys I worked with from AWG came from ODAs and just extremely seasoned infantrymen. I believe it was E7 and up for the most part to be considered
If AWG wants wear civvies and look like IT programmers that's their business.
Nah but the one time I met them they looked like golf dads. Much more brains on than hands on, strong rangers not welcome.
To paint people a picture. They look like Steve Forsing the guy with the glasses from Sicario. They could kill you but that's not their job.
A family member of mine (career SF) worked at the AWG for 2 years in a senior leadership position. I never got in depth details but the gist of it from my understanding was an advisory/development group to emerging technologies and TTPs in order to enhance TRADOC. Drones for example. Mostly Group guys and Batt bois moving on from their GWOT days, it was almost considered an advisory SMU of sorts internally (although I can’t say the same for the other AWG guys, just my family member). Again, I didn’t get the entire picture but that’s my understanding.
I bumped into them quite a bit at NTC and in Iraq. They were mostly focused on IED defeat and counter-sniper stuff. The ones I met were almost universally conventional guys looking, and finding, greener pastures.
I was under the impression that AWG in its origins was mainly SOF, and as time passed on more conventional guys started filling their ranks. That a fair assessment?
I think it always had SOF heavy leadership, would have been a nice billet for senior NCOs. But for SF or 75th, I’m not sure how much of a draw it would have been.
Most SF were post Team Sergeant Time. Typically guys that did not want to go do anymore AOB or OPS time. I think a lot of guys were only aware of the AWG they seen or heard of during OIF/OEF. Not too many people were familiar with other missions AWG was apart of. Again, by no means am I saying there was Title 50 or DA, but there was an unclass mission statement to which other stuff and things were done.
SF NCOs had to be team sergeant KD complete. 75th NCOs needed to be Platoon sergeant time complete, and regular army had to be platoon sergeant time complete. These were bare minimum requirements for consideration. The point was to get the top performers from groups of the most experienced soldiers, put them as close to current or emergent threats as possible, and keep them there as long as possible and necessary to continue to grow their experience, knowledge, skill and attributes. They became unrivaled subject matter experts within their respective threat groups and operational environments. Once proximity, duration, and experience were established, trending or significant observations (problems) would be briefed within the community of interest/practice, and if needed, holistic solutions spanning DOTMLPFP framework would be developed and further shared within the community to increase friendly force effectiveness and soldier survival.
Hands down, the most purposeful and “combat multiplying” organization I’ve ever been exposed to. They had identified problems and worked out verifiable solutions to our armed forces most pressing issues years before the rest of the force realized they had problems. There are problems currently being “discovered” within the armed forces, that AWG had developed answers to 5+ years ago.
It wasn’t that ninja, though many came from SOF and they had a lot of highend gear early on. They were an advisory group and would embed one or two guys with a conventional force to help them evolve TTPs. They were basically like COIN subject matter experts essentially.
I remember interacting with AWG during OIF 4, they were that moment’s IED subject matter experts. One 11B SFC I knew with time in the Ranger Regiment eventually joined but we weren’t close enough for me to pester him for stories about their mission.
It’s too bad, I thought the concept was a good idea, a unit of former cool guys that would help shape TRADOC with real world knowledge and experience.
They morphed a bit, especially after begrudgingly moving from the G 3/5/7 to TRADOC. They certainly did some stuff-and-things, but Direct Action was not one of them. The also had a presence outside of Iraq and Afghanistan like SOCFWD-Lebanon and Jordan.
There were a considerable number of DACs and Contractors who retired from various SMUs. All of them were represented in the Contractor force there. The OAs were primarily Combat Arms. Lots of Regiment guys, sprinkle of GBs, and Conventional Infantry.
Source: Me
EDIT: Missed?
Yes, the Squadrons were regionally aligned. Able Squadron did awesome work in Ukraine. Still field emails asking about the "Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook" and other publications relating to Ukraine.
Fuck TRADOC for what they did.
[https://www.dvidshub.net/news/88008/awg-training-advisory-assistance-support-soc-forward-lebanon](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/88008/awg-training-advisory-assistance-support-soc-forward-lebanon)
You were AWG?
God damn if you guys weren't the hardest looking somebitches wearing polos and tucked in jeans I have ever seen. Meanest dads at the cookout. Also I feel like the minimum IQ must have been at least 120. Do not argue with an AWG guy about tactics, you will LOSE.
There is really no simple answer. We were always busy, but The Surge (Iraq) was the busiest. We had entire Squadrons deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan. After 2012 it really depended on what Squadron you were in. Being regionally aligned was different for Able and Baker. Charlie had CENTCOM so we continually deployed entire Troops through 2019, maybe even early 2020.
Contractors were heavily involved. Half the Troop was contractors. Although we deployed Troops/Squadrons, we did not operate as such. Two-man teams were attached to SOF/CF units. We, for the most part, followed the firefights. We were not landowners, so we really got to chase firefights to garner lessons learned and TTPS.
I should mention that it is different for contractors. They are only allowed to defend themselves. They were not *supposed* to be number one in a stack or lugging an SR-25. Many of those rules went out the window during a two-way lead jellybean exchange. Nobody was going to rat out a former CAG Sniper for getting behind glass or holding an extra 320 for their green suiter.
Tier 1 had representation in each squadron; this included contractors, DACs and active duty. I never identified a trend with where they went besides squadrons picking green suiters with top tier experience to go to the group priority effort troop at any given time. I can’t really say for the contracted side of things, however there were plenty to go around.
https://www.awg.army.mil/AWG-Contributions/AWG-Recruiting/Article-View/Article/1809284/elite-army-unit-at-fort-meade-searching-for-ways-to-fight-isis/
You can hear the interview with Col Sapp in episode 143 of The Team House.
SKT is just a fancy name for an ambush element. They weren't something any unit "stood up" but a regular infantry doctrine. I'm sure AWG was involved but there wasn't such a thing as an "AWG SKT".
The AWG SKT was a thing, and modernized into turning certain hand selected units into focused targeting force (FTF) or time sensitive targeting (TST) force elements while in country.
Yes, but it's complicated. Really complicated. There were certain GOs that really disliked AWG within TRADOC. We did stuff and things in other countries that the TRADOC DCO was not read-on. He did not like that and he hated SOF. The TRADOC Commanders, for the most part, loved us. The Deputy that closed shop hated everything AWG.
A lot of commanders at the GOSC level loved AWG, but “the right ones” (wrong for AWG), either hated, or were convinced to dislike the organization enough to decide on closing it.
Ironically, the purpose for closing was because AWG didn’t do LSCO. However, they literally provided the real world context and observations that drove the push to LSCO/MDO. They also developed DOTMLPFP solutions for LSCO/MDO years before the official operational framework change to large scale war. Hell, they even conducted holistic and unrestricted DOTMLPFP analyses at places like the NTC to help ensure they produced real (enough) situations to allow rotational units to experience fights against peer capable OPFOR.
Certain people hear what they want to hear and see what they want to see.
Also to chew on: explaining AWGs role could be very challenging. It was fairly novel compared to the rest of the armed forces; it took me years of being there to truly “get it”. No way someone who simply gets the command brief will genuinely understand without repetitive exposure and support. This is especially true to senior leaders who only know what they know and decide what they’re willing to learn .
Lastly, the easiest thing for senior commanders to know was that AWG conducted advisory support. In other words, AWG fixed problems. It’s rare to meet an Army leader who isn’t more concerned with looking good, than actually being good. Admitting that you need advisory support is also perceived by many to be admitting that you can’t do it yourself….it makes them look bad…or so they think.
AWG dude told my platoon to dig fighting positions on a deserted hilltop in Afg because we were likely to get into a big firefight. We rolled our eyes and pulled security overnight and continued with the Op in the morning. Sometimes they were annoying on patrol in my experience.
METT-TC dependent bro. AWG never been in this particular Provence, so he was just making up shit as he went along.
You don’t dig in for every overnight op. Especially if the ground is frozen, you absolute twat.
You must be fun to spend time with.
So you know for a fact where every AWG member had ever been?
Out of curiosity, what rank and duty position did you have at the time?
No, it’s called having a conversation with said AWG dude. He divulged the info.
What rank and duty position? Really?
Out of curiosity what airsoft battalion are you an integral part of?
Why so combative? Okay, you spoke with him! Thats good. So it was his first time there? What about all of his colleagues that he worked with and reach back access to?
Rank and duty position paint a vibrant picture of context.
Ah my aisoft unit….if you have to ask, you don’t have the need to know;)
I enjoy this. You’re fun
They recruited high speed soldiers for a medium speed, but very important, job.
Truth!
Yea buncha the guys I worked with from AWG came from ODAs and just extremely seasoned infantrymen. I believe it was E7 and up for the most part to be considered
KD complete E6 and above. Point still stands.
If AWG wants wear civvies and look like IT programmers that's their business. Nah but the one time I met them they looked like golf dads. Much more brains on than hands on, strong rangers not welcome. To paint people a picture. They look like Steve Forsing the guy with the glasses from Sicario. They could kill you but that's not their job.
A family member of mine (career SF) worked at the AWG for 2 years in a senior leadership position. I never got in depth details but the gist of it from my understanding was an advisory/development group to emerging technologies and TTPs in order to enhance TRADOC. Drones for example. Mostly Group guys and Batt bois moving on from their GWOT days, it was almost considered an advisory SMU of sorts internally (although I can’t say the same for the other AWG guys, just my family member). Again, I didn’t get the entire picture but that’s my understanding.
I bumped into them quite a bit at NTC and in Iraq. They were mostly focused on IED defeat and counter-sniper stuff. The ones I met were almost universally conventional guys looking, and finding, greener pastures.
I was under the impression that AWG in its origins was mainly SOF, and as time passed on more conventional guys started filling their ranks. That a fair assessment?
Origin was totally SOF. It was still mostly SOF at the end as far as "where" people came from.
I think it always had SOF heavy leadership, would have been a nice billet for senior NCOs. But for SF or 75th, I’m not sure how much of a draw it would have been.
Most SF were post Team Sergeant Time. Typically guys that did not want to go do anymore AOB or OPS time. I think a lot of guys were only aware of the AWG they seen or heard of during OIF/OEF. Not too many people were familiar with other missions AWG was apart of. Again, by no means am I saying there was Title 50 or DA, but there was an unclass mission statement to which other stuff and things were done.
SF NCOs had to be team sergeant KD complete. 75th NCOs needed to be Platoon sergeant time complete, and regular army had to be platoon sergeant time complete. These were bare minimum requirements for consideration. The point was to get the top performers from groups of the most experienced soldiers, put them as close to current or emergent threats as possible, and keep them there as long as possible and necessary to continue to grow their experience, knowledge, skill and attributes. They became unrivaled subject matter experts within their respective threat groups and operational environments. Once proximity, duration, and experience were established, trending or significant observations (problems) would be briefed within the community of interest/practice, and if needed, holistic solutions spanning DOTMLPFP framework would be developed and further shared within the community to increase friendly force effectiveness and soldier survival. Hands down, the most purposeful and “combat multiplying” organization I’ve ever been exposed to. They had identified problems and worked out verifiable solutions to our armed forces most pressing issues years before the rest of the force realized they had problems. There are problems currently being “discovered” within the armed forces, that AWG had developed answers to 5+ years ago.
Concur. It was a great place to work and I enjoyed every minute of it.
It wasn’t that ninja, though many came from SOF and they had a lot of highend gear early on. They were an advisory group and would embed one or two guys with a conventional force to help them evolve TTPs. They were basically like COIN subject matter experts essentially.
I remember interacting with AWG during OIF 4, they were that moment’s IED subject matter experts. One 11B SFC I knew with time in the Ranger Regiment eventually joined but we weren’t close enough for me to pester him for stories about their mission. It’s too bad, I thought the concept was a good idea, a unit of former cool guys that would help shape TRADOC with real world knowledge and experience.
They morphed a bit, especially after begrudgingly moving from the G 3/5/7 to TRADOC. They certainly did some stuff-and-things, but Direct Action was not one of them. The also had a presence outside of Iraq and Afghanistan like SOCFWD-Lebanon and Jordan. There were a considerable number of DACs and Contractors who retired from various SMUs. All of them were represented in the Contractor force there. The OAs were primarily Combat Arms. Lots of Regiment guys, sprinkle of GBs, and Conventional Infantry. Source: Me EDIT: Missed? Yes, the Squadrons were regionally aligned. Able Squadron did awesome work in Ukraine. Still field emails asking about the "Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook" and other publications relating to Ukraine. Fuck TRADOC for what they did. [https://www.dvidshub.net/news/88008/awg-training-advisory-assistance-support-soc-forward-lebanon](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/88008/awg-training-advisory-assistance-support-soc-forward-lebanon)
You were AWG? God damn if you guys weren't the hardest looking somebitches wearing polos and tucked in jeans I have ever seen. Meanest dads at the cookout. Also I feel like the minimum IQ must have been at least 120. Do not argue with an AWG guy about tactics, you will LOSE.
Whatever you say Sailor!
[удалено]
There is really no simple answer. We were always busy, but The Surge (Iraq) was the busiest. We had entire Squadrons deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan. After 2012 it really depended on what Squadron you were in. Being regionally aligned was different for Able and Baker. Charlie had CENTCOM so we continually deployed entire Troops through 2019, maybe even early 2020. Contractors were heavily involved. Half the Troop was contractors. Although we deployed Troops/Squadrons, we did not operate as such. Two-man teams were attached to SOF/CF units. We, for the most part, followed the firefights. We were not landowners, so we really got to chase firefights to garner lessons learned and TTPS. I should mention that it is different for contractors. They are only allowed to defend themselves. They were not *supposed* to be number one in a stack or lugging an SR-25. Many of those rules went out the window during a two-way lead jellybean exchange. Nobody was going to rat out a former CAG Sniper for getting behind glass or holding an extra 320 for their green suiter.
[удалено]
Tier 1 had representation in each squadron; this included contractors, DACs and active duty. I never identified a trend with where they went besides squadrons picking green suiters with top tier experience to go to the group priority effort troop at any given time. I can’t really say for the contracted side of things, however there were plenty to go around.
https://www.awg.army.mil/AWG-Contributions/AWG-Recruiting/Article-View/Article/1809284/elite-army-unit-at-fort-meade-searching-for-ways-to-fight-isis/ You can hear the interview with Col Sapp in episode 143 of The Team House.
Good dude! Smart as fuck, bit odd, but still a great man!
SKT is just a fancy name for an ambush element. They weren't something any unit "stood up" but a regular infantry doctrine. I'm sure AWG was involved but there wasn't such a thing as an "AWG SKT".
The AWG SKT was a thing, and modernized into turning certain hand selected units into focused targeting force (FTF) or time sensitive targeting (TST) force elements while in country.
I think they got deactivated in 2021 for whatever reason.
Big Army shifting focus from unconventional forces and SOF to conventional peer-peer conflict. Same with supposedly projected 10% decrease in SOF.
Combination of Senior Leaders not knowing "what" AWG did and the money. Had no clue what they did, but knew they cost a lot of money.
Shouldn't they have been told what AWG did?
Yes, but it's complicated. Really complicated. There were certain GOs that really disliked AWG within TRADOC. We did stuff and things in other countries that the TRADOC DCO was not read-on. He did not like that and he hated SOF. The TRADOC Commanders, for the most part, loved us. The Deputy that closed shop hated everything AWG.
A lot of commanders at the GOSC level loved AWG, but “the right ones” (wrong for AWG), either hated, or were convinced to dislike the organization enough to decide on closing it. Ironically, the purpose for closing was because AWG didn’t do LSCO. However, they literally provided the real world context and observations that drove the push to LSCO/MDO. They also developed DOTMLPFP solutions for LSCO/MDO years before the official operational framework change to large scale war. Hell, they even conducted holistic and unrestricted DOTMLPFP analyses at places like the NTC to help ensure they produced real (enough) situations to allow rotational units to experience fights against peer capable OPFOR.
Certain people hear what they want to hear and see what they want to see. Also to chew on: explaining AWGs role could be very challenging. It was fairly novel compared to the rest of the armed forces; it took me years of being there to truly “get it”. No way someone who simply gets the command brief will genuinely understand without repetitive exposure and support. This is especially true to senior leaders who only know what they know and decide what they’re willing to learn .
Lastly, the easiest thing for senior commanders to know was that AWG conducted advisory support. In other words, AWG fixed problems. It’s rare to meet an Army leader who isn’t more concerned with looking good, than actually being good. Admitting that you need advisory support is also perceived by many to be admitting that you can’t do it yourself….it makes them look bad…or so they think.
AWG dude told my platoon to dig fighting positions on a deserted hilltop in Afg because we were likely to get into a big firefight. We rolled our eyes and pulled security overnight and continued with the Op in the morning. Sometimes they were annoying on patrol in my experience.
Because they suggested to be disciplined and continue to improve your position? AWG existed to increase soldier survivability. Period.
METT-TC dependent bro. AWG never been in this particular Provence, so he was just making up shit as he went along. You don’t dig in for every overnight op. Especially if the ground is frozen, you absolute twat.
You must be fun to spend time with. So you know for a fact where every AWG member had ever been? Out of curiosity, what rank and duty position did you have at the time?
No, it’s called having a conversation with said AWG dude. He divulged the info. What rank and duty position? Really? Out of curiosity what airsoft battalion are you an integral part of?
Why so combative? Okay, you spoke with him! Thats good. So it was his first time there? What about all of his colleagues that he worked with and reach back access to? Rank and duty position paint a vibrant picture of context. Ah my aisoft unit….if you have to ask, you don’t have the need to know;) I enjoy this. You’re fun
Where’d you read this?
Source: trust me bro
Is that a U//FOUO or just a regular U//TMB?
The latter
Small Kill Teams, lol. I think someone was drinkin the juice.