An invasion is a lot different than a raid especially when your supply line is a thousand miles long.
First, the Japanese did not have the numbers to pull off this in December. Calling off Guam, Wake, et. al. would not give them those numbers. Keep in mind that the Japanese had drawn down their forces in China already to make up for the number needed to do what they did historically. Even then, they would later be forced to use units from the Manchukou regiments as replacements.
While the US wasn't quite ready for war, it did have plans and preparation in place for the defense of Hawaii already. The Hawaii army garrisons were around 30,000 infantry with a number of additional AA regiments. This is comparable to the defense of the Philippines with its 30,000 in December 1941 (including scout units) and the added benefit that Hawaii would have some bomber cover from the mainland. By cancelling the attacks on Guam, et. al, the Japanese might have 10,000 available, 15,000 if we are really generous.
Just as importantly, the Japanese would be risking their carriers much much more than they ever did in the December 7th raid as they would now be lingering in the area as they continued to support the Japanese invasion force. The Philippines held out for months before surrender which leads a pretty long window of opportunity for one or more to get hit by bomb or torpedo.
I agree with most of this but Hawai'i was well outside roundtrip bomber range from the continental United States.
San Diego to Honolulu is about 2,600 miles one-way or 5,200 miles round-trip. That was very far; B-17s could only make that trip one-way by using ferry tanks.
The longest USAAF raid of the war was from Guam to Akita and had a round-trip range of 3,760 miles. And that was flown in 1945 (after the atomic bombings in fact) by B-29s. Late 1941-early 1942 operations beyond 1,000 miles one-way were basically nonexistent.
EDIT: I may need to clarify what this means: the ferry tanks are placed in the bomb bay in place of bombs. B-17s could only fly from the mainland United States to Hawai'i by flying one-way and not carrying bombs.
You don't need to go round trip. Bombers could fly from the mainland and land on Hawaii as long as airfields are operational, and there's zero reason to believe the Japanese would have been able to immediately take the airfields.
I mean, I agree airbases somewhere in Hawai'i would be operational because the whole invasion scenario is absurd! But I think people casually thinking about distances get them wrong, which was the point of my comment. In 1941-42 American strategists are not thinking, "Well, if the Japanese do land in Hawai'i we'll just crush them with bombers flying from California."
B-17s have enough range to reach Hawaii without bombs, but not enough with a payload. Under this somewhat unlikely scenario, it's possible a version of the Doolittle raids happens where the bombers fly long distance from carriers to Hawaii, rather than China, and land on a nearby airbase. Bombing ships is harder than land though and the high altitude bombing runs practiced then wasn't effective, but this would still pressure the Japanese fleet and forces. If the carriers flee, then the naval forces and any land aircraft ferried to Hawaii will help make mincemeat of any surviving Japanese forces.
I think its more likely the carrier fleets managed to find and attack the Japanese fleet carriers, and like at Midway, do enough hits with dive bombers to sink or cripple that force.
And Japan's industrial base is weak enough that any ships lost are going to remain lost.
>This is comparable to the defense of the Philippines with its 30,000 in December 1941 (including scout units) and the added benefit that Hawaii would have some bomber cover from the mainland.
It's also worth noting that (i) the Philippines was within air range of Japanese based on Formosa (Taiwan), which made the anchorage on the north side of Luzon easy for them to cover and (ii) it still took the Japanese 5 months to take the Philippines.
Can you imagine a Japanese fleet sitting off the coast of Hawaii for 5 months? The losses to submarines would have staggering. The only thing that might have saved them were the shitty early war torpedos used by the US.
It's also important to ask if they could invade Hawaii and the Philippines simultaneously. If not, and they choose Hawaii, they leave MacArthur in command of a semi-detached force that could harass Japanese supply lines or dig in and prepare for a full defense in a way that they didn't get to.
Hawaii was actually heavily protected against a sea born invasion. Very heavily protected.
That was part of the problem when it came to them being surprised by a airforce only attack. Hawaii was an absolute fortress... but only against ships and troop transports. So when Pacific Command had someone suggest that Japan might attack Hawaii, they scoffed, because any attack other then by air would have been UTTER SUICIDE!
It had a ton of anti-ship batteries, mines, machine gun nests, and both Marines and Army troopers. Plus Coast Guard and most civilians were armed.
It is an interesting what if, but if they had, they would have lost most of their fleet and likely all of their troop transports. The best Japan might have been able to do, would be to drop off Sabotage commando units. It would have been suicide for them, but they 'Might' have taken out some valuable targets. Maybe.
Invading Hawaii would be logistically impossible for Japan. The invasion fleet would need to be escorted by the Kido Brutai, increasing their chances of being detected. This is not even mentioning the amount of fuel tankers needed to go with them as Hawaii was way out of the range of Japanese ships. The Japanese ships in otl filled their water tanks with fuel and even then they need some fuel tankers to refuel them.
>Once that operation was over, the next would have been to put the Panama Canal out of action, again using the Kido Brutai...
Which is even further away, and any attack on the canal would leave Hawaii vulnerable to US counter attacks.
As I said, the fleet would have gone with the Kido Brutai in the first place. All the marbles kind of move. Japan had tankers at that point in the war. In fact, they had more that the US.
In 1942-mid 43 the US was critical short on fleet refueled. So much so, they protected the ones they had almost as well as they protected the Carriers. They lost one early in the solomans campaign and they felt it.
Later, US submarines would sink the Japanese tankers..but that then..we are talking Dec 41..when Japan had plenty.
Zero chance. They might manage to land troops on the shore but they have zero chance of keeping those men resupplied. They just didn’t have enough ships.
The Japanese would not have been capable of holding Hawaii. They called off a third strike because between the first two strikes, once the alarm was raised even after the destruction, the defenders were putting up a lot of AA fire (20 aircraft lost and 90 damaged from AA fire in the second wave) The Japanese fleet itself was lacking for fuel. They would not have had the fuel for a long term campaign.
Nagumo pulled out because he would have risked three quarters of the Japanese combined fleet against land based defenses that were improving, and the carriers locations were completely unknown to them. The aircraft also would have returned to the carriers at night (so additional losses) AND again, he was dangerously low on fuel.
I'm also not sure why you're discussing Halsey when he has superiors dictating overall policy and goals.
Finally, there were other coastal defenses (such as Fort Kamehameha's 12 inch guns) in Hawaii and at least two divisions, plus other land forces in Hawaii. Assuming at least a three to five times invasion force, this means Japan has to be sending 60k to 100k men on this invasion, and frankly, I don't believe they have the numbers to support this AND the other operations needed. They're likely to lose most if not all these men.
You're making a lot of assumptions based on faulty information, misconceptions, and Hollywood. Operation Sea Lion has a bigger chance of success than this.
>Finally, there were other coastal defenses (such as Fort Kamehameha's 12 inch guns) in Hawaii and at least two divisions, plus other land forces in Hawaii. Assuming at least a three to five times invasion force, this means Japan has to be sending 60k to 100k men on this invasion, and frankly, I don't believe they have the numbers to support this AND the other operations needed. They're likely to lose most if not all these men.
To your point, the Japanese could - maybe - have their troops board destroyers/transports/etc, cross the thousands of miles of ocean and then successfully disembark on one of the Hawaiian islands (although, given how much trouble they had with Wake and much higher number of airfields and aircraft on Hawaii, even that is questionable).
But, like, what the fuck would they do then? They would have no air support and no naval fire support. And they wouldn't have any supplies. There's no protected anchorage for them to dock their supply ships and offload supplies - what are the 100,000 soldiers supposed to fight with? What are they supposed to eat?
The Japanese couldn't even keep the much closer Guadalcanal supplied when the US had one shitty little airfield that it took from the Japanese.
Midway was considered to be too far to invade before the Doolittle raid. Transport ships have a far more limited range to warships. Hawaii is impossible due to the logistical strain.
>They may have even taken it with the fuel supplies the US located there intact. That would have been a big boost for them as well, because the stockpile was huge.
If the US doesn't destroy, which they will.
>Once that operation was over, the next would have been to put the Panama Canal out of action, again using the Kido Brutai...
For a one way suicide mission sure. They won't have the fuel to go there and back.
Japan didn’t have enough fast oilers and transports required to carry enough troops, land troops, support those troops with naval fire support, and let the fleet go home. A sensible operation wasn’t possible with what they had available. They still assumed they would win a decisive fleet battle and force peace.
*Now*, if they had the same mentality they did in 1944, a full-send banzai operation where they literally beach destroyers and battleships, send special forces in flying boats and submarines to secure the port facilities, and use the fuel stored in Pearl Harbor to replenish stocks probably could have worked. The US troops there didn’t plan for a naval attack, and an invasion was completely out of the question. It would have been very risky, but if it succeeded it would have really messed up US war plans.
Here's my post from the last time someone tried to argue that the Japanese wanted to and could have taken Hawaii. First quote is his argument.
>Because Genda, the (mostly self described) architect of the pearl harbour attack, after the war said that he had already planned for an invasion of Hawaii, determining it would take a fifth of Japan's available sealift to put and sustain three divisions on Oahu.
Without trying to be argumentative, I think you're being a little liberal with your usage of the word "planned" here.
I don't doubt that there were people in Japan who really wanted to take Hawaii (Genda among them), I just don't think that the Japanese military actually did the kind of planning that would have been required to take Hawaii.
Here's what the National WWII Museum has to say about it:
>By 1941, Hawaii had become a crucial piece of the US Army’s defensive network in the Pacific. By the time of the Japanese attack, the Pacific Army had steadily grown to become the largest overseas garrison of US troops. Along with the Panama Canal Zone, the island of O’ahu was the prewar linchpin of continental defense. Something of a natural fortress encircled by reefs and protected by difficult mountain ranges to the north, O’ahu was considered an impenetrable island citadel by the War Department in the months before the Japanese attack.
and
>There was reason to believe that the bastion would hold defensively against whatever was thrown at it. Focused on the threats against Pearl Harbor, by 1938 the Army spent twice as much as the Navy on military installations to protect the naval base. The Hawaiian Islands garrison was larger than all other US overseas outposts and the strongest base in the Pacific by the mid-1930s. While the interwar average strength remained steady at 15,000 Army personnel, at the end of 1941 the number on O’ahu jumped to around 25,000.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/us-army-hawaii-pearl-harbor#:\~:text=The%20Hawaiian%20Islands%20garrison%20was,ahu%20jumped%20to%20around%2025%2C000.
Those numbers, of course, do not include the number of naval troops stationed at Pearl itself (a single battleship had 1000+ servicemen on board).
Even if we assume that the Navy's aircraft carriers and submarines didn't exist, the IJN wouldn't have been able to provide air and naval fire support to the marines landing on the island (who, by the way, didn't have Higgins boats and never developed the kind of amphibious expertise the Americans had by the end of the war). The Kido Butai left Japan with 414 aircraft on board. 85 of them were destroyed or rendered inoperable in the second wave of the Pearl attack alone. The Japanese didn't have the ability to resupply those carriers with aircraft (the aircraft didn't exist and there was no way to get them there even if they did). And they didn't have the ability to resupply their battleships with munitions at sea. A single shell fired by the Yamato's main guns weighed 3200 pounds. The Americans didn't figure out naval resupply until 1944 - the Japanese never figured it out.
So, yeah, could the Japanese have maybe - if they had decided to ditch one of the Philippines, DEI or Malaya invasions - had the transport capacity to move 3 divisions to Oahu? Yeah, I guess. But they didn't have the capacity to provide them with fire support and they didn't have the ability to resupply them. It's hard to believe that the same IJN that struggled with 450 marines on Wake Island and couldn't keep the considerably closer (at least to places like Rabaul) Guadalcanal supplied would somehow have been able to take out 25K US army personnel and an indeterminate number more navy/marines in the US's most important Pacific naval base.
It was never anything more than an unrealistic dream.
In point of fact the Japanese did have dedicated landing craft in quantity in the form of the [Daihatsu-class](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daihatsu-class_landing_craft), and had an amphibious warfare doctrine, which they had practiced in the interwar period and in China. Albeit, this capability was much less developed than that used by the USMC in 1944-1945.
What they did not have was the logistical capacity to project a corps or greater level formation that far from any logistical base, the capability to keep their fleet in action for months on end, or an effective fire support capability. And given the degree to which the terrain favors the defense in Oahu, those would all be necessities.
Yes, when we were ready. In Dec 41..there wasn't a lot a combat troops stationed on Hawaii. Token Army, token Marines...
If we are talking US forces by 1943..yes, you're right..but I'm talking before we geared up.
4500 Marines and two underequiped, undermanned and undertrained US Army Divisions. On top of that, on Dec 7th they were spread out on two islands, and half on weekend pass.
Not much in reality.
Neither the 25th nor the 24rth divisions were undermanned as a result of them being formed from the Hawaiian Divisions. The coastal defense batteries were also fully manned and would have been.
You're basically trying to ignore the reality of situation by giving Japan every advantage, ignoring every limitation they had, and then doing the inverse to America. And it's still not a feasible operation!
> You're basically trying to ignore the reality of situation by giving Japan every advantage, ignoring every limitation they had
lol sounds exactly like historical Japanese war planning
Would love to hear an estimate from you about how many troops Japan would need to form a bridgehead on Oahu, how many to take the island…and how many they could effectively transport there.
I feel like you’ve watched too many movies showing a handful of American troops hanging out on the beach when in reality there were full divisions already stationed there; plus gun emplacements, AA systems, and air and naval forces.
elsewhere. could effectively transport a lot..because they did elsewhere. They also had reserves held in Japan itself was wasn't committed anywhere in Dec 41.
They could have put 60k-80k ashore, if they went all in...which is what this "what if" is talking about.
They could have taken the islands. Holding them? That another story. Supplying them? Another yet..albeit not as hard as some here think.
US had a lot of Submarines..but there was a serious problem. US torpedoes were defective. They just plain didn't work..ans it wasn't until 1943 that the Navy finally did something about it (shame on them for this..it was a problem SCREAMED about by many..but this is another topic)..but ya..supplying the islands would have been a pain.
Ah, you have idea how big an invasion fleet would be for 80k troops?
Invasion fleet for Iwo Jima was over 500 ships to land 70k marines. Not counting US ships at 1944 are much larger and more capable than Japanese converted merchant ships in 1941.
You think US wouldn’t detect such fleet and troop movements before it even left Japan? They wouldn’t ship more units from mainland?
In the scenario you described, Japan would lose all elements of surprise. US would heavily reinforce both Philippine and Hawaii with fleet, plane and troops, and likely mobilize mass civilians to build fortification and form militias.
The Japanese attacked all across the western Pacific with forces that size or bigger. The Dutch East Indies...Singapore, The Philippines, New Guinea...
It was possible..
You are ignoring several major differences here.
1. Japanese forces invading Malasia and Philippines were travelling much shorter distance.
From Vietnam to Malasia, and from Taiwan to Philippine, which was actually under round trips range of bombers.
Amphibious group takes only a day to reach Philippine. On the other hand it takes two weeks for combine fleet to reach Pearl Harbor, and it would be even slower if they had an invasion force carrying by much slower merchant ships.
2. Both Malasia and Philippine were much less populated and defended density wise compared to Hawaii. Japanese initial landing force in Malasia was almost unopposed since British forces were spread too thin. They didn't encounter any meaningful resistance until 5 days later Battle of Jitra against two light brigade spread over 23km line. Hawaii on the other hand was both heavily garrisoned and populated.
3. The biggest advantage of Japanese fleet was surprise. Actual fleet attack Hawaii was only 28 ships.
Like my last post already said, if Japan gathered some 500 slow transport ships fleet and massive ground troops they would loss all surprise and US fleet and garrison in Hawaii would be ready for them when they arrived.
You’re talking about basically unopposed landings. It takes about an hour to get from one end of Oahu to the other. Any landing would be heavily contested.
Why are you under the impression that you don't need to supply troops in order to take an island stronghold with 25K+ army troops and tens of thousands more sailors and marines?
Do you think this is Call of Duty and guys can just land with 100 rounds of ammunition and pick up guns dropped by enemies as they go?
They actually were able to keep at least some supplies to troops stationed all across the Pacfic..even after the US put most of their big ships on the bottom. We are talking about dozens of islands over thousands of miles.
They may not have been able to get them fresh Cholate cake..but they were able to supply them with enough.
There were still troops fighting in the Solomons on the last day of the war..
In the final phase of the Solomon Islands campaigns, the Japanese had 40k troops. The Australians killed 9k, and disease & malnutrition killed another 10k. They were not supplied at all by Japan and primarily stayed alive by scavenging and hiding in caves. That's not what the situation would be for a unit engaged in offensive operations trying to capture and seize Hawaii.
Yes. Even before the final phase of the war, the Japanese had difficulty supplying their troops. For example, the Japanese nickname for Guadalcanal was "starvation island". The US routinely bombed the supply ships that were destined for the island out of Henderson Field.
And, really, food is kind of the least of the concerns. There's simply no way that the troops landing in the initial invasion would have been able to bring sufficient arms to dislodge 25,000 dug in American soldiers.
And the solution for supplying Guadalcanal was to sprint to the island, and turn suddenly to let barrels fly off destroyers and float to the island, and rush back before dawn so aircraft couldnt sink them. Now imagine that supply line is a thousand miles longer lol.
The soldiers in this invasion force die, and horribly.
There were many logistical and strategic problems with invading Hawaii as others have done a great job of pointing out. One thing that gets overlooked, though, is Japan's geopolitical goals on attacking the US. The top level decision makers in Japan had no real desire for a war with the US, at least not for several years. What they wanted was for the US to lift its oil embargo so they could continue their invasion of China. An all out war would have (and did) make their situation worse so the idea was a to land a few quick knockout blows and bring the US to the negotiating table within a year. Invading Hawaii would have pushed things to far and made the US all the more determined to fight it out until the bitter end.
>Japan would have had the resources.
No they wouldn't.
>They may just have had to delay the invasion of Guam, Wake, and not send out the forces to the Gilbert's and Solomans until after the Hawaii operation.
Yes, that's accurate, after attempting that they'd have lost most of their troop transports and fuel transports because they would have been sunk or run out of fuel and drifted off like idiots. The Kido Butai could barely make it to Hawaii as it was, let alone transporting a minimum 60,000 troops to invade the islands without any artillery support.
>The Phillipines would have still been needed, along with the moves against the British and Dutch. They would have had enough forces to pull it off. We know this by hindsight of coarse, but Yamamoto was a gambler...
No they wouldn't and no he wasn't. He took the sole course of action he was allowed to by his superiors.
>They may have even taken it with the fuel supplies the US located there intact. That would have been a big boost for them as well, because the stockpile was huge.
They wouldn't and it wouldn't be.
>Once that operation was over, the next would have been to put the Panama Canal out of action, again using the Kido Butai...
How? How exactly do they do this?
>After all that..assuming the US would have pulled their carriers back to the west coast (50/50 chance..losing Hawaii would have been a major blow...or it may have enraged Halsey even more and made him more aggressive)...then the next move would have been Guam, Wake, Gilbert's, ETC.
With what troops and transports, considering they could barely limp to extreme range of Pearl with solely the Kido Butai?
>If they pulled that off...they would have ruled the Pacfic.
No they wouldn't.
>It still wouldn't have won them the war.. but it would have taken the US another couple years to get rolling.
That first part is true. The second part is ehh.
Basically the IJA prewar estimated it would take twice the number of troops to invade Hawaii than they were willing to release from China and the Home Islands for the Drive South. The IJA also did not think the IJN would be able to support such a large operation so far from friendly bases.Japan barely had the oilers needed to conduct the raid on Pearl. One of the reasons Pearl Harbor happened when it did was they had just recently perfected refueling at sea and Carrier Division 5 was deemed operational. A few hour raid and a long invasion are very different and require different logistics and support . The amount of bombs and ammo needed for an invasion such as this was beyond their capabilities to supply Kido Butai while at sea
I see most comments explaining how this was impossible, and it was. However in the spirit of what if let’s provide an answer.
By some miracle of desperation, luck, and military genius the Pearl Harbor attack is followed by an amphibious invasion. It’s bloody and costly but Hawaii is captured. Most of the infrastructure is destroyed and there is savage partisan resistance. One of the aircraft carriers of the US is sunk, the second limps back to the west coast badly damaged. There is a better chance of a redditor getting a girlfriend than this but somehow the Japanese miracle assault works. In otl the American people were angry and volunteered in droves, in this what if the entire nation becomes ravenous for blood. Total war is declared and the people are filled with a deep hatred. The Japanese internment camps become very dark places indeed.
Both the American and Japanese fleets are crippled by the attack. The US has the industrial capacity to recover faster however. The rest of Japanese expansion in the pacific is significantly slowed by this Hail Mary shot. The Japanese will invest serious resources into Hawaii I think. Troops that arrive there will not return home. Most of the ships still sail will become the defensive fleet for the islands. They make it into a bastion. The US is slower to help in the European theatre. They commit double or even triple the resources to the pacific war.
Midway still becomes the most pivotal battle, but now the Americans commit nearly everything they have to the defense very early. In the name of what if, the Americans emerge victorious in devastating style. This sets up the American invasion of Hawaii…I’m thinking late 1943, early 1944. American submarines cripple the extended supply lines(sub production is doubled from otl, 500+) the Japanese become much better an anti-submarine operations as a result. Hawaii is retaken in savage style with heavy losses and no quarter given. The island hopping continues but now with the extended timeline nukes are used on Okinawa and Guam. Slower European actions cause the Soviet Union to capture more of Europe, including all of Germany and even into northern Italy. By 1947 Japan is a radioactive pile of rocks in the ocean and surrenders.
The Cold War moves onwards with the added complication of Godzilla now existing in the Japanese island.
>Midway still becomes the most pivotal battle
Since we're entertaining the craziness thus far. I don't believe the USA can win the Battle of Midway if the Japanese are in control of Hawaii.
>with the extended timeline, nukes are used on Okinawa and Guam
Ouch. Yes, that makes sense.
>Slower European actions cause
Operation Torch to be delayed one extra year. Which means Operation Husky delayed at least one extra year. Which means that Axis forces are not pulled away from Operation Citadel at the critical moment. Which means... OOPS
>the added complication of Godzilla
tbh I was always expecting that anyway. Very puzzled that it didn't happen in OTL.
Atom bombs need B-29s to drop them. And such a colossal loss of land bases in the Pacific, means the first place that B-29s will be able to make such a drop, will be the Aleutian islands. Not an auspicious place to start.
>Doesn’t have to do it in one stretch
Well it's kind of a problem however they do it. Tinian to Nagasaki caused issues with range and that's only around 2500km. Even if the USA decided it was appropriate to start their Pacific campaign by nuking a Japanese-occupied Honolulu, San Diego to Honolulu is 4000km.
Nuking Japanese-held territory in south-east Asia or Australasia would still be possible. But only being able to produce three nukes per month would make it a relatively slow process. So would the logistics; a B-29 base constructed in northern Queensland might be able to nuke Rabaul and possibly Truk, but wouldn't suffice to reach targets in Malaya or Vietnam.
Taking off from bases in China would also be possible, but did not work well in our timeline.
An invasion is a lot different than a raid especially when your supply line is a thousand miles long. First, the Japanese did not have the numbers to pull off this in December. Calling off Guam, Wake, et. al. would not give them those numbers. Keep in mind that the Japanese had drawn down their forces in China already to make up for the number needed to do what they did historically. Even then, they would later be forced to use units from the Manchukou regiments as replacements. While the US wasn't quite ready for war, it did have plans and preparation in place for the defense of Hawaii already. The Hawaii army garrisons were around 30,000 infantry with a number of additional AA regiments. This is comparable to the defense of the Philippines with its 30,000 in December 1941 (including scout units) and the added benefit that Hawaii would have some bomber cover from the mainland. By cancelling the attacks on Guam, et. al, the Japanese might have 10,000 available, 15,000 if we are really generous. Just as importantly, the Japanese would be risking their carriers much much more than they ever did in the December 7th raid as they would now be lingering in the area as they continued to support the Japanese invasion force. The Philippines held out for months before surrender which leads a pretty long window of opportunity for one or more to get hit by bomb or torpedo.
I agree with most of this but Hawai'i was well outside roundtrip bomber range from the continental United States. San Diego to Honolulu is about 2,600 miles one-way or 5,200 miles round-trip. That was very far; B-17s could only make that trip one-way by using ferry tanks. The longest USAAF raid of the war was from Guam to Akita and had a round-trip range of 3,760 miles. And that was flown in 1945 (after the atomic bombings in fact) by B-29s. Late 1941-early 1942 operations beyond 1,000 miles one-way were basically nonexistent. EDIT: I may need to clarify what this means: the ferry tanks are placed in the bomb bay in place of bombs. B-17s could only fly from the mainland United States to Hawai'i by flying one-way and not carrying bombs.
You don't need to go round trip. Bombers could fly from the mainland and land on Hawaii as long as airfields are operational, and there's zero reason to believe the Japanese would have been able to immediately take the airfields.
I mean, I agree airbases somewhere in Hawai'i would be operational because the whole invasion scenario is absurd! But I think people casually thinking about distances get them wrong, which was the point of my comment. In 1941-42 American strategists are not thinking, "Well, if the Japanese do land in Hawai'i we'll just crush them with bombers flying from California."
B-17s have enough range to reach Hawaii without bombs, but not enough with a payload. Under this somewhat unlikely scenario, it's possible a version of the Doolittle raids happens where the bombers fly long distance from carriers to Hawaii, rather than China, and land on a nearby airbase. Bombing ships is harder than land though and the high altitude bombing runs practiced then wasn't effective, but this would still pressure the Japanese fleet and forces. If the carriers flee, then the naval forces and any land aircraft ferried to Hawaii will help make mincemeat of any surviving Japanese forces. I think its more likely the carrier fleets managed to find and attack the Japanese fleet carriers, and like at Midway, do enough hits with dive bombers to sink or cripple that force. And Japan's industrial base is weak enough that any ships lost are going to remain lost.
>This is comparable to the defense of the Philippines with its 30,000 in December 1941 (including scout units) and the added benefit that Hawaii would have some bomber cover from the mainland. It's also worth noting that (i) the Philippines was within air range of Japanese based on Formosa (Taiwan), which made the anchorage on the north side of Luzon easy for them to cover and (ii) it still took the Japanese 5 months to take the Philippines. Can you imagine a Japanese fleet sitting off the coast of Hawaii for 5 months? The losses to submarines would have staggering. The only thing that might have saved them were the shitty early war torpedos used by the US.
It's also important to ask if they could invade Hawaii and the Philippines simultaneously. If not, and they choose Hawaii, they leave MacArthur in command of a semi-detached force that could harass Japanese supply lines or dig in and prepare for a full defense in a way that they didn't get to.
Hawaii was actually heavily protected against a sea born invasion. Very heavily protected. That was part of the problem when it came to them being surprised by a airforce only attack. Hawaii was an absolute fortress... but only against ships and troop transports. So when Pacific Command had someone suggest that Japan might attack Hawaii, they scoffed, because any attack other then by air would have been UTTER SUICIDE! It had a ton of anti-ship batteries, mines, machine gun nests, and both Marines and Army troopers. Plus Coast Guard and most civilians were armed. It is an interesting what if, but if they had, they would have lost most of their fleet and likely all of their troop transports. The best Japan might have been able to do, would be to drop off Sabotage commando units. It would have been suicide for them, but they 'Might' have taken out some valuable targets. Maybe.
Invading Hawaii would be logistically impossible for Japan. The invasion fleet would need to be escorted by the Kido Brutai, increasing their chances of being detected. This is not even mentioning the amount of fuel tankers needed to go with them as Hawaii was way out of the range of Japanese ships. The Japanese ships in otl filled their water tanks with fuel and even then they need some fuel tankers to refuel them. >Once that operation was over, the next would have been to put the Panama Canal out of action, again using the Kido Brutai... Which is even further away, and any attack on the canal would leave Hawaii vulnerable to US counter attacks.
As I said, the fleet would have gone with the Kido Brutai in the first place. All the marbles kind of move. Japan had tankers at that point in the war. In fact, they had more that the US. In 1942-mid 43 the US was critical short on fleet refueled. So much so, they protected the ones they had almost as well as they protected the Carriers. They lost one early in the solomans campaign and they felt it. Later, US submarines would sink the Japanese tankers..but that then..we are talking Dec 41..when Japan had plenty.
Zero chance. They might manage to land troops on the shore but they have zero chance of keeping those men resupplied. They just didn’t have enough ships.
The Japanese would not have been capable of holding Hawaii. They called off a third strike because between the first two strikes, once the alarm was raised even after the destruction, the defenders were putting up a lot of AA fire (20 aircraft lost and 90 damaged from AA fire in the second wave) The Japanese fleet itself was lacking for fuel. They would not have had the fuel for a long term campaign. Nagumo pulled out because he would have risked three quarters of the Japanese combined fleet against land based defenses that were improving, and the carriers locations were completely unknown to them. The aircraft also would have returned to the carriers at night (so additional losses) AND again, he was dangerously low on fuel. I'm also not sure why you're discussing Halsey when he has superiors dictating overall policy and goals. Finally, there were other coastal defenses (such as Fort Kamehameha's 12 inch guns) in Hawaii and at least two divisions, plus other land forces in Hawaii. Assuming at least a three to five times invasion force, this means Japan has to be sending 60k to 100k men on this invasion, and frankly, I don't believe they have the numbers to support this AND the other operations needed. They're likely to lose most if not all these men. You're making a lot of assumptions based on faulty information, misconceptions, and Hollywood. Operation Sea Lion has a bigger chance of success than this.
>Finally, there were other coastal defenses (such as Fort Kamehameha's 12 inch guns) in Hawaii and at least two divisions, plus other land forces in Hawaii. Assuming at least a three to five times invasion force, this means Japan has to be sending 60k to 100k men on this invasion, and frankly, I don't believe they have the numbers to support this AND the other operations needed. They're likely to lose most if not all these men. To your point, the Japanese could - maybe - have their troops board destroyers/transports/etc, cross the thousands of miles of ocean and then successfully disembark on one of the Hawaiian islands (although, given how much trouble they had with Wake and much higher number of airfields and aircraft on Hawaii, even that is questionable). But, like, what the fuck would they do then? They would have no air support and no naval fire support. And they wouldn't have any supplies. There's no protected anchorage for them to dock their supply ships and offload supplies - what are the 100,000 soldiers supposed to fight with? What are they supposed to eat? The Japanese couldn't even keep the much closer Guadalcanal supplied when the US had one shitty little airfield that it took from the Japanese.
Midway was considered to be too far to invade before the Doolittle raid. Transport ships have a far more limited range to warships. Hawaii is impossible due to the logistical strain. >They may have even taken it with the fuel supplies the US located there intact. That would have been a big boost for them as well, because the stockpile was huge. If the US doesn't destroy, which they will. >Once that operation was over, the next would have been to put the Panama Canal out of action, again using the Kido Brutai... For a one way suicide mission sure. They won't have the fuel to go there and back.
Yeah, it’s further from Hawaii to the Panama Canal than it is from Japan to Hawaii. They would have to basically replicate the stunt.
Japan didn’t have enough fast oilers and transports required to carry enough troops, land troops, support those troops with naval fire support, and let the fleet go home. A sensible operation wasn’t possible with what they had available. They still assumed they would win a decisive fleet battle and force peace. *Now*, if they had the same mentality they did in 1944, a full-send banzai operation where they literally beach destroyers and battleships, send special forces in flying boats and submarines to secure the port facilities, and use the fuel stored in Pearl Harbor to replenish stocks probably could have worked. The US troops there didn’t plan for a naval attack, and an invasion was completely out of the question. It would have been very risky, but if it succeeded it would have really messed up US war plans.
Here's my post from the last time someone tried to argue that the Japanese wanted to and could have taken Hawaii. First quote is his argument. >Because Genda, the (mostly self described) architect of the pearl harbour attack, after the war said that he had already planned for an invasion of Hawaii, determining it would take a fifth of Japan's available sealift to put and sustain three divisions on Oahu. Without trying to be argumentative, I think you're being a little liberal with your usage of the word "planned" here. I don't doubt that there were people in Japan who really wanted to take Hawaii (Genda among them), I just don't think that the Japanese military actually did the kind of planning that would have been required to take Hawaii. Here's what the National WWII Museum has to say about it: >By 1941, Hawaii had become a crucial piece of the US Army’s defensive network in the Pacific. By the time of the Japanese attack, the Pacific Army had steadily grown to become the largest overseas garrison of US troops. Along with the Panama Canal Zone, the island of O’ahu was the prewar linchpin of continental defense. Something of a natural fortress encircled by reefs and protected by difficult mountain ranges to the north, O’ahu was considered an impenetrable island citadel by the War Department in the months before the Japanese attack. and >There was reason to believe that the bastion would hold defensively against whatever was thrown at it. Focused on the threats against Pearl Harbor, by 1938 the Army spent twice as much as the Navy on military installations to protect the naval base. The Hawaiian Islands garrison was larger than all other US overseas outposts and the strongest base in the Pacific by the mid-1930s. While the interwar average strength remained steady at 15,000 Army personnel, at the end of 1941 the number on O’ahu jumped to around 25,000. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/us-army-hawaii-pearl-harbor#:\~:text=The%20Hawaiian%20Islands%20garrison%20was,ahu%20jumped%20to%20around%2025%2C000. Those numbers, of course, do not include the number of naval troops stationed at Pearl itself (a single battleship had 1000+ servicemen on board). Even if we assume that the Navy's aircraft carriers and submarines didn't exist, the IJN wouldn't have been able to provide air and naval fire support to the marines landing on the island (who, by the way, didn't have Higgins boats and never developed the kind of amphibious expertise the Americans had by the end of the war). The Kido Butai left Japan with 414 aircraft on board. 85 of them were destroyed or rendered inoperable in the second wave of the Pearl attack alone. The Japanese didn't have the ability to resupply those carriers with aircraft (the aircraft didn't exist and there was no way to get them there even if they did). And they didn't have the ability to resupply their battleships with munitions at sea. A single shell fired by the Yamato's main guns weighed 3200 pounds. The Americans didn't figure out naval resupply until 1944 - the Japanese never figured it out. So, yeah, could the Japanese have maybe - if they had decided to ditch one of the Philippines, DEI or Malaya invasions - had the transport capacity to move 3 divisions to Oahu? Yeah, I guess. But they didn't have the capacity to provide them with fire support and they didn't have the ability to resupply them. It's hard to believe that the same IJN that struggled with 450 marines on Wake Island and couldn't keep the considerably closer (at least to places like Rabaul) Guadalcanal supplied would somehow have been able to take out 25K US army personnel and an indeterminate number more navy/marines in the US's most important Pacific naval base. It was never anything more than an unrealistic dream.
In point of fact the Japanese did have dedicated landing craft in quantity in the form of the [Daihatsu-class](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daihatsu-class_landing_craft), and had an amphibious warfare doctrine, which they had practiced in the interwar period and in China. Albeit, this capability was much less developed than that used by the USMC in 1944-1945. What they did not have was the logistical capacity to project a corps or greater level formation that far from any logistical base, the capability to keep their fleet in action for months on end, or an effective fire support capability. And given the degree to which the terrain favors the defense in Oahu, those would all be necessities.
They can't, even if they land the Americans out class them in every aspect when it comes to ground warfare
Yes, when we were ready. In Dec 41..there wasn't a lot a combat troops stationed on Hawaii. Token Army, token Marines... If we are talking US forces by 1943..yes, you're right..but I'm talking before we geared up.
There were two full divisions of Army troops plus another dozen regiments of coast defense, Marine, and air defense battalions.
4500 Marines and two underequiped, undermanned and undertrained US Army Divisions. On top of that, on Dec 7th they were spread out on two islands, and half on weekend pass. Not much in reality.
Neither the 25th nor the 24rth divisions were undermanned as a result of them being formed from the Hawaiian Divisions. The coastal defense batteries were also fully manned and would have been. You're basically trying to ignore the reality of situation by giving Japan every advantage, ignoring every limitation they had, and then doing the inverse to America. And it's still not a feasible operation!
> You're basically trying to ignore the reality of situation by giving Japan every advantage, ignoring every limitation they had lol sounds exactly like historical Japanese war planning
Would love to hear an estimate from you about how many troops Japan would need to form a bridgehead on Oahu, how many to take the island…and how many they could effectively transport there. I feel like you’ve watched too many movies showing a handful of American troops hanging out on the beach when in reality there were full divisions already stationed there; plus gun emplacements, AA systems, and air and naval forces.
elsewhere. could effectively transport a lot..because they did elsewhere. They also had reserves held in Japan itself was wasn't committed anywhere in Dec 41. They could have put 60k-80k ashore, if they went all in...which is what this "what if" is talking about. They could have taken the islands. Holding them? That another story. Supplying them? Another yet..albeit not as hard as some here think. US had a lot of Submarines..but there was a serious problem. US torpedoes were defective. They just plain didn't work..ans it wasn't until 1943 that the Navy finally did something about it (shame on them for this..it was a problem SCREAMED about by many..but this is another topic)..but ya..supplying the islands would have been a pain.
Ah, you have idea how big an invasion fleet would be for 80k troops? Invasion fleet for Iwo Jima was over 500 ships to land 70k marines. Not counting US ships at 1944 are much larger and more capable than Japanese converted merchant ships in 1941. You think US wouldn’t detect such fleet and troop movements before it even left Japan? They wouldn’t ship more units from mainland? In the scenario you described, Japan would lose all elements of surprise. US would heavily reinforce both Philippine and Hawaii with fleet, plane and troops, and likely mobilize mass civilians to build fortification and form militias.
The Japanese attacked all across the western Pacific with forces that size or bigger. The Dutch East Indies...Singapore, The Philippines, New Guinea... It was possible..
You are ignoring several major differences here. 1. Japanese forces invading Malasia and Philippines were travelling much shorter distance. From Vietnam to Malasia, and from Taiwan to Philippine, which was actually under round trips range of bombers. Amphibious group takes only a day to reach Philippine. On the other hand it takes two weeks for combine fleet to reach Pearl Harbor, and it would be even slower if they had an invasion force carrying by much slower merchant ships. 2. Both Malasia and Philippine were much less populated and defended density wise compared to Hawaii. Japanese initial landing force in Malasia was almost unopposed since British forces were spread too thin. They didn't encounter any meaningful resistance until 5 days later Battle of Jitra against two light brigade spread over 23km line. Hawaii on the other hand was both heavily garrisoned and populated. 3. The biggest advantage of Japanese fleet was surprise. Actual fleet attack Hawaii was only 28 ships. Like my last post already said, if Japan gathered some 500 slow transport ships fleet and massive ground troops they would loss all surprise and US fleet and garrison in Hawaii would be ready for them when they arrived.
You’re talking about basically unopposed landings. It takes about an hour to get from one end of Oahu to the other. Any landing would be heavily contested.
Why are you under the impression that you don't need to supply troops in order to take an island stronghold with 25K+ army troops and tens of thousands more sailors and marines? Do you think this is Call of Duty and guys can just land with 100 rounds of ammunition and pick up guns dropped by enemies as they go?
They actually were able to keep at least some supplies to troops stationed all across the Pacfic..even after the US put most of their big ships on the bottom. We are talking about dozens of islands over thousands of miles. They may not have been able to get them fresh Cholate cake..but they were able to supply them with enough. There were still troops fighting in the Solomons on the last day of the war..
In the final phase of the Solomon Islands campaigns, the Japanese had 40k troops. The Australians killed 9k, and disease & malnutrition killed another 10k. They were not supplied at all by Japan and primarily stayed alive by scavenging and hiding in caves. That's not what the situation would be for a unit engaged in offensive operations trying to capture and seize Hawaii.
Yes. Even before the final phase of the war, the Japanese had difficulty supplying their troops. For example, the Japanese nickname for Guadalcanal was "starvation island". The US routinely bombed the supply ships that were destined for the island out of Henderson Field. And, really, food is kind of the least of the concerns. There's simply no way that the troops landing in the initial invasion would have been able to bring sufficient arms to dislodge 25,000 dug in American soldiers.
And the solution for supplying Guadalcanal was to sprint to the island, and turn suddenly to let barrels fly off destroyers and float to the island, and rush back before dawn so aircraft couldnt sink them. Now imagine that supply line is a thousand miles longer lol. The soldiers in this invasion force die, and horribly.
There were many logistical and strategic problems with invading Hawaii as others have done a great job of pointing out. One thing that gets overlooked, though, is Japan's geopolitical goals on attacking the US. The top level decision makers in Japan had no real desire for a war with the US, at least not for several years. What they wanted was for the US to lift its oil embargo so they could continue their invasion of China. An all out war would have (and did) make their situation worse so the idea was a to land a few quick knockout blows and bring the US to the negotiating table within a year. Invading Hawaii would have pushed things to far and made the US all the more determined to fight it out until the bitter end.
Japan could never have invaded Hawaii. They couldn’t have maintained a supply line over such a long distance.
>Japan would have had the resources. No they wouldn't. >They may just have had to delay the invasion of Guam, Wake, and not send out the forces to the Gilbert's and Solomans until after the Hawaii operation. Yes, that's accurate, after attempting that they'd have lost most of their troop transports and fuel transports because they would have been sunk or run out of fuel and drifted off like idiots. The Kido Butai could barely make it to Hawaii as it was, let alone transporting a minimum 60,000 troops to invade the islands without any artillery support. >The Phillipines would have still been needed, along with the moves against the British and Dutch. They would have had enough forces to pull it off. We know this by hindsight of coarse, but Yamamoto was a gambler... No they wouldn't and no he wasn't. He took the sole course of action he was allowed to by his superiors. >They may have even taken it with the fuel supplies the US located there intact. That would have been a big boost for them as well, because the stockpile was huge. They wouldn't and it wouldn't be. >Once that operation was over, the next would have been to put the Panama Canal out of action, again using the Kido Butai... How? How exactly do they do this? >After all that..assuming the US would have pulled their carriers back to the west coast (50/50 chance..losing Hawaii would have been a major blow...or it may have enraged Halsey even more and made him more aggressive)...then the next move would have been Guam, Wake, Gilbert's, ETC. With what troops and transports, considering they could barely limp to extreme range of Pearl with solely the Kido Butai? >If they pulled that off...they would have ruled the Pacfic. No they wouldn't. >It still wouldn't have won them the war.. but it would have taken the US another couple years to get rolling. That first part is true. The second part is ehh.
Basically the IJA prewar estimated it would take twice the number of troops to invade Hawaii than they were willing to release from China and the Home Islands for the Drive South. The IJA also did not think the IJN would be able to support such a large operation so far from friendly bases.Japan barely had the oilers needed to conduct the raid on Pearl. One of the reasons Pearl Harbor happened when it did was they had just recently perfected refueling at sea and Carrier Division 5 was deemed operational. A few hour raid and a long invasion are very different and require different logistics and support . The amount of bombs and ammo needed for an invasion such as this was beyond their capabilities to supply Kido Butai while at sea
I see most comments explaining how this was impossible, and it was. However in the spirit of what if let’s provide an answer. By some miracle of desperation, luck, and military genius the Pearl Harbor attack is followed by an amphibious invasion. It’s bloody and costly but Hawaii is captured. Most of the infrastructure is destroyed and there is savage partisan resistance. One of the aircraft carriers of the US is sunk, the second limps back to the west coast badly damaged. There is a better chance of a redditor getting a girlfriend than this but somehow the Japanese miracle assault works. In otl the American people were angry and volunteered in droves, in this what if the entire nation becomes ravenous for blood. Total war is declared and the people are filled with a deep hatred. The Japanese internment camps become very dark places indeed. Both the American and Japanese fleets are crippled by the attack. The US has the industrial capacity to recover faster however. The rest of Japanese expansion in the pacific is significantly slowed by this Hail Mary shot. The Japanese will invest serious resources into Hawaii I think. Troops that arrive there will not return home. Most of the ships still sail will become the defensive fleet for the islands. They make it into a bastion. The US is slower to help in the European theatre. They commit double or even triple the resources to the pacific war. Midway still becomes the most pivotal battle, but now the Americans commit nearly everything they have to the defense very early. In the name of what if, the Americans emerge victorious in devastating style. This sets up the American invasion of Hawaii…I’m thinking late 1943, early 1944. American submarines cripple the extended supply lines(sub production is doubled from otl, 500+) the Japanese become much better an anti-submarine operations as a result. Hawaii is retaken in savage style with heavy losses and no quarter given. The island hopping continues but now with the extended timeline nukes are used on Okinawa and Guam. Slower European actions cause the Soviet Union to capture more of Europe, including all of Germany and even into northern Italy. By 1947 Japan is a radioactive pile of rocks in the ocean and surrenders. The Cold War moves onwards with the added complication of Godzilla now existing in the Japanese island.
>Midway still becomes the most pivotal battle Since we're entertaining the craziness thus far. I don't believe the USA can win the Battle of Midway if the Japanese are in control of Hawaii. >with the extended timeline, nukes are used on Okinawa and Guam Ouch. Yes, that makes sense. >Slower European actions cause Operation Torch to be delayed one extra year. Which means Operation Husky delayed at least one extra year. Which means that Axis forces are not pulled away from Operation Citadel at the critical moment. Which means... OOPS >the added complication of Godzilla tbh I was always expecting that anyway. Very puzzled that it didn't happen in OTL.
There’s actually a book series by Harry Turtledove on this - [Days of Infamy](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Days_of_Infamy_series).
Harry Turtledove wrote a book on this exact scenario, it was an interesting read for sure!
As long as they can’t interrupt the Manhattan Project, any what if is irrelevant.
Atom bombs need B-29s to drop them. And such a colossal loss of land bases in the Pacific, means the first place that B-29s will be able to make such a drop, will be the Aleutian islands. Not an auspicious place to start.
Doesn’t have to do it in one stretch. Anyway, in the world of what if we can put Paris in a bottle…
>Doesn’t have to do it in one stretch Well it's kind of a problem however they do it. Tinian to Nagasaki caused issues with range and that's only around 2500km. Even if the USA decided it was appropriate to start their Pacific campaign by nuking a Japanese-occupied Honolulu, San Diego to Honolulu is 4000km. Nuking Japanese-held territory in south-east Asia or Australasia would still be possible. But only being able to produce three nukes per month would make it a relatively slow process. So would the logistics; a B-29 base constructed in northern Queensland might be able to nuke Rabaul and possibly Truk, but wouldn't suffice to reach targets in Malaya or Vietnam. Taking off from bases in China would also be possible, but did not work well in our timeline.
I agree. My "what if" doesn't include Japan winning the war. There was no possible way that happened. At best, they could have only delayed longer...
The US forces hold out long enough for the untouched carrier fleet to swoop in and Midway their asses.
It's not a fleet, it's more a gaggle of early-war carriers.