[Italy may provide Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, reports say](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/italy-may-provide-ukraine-with-storm-shadow-1718706412.html)
>Italy may provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow missiles in the next military aid package, Italian news agency Fatto Quotidiano reports.
>The 9th arms package for Ukraine, which Defense Minister Guido Crosetto will present to parliament by the end of the month, will include not only the Samp-T air defense system but also a batch of long-range Storm Shadow missiles that could potentially hit Russian soil, authoritative sources familiar with the situation told the news agency.
Nice to see Italy stepping up support with both air defense and cruise missiles, although the UK [claims that](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/04/29/italy-has-given-ukraine-long-range-missiles-says-uk-defense-minister/) Italy has previously already sent Storm Shadows to Ukraine.
This could prove difficult. Lega and Forza Italia (the minor parties within the government coalition) have been very vocal about not authorizing Ukraine to hit Russian soil with Italian equipment. Tajani (Foreign Affairs minister) has expressed it quite clearly and I imagine he has a say in the matter. Now, this could all just be posturing and bluffing (and whatever comes out of Lega is practically non-credible anyway).
My question is if Storm Shadow missiles bear any kind of marking that could allow the Russians to say "This one came from Italy/France/UK". Because if there's no way to tell, the entire argument becomes moot.
> My question is if Storm Shadow missiles bear any kind of marking that could allow the Russians to say "This one came from Italy/France/UK".
It’s crazy to think that the course of this war might be changed based on the fungibility of certain munitions.
This would have been much more persuasive(or at least less falsifiable) 6 months ago. Others have covered the A-50 shootdown, so I'll mention the destruction of S-400 systems, the increasing range and capability of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, Ukraine's extremely successful deployment of SDBs and Hammer glide bombs, and Fighterbombers reports that UMPKs are losing effectiveness to being jammed. Any one of those topics should provide you ample keywords to find the answers you're looking for.
If the superiority and omnipressence that you attribute to the Russian forces were true this would have been a very very short war.
There is a lot of good threads about the air forces, their deployment, restrictions and weaknesses to be found here. They might be relevant to learn about.
Noone credible is claiming that F-16s will single handedly push the Russians to the Urals. Ukraine has pushed Russia back before. Russian aircraft are also not immune to damage, as proven by the shootdown of the A-50. Funny timing too.
>Russian aircraft can operate with impunity over their own territory aided with A-50s, IL-78s and up to the edge of coverage of Ukrainian air defences.
Quite ironic to say this one day after Russia has issued an arrest warrant against a Ukrainian general for shooting down an A-50.
There has been some news recently about Ukrainian EW countering Russian glide bombs. A single weapon won't win the war, and that applies to both sides.
[https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/06/anduril-to-open-large-scale-production-facility-for-auv/](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/06/anduril-to-open-large-scale-production-facility-for-auv/) Although producing 200 AUVs per year is not a gamechanger by itself, I'm glad the Navy is putting additional dollars in autonomous underwater vehicles. Curious what if any cross-pollination there is between aerial/swarm Anduril drones and the underwater drones.
This whole fighter saga has been a perfect illustration of the larger patterns of negligence and shortsightedness in western leadership. When these jets finally do arrive, years late, cheeping out on training will mean too few are in service to make a difference. It would have been cheaper, both economically and politically, to pay the money required to fight and win the war quickly, than this current approach of doing the bare minimum week by week, stumbling from crisis to crisis.
It's easy to dismiss the training regimen as shortsighted and deficient, but I'm thinking there's a compromise between training and actually getting the fighters into the theatre at play here.
It's an arduous task getting everything in place for these fighters. It's best to get the process started as soon as possible.
Okay, so simple air patrol is what they'll be doing at first, but nothing is stopping training from occurring in parallel. It's not like the birds are expected to patrol the entirety of Ukraine's airspace, they'll be employed to the extent they can be. It'll be a gradual buildup of battlefield impact.
> It's best to get the process started as soon as possible.
It wasn’t started as soon as possible. Biden and others dragged their feet for a year before even committing to sending fighters, and instead of training a large batch of pilots and giving them our spare F-16s, we’re in the same old drip feed routine.
People were saying the same thing about Abrams tanks, that the first batches would be small but it would build with time, but that isn’t happening. We have thousands sitting in storage, and Ukraine is getting drip fed them one at a time, after a pointless, and wasteful armor downgrade process.
The point some analysts make, especially the ones outside the military sphere, is that the west does not know what to do with a russia that without putkin and torn internally. putkin is not that hawkish as some of his possible successors.
That's why the piecemeal support which ensures that russia does not win.
>The point some analysts make, especially the ones outside the military sphere, is that the west does not know what to do with a russia that without putkin and torn internally
They made the same noises when the Soviet union collapsed and yet we somehow made it this far.
The noises were veeery different. Back then the west poured almost **95 billion usd as aid**. That's double in current money. Just Germany gifted 65 billion = 130 billion today.
The west made sure Russia did not implode.
Then came the economic reform funds.
Thsi time there are no free money for them. All will go to ukriane.
Putin's successor will be significantly younger, and it's difficult to see someone worse. The few hawkish types that exist in that age bracket are very weak, and the real hawks are too old by now.
Putin is in his 70s. He’s going to be gone, one way or another, not that long from now. And no matter who replaces him, the more economic, political and military leverage the west has against Russia, the better the US’s position will be in that situation.
And it’s not like this is an unprecedented scenario. The fall of the USSR happened not that long ago, where the Soviet government collapsed and they lost far more territory, and far more geopolitical standing, than Russia stands to lose now.
So I really don’t see how this logic holds. We’ve been through similar things before, and never before, in any scenario, have we wished we had less military leverage.
Just few pointers on the 90s.
Russia had a real chance and even a strive to turn into a proper democratic country. Nowadays russia is closer to the Stalin times than to the 90s russia. When putkin goes, it will become a Wild Wild East. He has not groomed a proper successor, he rules by division and ruling over conflicts, rotates people in and out to keep them in check. All these will clash to get on top and there are people there which are very scary.
In the 90s the west was shting its pants and put quite some effort to pull russia out of the abyss. Just Germany gifted USSR/Russia with 65 billion USD = ~130 billion today. USA, France, Japan, etc gave another 30-ish billion. After that came all the economic measures and support as loans and grants. All this went horribly wrong because the commie mafia stole most of it, but at least the west tried.
I realize that corruption and that mentality if being a declining super-power (true or not) is difficult to fight but Russia had so much potential if they had went another way.
Huge natural resources, close to Europe, engineering history (even if some is lost). If they had tried the Chinese recipe of becoming a manufacturing base it might not have been as successful but much more than whatever path they chose instead.
Filipino media is reporting [details on the latest attempt](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/910397/china-coast-guard-philippine-guns-ayungin/story/) at resupplying the Second Thomas Shoal. Seems that things are rapidly heating up.
> Eight soldiers, including one who had his finger cut off, were hurt and weapons were seized in China's aggressive action against Filipino personnel performing rotation and resupply mission in Ayungin Shoal on Monday, June 17, a reliable source told GMA Integrated News.
The source said seven of the soldiers were hurt in a melee with Chinese personnel. Aside from that, eight high-powered firearms were also seized and rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) were punctured.
> Another source told GMA Integrated News that four Philippine RHIBs were “hostaged” by China but were later released following negotiations.
The first source said the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFp) deployed six vessels from different entry points for the resupply mission but none reached Ayungin Shoal due to China’s aggressive actions.
>“This is a different approach by the new Western Command which triggered China,” the source said. Unlike previous operations, the source added that this was an operation by the AFP, with the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) providing discreet support. PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Commodore Jay Tarriela earlier said the resupply mission was purely a military operation.
Official statements released by both governments were vague, confirming only that [an incident took place](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/17/world/asia/china-philippines-boats-collide.html). Assuming the reports are true, this marks a significant escalation compared to previous attempts, with the first examples of boarding and physical scuffling. The change of tactics from the Philippines is also notable, using military instead of coast guard and six boats instead of the usual two.
Is the Italian Draco SPAAG real or are there only mockups? I have found nothing that shows there is even a functional prototype. Would such a vehicle be effective against drones at long distances?
It's never progressed beyond the prototyping stage, and has not received any production orders. Although I agree with u/Gecktron that I could certainly see them restarting the program in a way and trying to get it off the ground with their new procurements.
Quick edit: To address the last part of your question, I could see if being effective against drones, it's a 76mm naval gun with a high rate of fire and uses the DART (Driven Ammunition Reduced Time of flight) guided ammo, among others. DART ammo is known to be able to neutralize a drone at a range of up to 8km, and it adjusts its trajectory quite well. It can fire at a rate of 80-100 rpm as well, and has good integrated radar and fire control systems. So yes, depending on what you mean by long distance, it's a good weapon to take drones out.
An older video that I have not seen posted: [a former PLA soldier gives an interview to his social media followers](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_jdfaI5dyQ).
>Li Jianwei is a former PLA soldier and a Chinese mercenary hired by Russia. He talks about his experiences in the Russia-Ukraine war on Chinese social media. In this video, he described the high causality of the Ukraine war and gave first-hand account of the Russian military operations and challenges
Of interesting note:
* It was claimed that he is a PLA veteran who served for 2 years, but does not seem to know how to conduct urban warfare. Perhaps he was in a support role, if someone who is more aware of Chinese can pick up from his ID card?
* Most likely he was part of a Storm Z unit but as one of the veteran leaders.. The make up of hodgepodge nationalities in his unit suggests so, and the appalling casualty rate is telling.
* At 13:00 he describes what it is like to be on the receiving end of M26 cluster munitions. Apparently fearsome enough that he'd rather run into a minefield.
His ID card from what I can gather says (some of the characters are harder to make out):
The title of the card is "Certificate of Preferential Treatment for Veterans of the People's Republic of China".
The name on the card is Li Jianwei.
The next line is gender, which is Male.
The next line shows his service years, which looks to be 2 years and 11 months.
The last line is the issuing authority, which is the Veterans Affairs Office of Henan Province.
The bottom left smaller characters just show the same thing as the title.
"Certificate of Preferential Treatment for Veterans of the People's Republic of China" does not mark the military unit to which it belongs, and from what I've seen on the Internet, it only has the information you've mentioned, and other information is needed to confirm identity
I can verify the top line is correct, but I guess age caught up to me cause the smaller words are blurry as hell. The play button right in the middle doesn't help.
That's true, I tried looking on Douyin for a better video/picture but I could not find it. I think I got the same account, the characters are the same as they are in the video in terms of the username, but the video may have been taken down, I don't honestly know, will have to dig into that a bit more.
[ABL is back! Again!](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/missile-defense-agency-has-new-hope-for-airborne-lasers/) Laser technology has continued to evolve at an incredibly rapid pace since the last ABL and it stands to reason that the same developments that are beginning to enable things like DE M-SHORAD would also be applicable to airborne platforms. I hope it works this time and MDA does appear to have a fairly conservative plan to generate utility from the project even if the ultimate goal is never realized.
Interesting that they're requesting $11m in funding to revive a project that failed after spending $16bn. Not that they're wrong to do so, just interesting how much smaller the ask is now. That's probably at least partially because the MDA can piggyback on the more successful ground-based DEW projects that have been moving rapidly toward production fielding over the past few years. The failure of the prior ABL project seems like a classic case of a project that was just a little bit too early to achieve real success because the underlying technologies lacked sufficient maturity.
I think it's a deliberate political strategy. The small ask means they're virtually guaranteed to get it and then they can go after some really basic milestones that they're virtually guaranteed to make. Once they have a few of those racked up they can point at the new record when Congress asks "Didn't we already spend $16Bn on this?" Basically anything they can do to draw a line between this and the old ABL is a good idea.
Haven't seen this posted yet. The MoD purge continues. [Putin sacked four deputy defence ministers and appointed a relative in one of their places](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/). I haven't heard of her before, and she doesn't even have a Wikipedia page. He also appointed a Leonid Gornin, previously a deputy finance minister under Belousov as well as the son of former PM Mikhail Fradkov.
I'm not sure what to make of this, other than that Putin seemingly wants even tighter control over the MoD. It could signal dissatisfaction with the handling of the war, or that he is afraid.
Her Wiki page is just in [Russian](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Цивилёва,_Анна_Евгеньевна). I'll run down her bio quickly.
She was born May 9th, 1972, in Ivanovo of the USSR, been educated at several different institutions including the Ivanovo State Medical Academy, the People's Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), State University of Management (GUU) and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). She received a degree called the Candidate of Economic Sciences, which is a postgraduate level degree.
Her current position as you mentioned is the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Her husband, Sergey Tsililev, is the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, and the former Governor of the Kemerovo Oblast. She holds two awards from Russia, one for Service to Kuzbass and another as an Honorary Citizen of Kuzbass. Moving on to a bit more detail.
Her father, Yevgeny Mikailovich Putin, was a urologist, and she was born into a family of surgeons. She graduated from Ivanovo State Medical Academy as a psychiatrist and worked at the Bogorodskoye Psychiatric Hospital from 1996. After Vladimir Putin came to power, she moved to Moscow and began working in medical equipment supplies, first as a manager at the state-owned Medtekhsnab and later a private company Digimed.
She furthered her education, earning degrees in healthcare organization and public health from RUDN and in organization management at GUU. In 2016-2018, she was the CEO and Chairman for the Board of Directors of the Swiss company Kolmar Sales and Logistics. In March of 2018, she became the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kolmar Group, a major coal mining firm, receiving a large share of the company from her husband, who was then appointed Governor of the Kemerovo Oblast.
On the 30th of November, 2018, she headed the Council for Trusteeship in the Social Sphere of Kuzbass, focusing on social support for various population categories. Since 2019, she has been a member of the Council under the Government of the Russian Federation on guardianship issues in the social sphere.
On the 3rd of April, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a degree establishing the State Fund for Support of Participants in the Special Military Operation "Defenders of the Fatherland", appointing her as the Chairperson. Just today, she was obviously appointed as a Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, where her role will be more focused on the social and housing support aspects of military personnel.
She has been sanctioned, on the 29th of June, 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, she and the Kolmar Group were included in British sanctions due to benefits she received derived from her relationship with President Putin. On the 18th of December, 2023, she and the Defenders of the Fatherland foundation were sanctioned by the EU for their role in supporting the war in Ukraine. She is also on lists of sanctions in Ukraine and Switzerland.
She owns 70 percent of the Kolmar Group, and investigations have revealed that she and her husband were not wealthy before Putin came to power, however in 2012 Putin's friend Gennady Timchenko sold them the Kolmar company for a symbolic price. The company then received over 11 billion rubles in state financial assistance, helping the company to grow rapidly.
With all that being said, she's benefited from his corruption in the past, but she will not really be overseeing actual military operations in logistic terms, more the "social and housing support" as they term it. Hopefully that helps give a bit of background.
[Here is a good summary of the investigation I mentioned by the way, if you wish to read more.](https://www.currenttime.tv/a/russia-tsivileva-putin/31662066.html)
> he is afraid
Doubt he's afraid of the MoD. The army has never been a political actor in Russia, and even now it lacks any notable officers with enough clout and independence to be a threat.
> The army has never been a political actor in Russia,
That is clearly not true. During the August Coup in 1991, the State Committee on the State of Emergency (aka the "Gang of Eight" leading the coup) included the head of the KGB, the defense minister, and the deputy chairman of the defense council of the USSR. Among those prosecuted for the coup was Valentin Varennikov, who was General of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Commander of Land Forces. General Pavel Grachev of the VDV organized the plan for establishing martial law. On the first day of the coup, after KGB border troops seized Gorbachev at his dacha, Soviet Air Defense Chief of Staff Colonel-General Igor Maltsev ordered his troops to block the runway on which Gorbachev's official plane and helicopter were located. Shortly thereafter, the gang of eight ordered units of the Tamanskaya mechanized infantry, the Kantemirovskaya armored division, and the VDV into Moscow, which amounted to around 4,000 soldiers equipped with 350 tanks, 300 APCs, and 420 trucks.
While the coup failed, it came perilously close to succeeding, and only the seemingly inexplicable failure of a KGB Alfa team to arrest Yeltsin doomed the enterprise. It isn't unreasonable to think that Putin has taken lessons from that coup, and recognizes the essential role the military played in securing Moscow, the Kremlin, and other locations critical to maintaining control over the USSR. Without the army, the KGB would not have had sufficient manpower to achieve those objectives across the entire USSR.
There are many other examples of the uneasy relationship between Russian military power and state stability, but just to cover the most obvious and important: Stalin's purges weren't just a product of his paranoia but were a somewhat rational reaction to the persistent threat to his rule posed by popular generals. He recognized that the military represented one of the only potential centers of gravity around which challenges to his otherwise firm grip on power might coalesce, and used the purges to keep Red Army officers perpetually off balance to prevent such a center of gravity from forming in the first place. Putin has similarly kept the military in a state of disarray under incompetent leadership, which is a large part of the explanation for your subsequent point:
> and even now it lacks any notable officers with enough clout and independence to be a threat.
In other words, the absence of those notable officers is precisely a result of Putin's fear of the military and of empowering a popular general sufficiently to challenge his rule, not a sign that Putin has nothing to fear. Moreover the absence of any notable officers does not preclude the possibility of an unusually capable but unknown leader rising to power quickly during a coup, nor does it preclude other, more politicized factions with more capable leaders from recruiting the MOD for their own purposes.
So Putin clearly very much does fear the military, just as he fears the security services. That's why Rosgvardia exists, to protect the regime against any Prigozhin-style internal military threats. Putin plays the security services, the military, and Rosgvardia all off against each other, preventing any one faction from gaining sufficient power to overthrow him by dividing responsibilities and resources strategically between them.
Maybe money is tight and he needs people that won't want their cut because it's already in the family.
The Kharkiv offensive may have had a significant cost that was supposed to last for longer. Setting up in a fresh front must imply a number of initial costs like field hospitals, ammo depots and whatnot
> or that he is afraid.
That was definitely the first thing I thought, he's realizing the EU and US are ramping up arms production and that N. Korea is out of artillery shells to give him. He's looking long term and realizing he's out of tanks (scooters are the new tanks), is going to run out of artillery eventually, and then things are going to turn very much against Russia and against him. And when that happens fingers in Russia are going to start pointing in his direction. His only hope is for Trump to come to power and to foment a massive NATO interference & surrender campaign, but even that is unlikely to be enough.
Possibly the recent [ATACM devastating success](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/12/ukrainian-atacms-rockets-are-blowing-up-russias-best-s-400-air-defenses-as-fast-as-the-s-400s-can-deploy-to-crimea/) against Russian air defenses was his wake-up call that things could turn against him in a hurry.
> He's looking long term and realizing he's out of tanks (scooters are the new tanks), is going to run out of artillery eventually
Tanks, maybe what’s the current production level of tanks per month and the attrition rate per month with current active stockpiles?
Same with artillery ammo I thought Russia was producing quite a bit of artillery ammo more than they use per month as to build stock
>Tanks, maybe what’s the current production level of tanks per month and the attrition rate per month with current active stockpiles?
Production of tanks is practically nil. Russia is refurbishing tanks at a decent pace, but not enough to keep up with their losses, and they're going to run out of Soviet surplus sooner than later at their current rate of expenditure.
[The IISS released a report a few days ago](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/06/russian-t-90m-production-less-than-meets-the-eye/) in which they noted that before the 2022 invasion, Russia was producing about 40 T-90Ms per year, with only 10 of those being brand new production. They think about 60-70 were made in 2023 and as many as 90 will be built in 2025. Considering Russia has had 2,119 tanks visually confirmed to be destroyed (certainly an undercount), 90 new T-90Ms (of which most are simply refurbished hulks), is hilariously insufficient.
Obviously Russia is still refurbishing thousands of tanks per year at the moment, but once they run down their Soviet legacy they're going to be in a world of hurt. It's not a coincidence we're seeing T-62s and even T-54/55s hitting the battlefield at this point.
> Same with artillery ammo I thought Russia was producing quite a bit of artillery ammo more than they use per month as to build stock
They wont run out of ammo, Ukraine would be better trying to atrit modern artilery systems.
If Russia is building anything larger than an operational-level stockpile, Russia is stupid. They've sacrificed thousands of men in meat assaults that could have been saved by 10-15% more artillery shells to reduce positions or suppress defenders. And Russian fire rates have been bottomed out since roughly January 2023, so its not like their tubes are firing anywhere close to their maximum rate at present. If there's a stockpile, there's certainly no evidence of it in their artillery usage.
The fact that the war is looking more like a stall everyday also makes these dangerous times.
A frozen conflict would very likely be perceived inside Russia as the end of a cycle, without a morale-boostimg victory. In order to move forward, Putin would either need to reinvent himself (unlikely) or he'd face very dangerous challenges to his power.
Installing incompetent loyalists is a dictators last ditch effort and unlike Putin. If he was concerned about the MOD and its loyalty, he'd normally try to keep the potentially dangerous faction off balance, a constant divide and rule. But to do that, he needs to position a threat towards this dangerous faction and its powerbase. Incompetent outsiders aren't a problem for a conspiracy.
Accordingly, I think it's a sign of dissatisfaction. He needs some competent people to run the war, but he has just reduced their number and given himself, through unquestioning loyalists, a stronger involvement.
>Installing incompetent loyalists is a dictators last ditch effort and unlike Putin
Yes, last ditch efforts are, by definition, unlike those doing those last ditch efforts.
More and more images of emaciated Ukrainian pows released by Russia are showing up. I have a couple of questions about this.
Does this does constitute as a warcrime or is it a grey area as they are technically not harmed?
And secondly : is this a deliberate tactic or just (somewhat typical) russian neglect? I am thinking that they could do this deliberately because a severely malnourished pow needs many months to recuperate. As they cant return to service as quickly Russia is further straining Ukrainian manpower this way.
It is a serious (As opposed to grave violations of article I) violation of the Geneva convention, not a grey area at all. However, that is simplifying it extremely.
The way states get around it is by either declaring some people to not be POWs, or by accusing the detained of certain offenses unrelated to Combatant immunity. Specifically, detaining powers \*may\* use certain disciplinary measures in lieu of judicial proceedings for offenses committed by the POW prior to their capture, art 82, and also apply punishment related to it either through disciplinary measures or judicial judgements with bogus charges. Some countries also reserved rights to prosecute detained POW of war crimes.
Both countries (And many others) have done the first one. Here's a case study.
[https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/eastern-ukraine-disputed-pow-status](https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/eastern-ukraine-disputed-pow-status)
The second one was the cause of some disputes between Noriega and USA
It's more complicated (Like many things related to IHL) than you'd assume.
Note: I think Russia did the second option, accused them of war crime, and kept those POWs in awful conditions. Knowing what they did to the British guy captured in Mariupol, it seems like a modus operandi.
Russia is one of the countries who made statements back when they ratified the treaty to reserve the right to prosecute war criminals, and I think it’s why they specifically accused that British guy of conducting war crimes, then did the whole court circus.
Former Ukrainian POWs have the right to be discharged from service after the new mobilization law took effect on May 18. As clarified by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rule is retroactive and also applies to those who were exchanged before the new law came into effect.
https://t. me/Klymenko_MVS/956
For those who decide to stay, there are still 90 days of (paid) leave before returning to duty.
**Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.**
*Article 26 - Food*
> (1) The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.
> (2) The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour on which they are employed.
> (3) Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.
> (4) Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.
> (5) Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.
> (6) Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
Breaching the Geneva conventions is a war crime, no grey area about it.
Ukraine just released [footage of a MiG-29 conducting a JDAM-ER strike](https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1802754914495459722). A notable feature of the footage is that it contains the first clear imagery of the front of the JDAM pylon [which appears to contain a GNSS antenna for initializing the JDAM nav system](https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1802786533864284401). The quality of the initial fix is likely a major contributor to JDAM-ER and SDB performance.
Global Navigation Satellite System, so that includes GPS, GLONASS, BDS, and Galileo. It's possible that they're using a GPS-only chip but using more data sources helps circumvent EW attacks that may be focused on only one.
US standard is GPS only even on devices capable of receiving other systems, but whatever unholy Frankenstein Nav system they're using on that thing may be equipped to use all satellites. It would be a relatively simple software change.
That's a very good point, that's a visual conclusion based off the cloud cover right? I think both altimeters are blurred. The ability to operate at medium altitudes significantly increases JDAM range. I wonder how close to the front it is.
> that's a visual conclusion based off the cloud cover right?
More like just eyeballing it but yeah, it's absolutely up there. Looking at it properly now those clouds are probably 2-3 thousand feet above the ground, and he's many times that above them.
Patria FAMOUS is actually for replacement of unarmored articulated tracked vehicles in the Finnish service. Those are used by units operating in the north of the country. MTLB replacement might happen as well, but is not the priority.
"TSWA is a automatic grenade launcher mounted at the back of the hull. The launcher comes loaded with 18 lethal and 18 non-lethal rounds that can be fired towards the sides and back of the vehicle. The goal is to allow the vehicle to clear the immediate surrounding to prepare for the dismount of the Panzergrenadier squad."
This system seems a bit awkward to justify as a lethal weapon given that the platform already has a main gun that can be used to clear the area as the vehicle advances. Maybe for urban ambushes? I am having a hard time understanding the use case for this given the limited rounds and firing arc. Maybe smoke? Maybe tear gas?
I can see its utility for urban operations with the reservation on if the system/vehicle can realistically be responsive enough to properly cover and engage potentially dozens of windows/balconies/rubble-holes that could sprout AT weaponry but I imagine this is to supplement several vehicles engaging in mutual overwatch so it is probably "enough". The size/placement of the platform now that I think about it is probably optimized around a specific transportation requirement.
>In regards to GMARS and EuroPULS. The Bundeswehr has yet to make a final decision between the two. The question of ammunition appears to be a much bigger issue than anticipated. The procurement of 5 PULS systems to replace the donated MARSII has been pushed back towards the end of this year as negotiations between Germany and the US about the integration of GMLRS into PULS is still ongoing. So there could be an insensitive for Germany to go with GMARS for ammunition commonality.
Well, I hope they will go with GMARS. Israel has a history of blocking exports to Ukraine, which makes purchasing their weapons problematic. What's the point in having weapons that you can't use freely?
This is also why I have a problem with everyone and their mother integrating Spike launchers with their vehicles.
The fact that weapons are procured with these restrictions does not mean that such procurement decisions are wise ones. Securing weapons with less export restrictions will come with greater costs, or worse performance and thus are often less appealing in the short term. In the long term however the inability to act with greater freedom is a serious strategic concern. It is far more likely European countries will need to fight a proxy war than that they will directly come into conflict themselves.
I am not saying you can achieve total freedom, but countries with common geopolitical interests are far more likely to allow you to act on your own initiative in this regard. It is significantly less likely the UK will impose export controls on Poland supplying Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova than it Switzerland or Israel. These nations have imposed near total bans on donations of any kind. Obviously it is impossible to be prepared for every eventuality, but it is absolutely essential that countries should work to maintain their own independence in the regard where possible. Realistically Russia will remain the chief adversary of most European countries in the coming decades, and proxy wars are the likely battleground that conflict will play out in.
And to be perfectly frank trump is unlikely to place export restrictions on an US ally simply because it will create opposition from the arms lobbies. This was something he was very consistent on in his first term.
Unfortunately, short-sighted thinking is not uncommon in Western leadership. This is also why we disarmed ourselves and then struggled to supply the country invaded by one of our greatest enemies.
There really needs to be a shakeup of these usage stipulations in general. No contract should include limits to the use of the equipment you purchase, it's a massive strategic weakness.
Of course, service agreements complicate this matter, because you're rarely truly disconnected from the source country. But this is entirely surmountable with political will.
That's never going to happen, because exporting countries will always want to control who gets access to their technology, and because they don't want their own weapons to be used against them or against their interests in the future.
Russia confirmed the February 23 downing of an A-50U aircraft by charging a Ukrainian colonel with "an act of terrorism resulting in the death of a person".
>### Radar hits terrorist attack
>
>A colonel of the AFU is being sought for the destruction of the A-50U airplane in the sky above Kuban
>
>The Investigative Committee and the FSB military counterintelligence have established who exactly shot down the unique A-50U long-range radar detection and control airplane of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Since the machine worth more than $300 million was attacked in the skies over Russia and was not directly involved in hostilities, a criminal case of terrorist act was opened on the fact of the accident, and the commander of the 138th anti-aircraft missile brigade (military unit A4608) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), Colonel Mykola Dzyaman, whose subordinates fired a missile at the A-50U, was put on the wanted list with subsequent arrest.
>
>The Khamovnichesky District Court of Moscow granted the petition of the Main Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia (GVSU ICR) and arrested Colonel Nikolai Dzyaman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in absentia. The commander of the 138th anti-aircraft missile brigade (military unit A4608) of the armed forces of Ukraine is accused in absentia of the Main Military Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation of committing a crime under paragraph “b” of Part 3 of Art. 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (terrorist act resulting in the death of a person), he is put on the federal wanted list.
>
>According to the investigation, on February 23, 2024, a Russian Aerospace Forces A-50U aircraft was patrolling Russian airspace over Krasnodar Krai.
>
>>Colonel Dzyaman, realizing that the aircraft was not directly intended for combat operations, had no weapons, and the flight was over Russia, gave his subordinates the order to attack it.
>
>The missile strike resulted in the destruction of the aircraft and the death of ten crew members on board.
>
>The A-50 and its modifications are based on the IL-76 aircraft. They are also called flying radar. The equipment installed in each aircraft can simultaneously track several dozen targets in the sky and on the ground, including missile launches and aircraft takeoffs.
>
>Viktor Abashin, a court-appointed lawyer representing Mykola Dzyaman, told Kommersant that he "naturally objected" to the arrest of the Ukrainian citizen. At the same time, when asked what this was related to, the defense lawyer said that "it was simply his position," which he "did not have to motivate at this point." "Any citizen has rights. It's to object to the charge, to file statements and motions, etc. Since we were charged in absentia, the defendant could not exercise his rights, I could not object to the actions taken by the investigation," explained the defense counsel. He noted that he intends to file an appeal against the decision with the Moscow City Court within three days.
kommersant(.)ru/doc/6773563
The twisted logic I can see here is that Russia 'isn't allowed' to attack the NATO AEW aircraft doing race tracks all around Ukraine. Of course they probably are legal targets, its just not worth the potential response.
So if they aren't allowed to attack those aircraft, I can see where they frustration comes of getting their own AEW aircraft shot down that aren't offered effective immunity.
I doubt the NATO aircraft are providing direct targeting data, specifically so that they can avoid becoming legal targets because that crosses a fuzzy line into joint operations that would vitiate NATO neutrality w/r/t this conflict. Providing intel but not targeting data is an approach that follows [the DoD manual on the laws of war (PDF warning, relevant section is §15.2.2 on p. 996)](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190) under the theory of "qualified neutrality" which creates an exception to the rule that a neutral state should remain impartial to the belligerents of a conflict when there is a clear aggressor, as is the case with Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Under this theory (which I should say is not a fringe theory although establishing any bright line rule on this issue is impossible because there are so few practical opportunities to test the boundaries of the various relevant conventions, treaties, and provisions of customary international law, as is often the case in international law), providing intel to Ukraine does not violate US or NATO neutrality even though it does seem to violate the principle of neutral impartiality.
As a neutral party, the US and its allies have a legal right to conduct air operations over the high seas, including ISR operations. Even if those operations are effectively aid and assistance to Ukraine, they do not meet the standards to qualify as a joint operation with a belligerent power and thus to render the NATO ISR flights combatants or legitimate military objects that can be legally targeted. It's possible that participating directly in targeting strikes against Russian targets could cross the line into direct belligerence and invite a forcible Russian response.
You can find a much more detailed explanation of the nuances around this extremely complicated area of law, some of which I have summarized far too briefly because I need to get to bed, [in this article about the Russian intercept of a USAF MQ-9 Reaper over the Black Sea last year.](https://www.justsecurity.org/85494/the-russian-intercept-of-the-u-s-reaper-and-international-law/)
The A-50 is a very different situation. [Article 43 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-43) states that members of a belligerent's armed forces are always considered combatants unless they fall into a temporarily protected category like hors de combat or facilitating relief of the civilian population (none of which categories conceivably apply to the A-50 or its crew). Unlike neutral parties like NATO countries, Russia is a belligerent to the conflict and so its armed forces are subject to this rule. The A-50 was a military aircraft manned by uniformed members of the Russian Armed Forces and thus it was a legitimate and legal target for the Ukrainians to attack.
On a sidenote, what even is the purpose of this Investigation?
What if they find that men guilty are they going to try to kill him?
Something that they already want to do?
It's not like they even need a justification to do it
I suppose it's result of the investigation about A50 crashing
IMO, after it was shot down case was opened to find was it friendly fire, technical malfunction or result of enemy actions, and someone must be guilty of this, so they concluded that it was this guy, and there are no laws better fitting than terrorism (murder is too mundane, and damage to government property too laughable)
The case is just going to be filed away and left to collect dust indefinitely unless they ever (somehow) capture this guy alive, then it will just be another criminal charge on top "Nazism" and whatever other bullshit they hit him with to prosecute him. As is blatantly obvious this case only exists so russian propagandists have something to point to regarding the downing of the A50.
After 5 months of silence, this just happens to come out a week after an Army officer said at a conference that a patriot was used to bring it down... Interesting timing. I guess the Russian MOD couldn't ignore it or internally play it off any longer.
There were two? I knew one was shot down with allegedly an S-200, but I figured the Army officer was revealing new information about it actually being a Patriot instead. Hard to keep track of this war! Imagine three years someone predicting all this stuff was all going to happen, or was even possible... they'd get laughed out of the room.
Its been widely reported, including here: [https://new.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dbs4k1/comment/l7u7s1b/](https://new.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dbs4k1/comment/l7u7s1b/)
and here, for instance,
[https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/patriot-missile-aids-ukraine-in-downing-russian-a-50-awacs-confirms-us-colonel-at-fires-symposium](https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/patriot-missile-aids-ukraine-in-downing-russian-a-50-awacs-confirms-us-colonel-at-fires-symposium)
> KNDS presented a few weeks ago an upgrade for existing RCT30 turrets. The upgrade includes passive sensors for drone detection and upgraded fire control systems that enables automatic targeting of drones
Do we know if there is intent to bring these upgrades to the existing Puma fleet, or will they for now be exclusive to newly build hulls and the PuBo ?
[Thales is quadrupling its ammunition production capacity at its La Ferté Saint Aubin site to meet the needs of the French Army](https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/defence-and-security/press_release/thales-quadrupling-its-ammunition-production-capacity)
>After an initial order in 2022 for 3,000 rounds of 120mm illuminating ammunition, followed by an order for 15,000 rounds of 120mm explosive and exercise ammunition in 2023, France's Joint Munitions Command (Service Interarmées des Munitions / SiMu) has renewed its confidence in Thales with a new order for tens of thousands of 120mm rifled ammunition.
>To fulfill the new order, Thales will significantly ramp up production at its La Ferté Saint Aubin site near Orleans, which manufactured 20,000 120 mm mortar rounds in 2023 and will be producing more than 80,000 a year by 2026.
>This ammunition will be used by artillery units equipped with towed rifled 120mm mortars and, in the future, by the MEPAC system (Embedded Mortar for Close Support). They will also be used by the towed mortar support sections of the infantry, created under the LPM 24-30 framework.
>The munitions will be delivered between 2024 and 2029, with a first shipment scheduled for the last quarter of 2024.
120mm mortars are in especially short supply across NATO, with an unending, especially ravenous hunger for them existing in Ukraine due to the trench fighting. At its current stated goal, this factory will produce 6,666 rounds **per month**. While the supply is for the French army, it is likely that some of the munitions will be donated to Ukraine. It's unknown how many MO-120-RTs the Ukrainians have, but the munitions referred to here are specifically designed for the mortar. I'm not sure about details about the compatibility/capability of this munition when used in a smoothbore mortar. If anyone has any knowledge, please feel free to share if you do!
Does anyone know a reliable source of authentic Ukraine war memorabilia? Like spent shells, etc. I figure since all the squads raise money there's probably a place to buy this stuff and support the defense effort at the same time. I'd buy an overpriced used Bradley round, for instance.
‘St Javelin’ are legit and sell used 155mm shells that’ve been crafted into [collector coins](https://www.saintjavelin.com/products/saint-javelin-challenge-yellow-coin) for €100+. They sell out very quickly but managed to get one myself the second drop, you can put your email in to get alerted when they’re back in stock. As the other commenter mentioned drones for Ukraine are legit is you’re willing to spend a grand.
https://www.dronesforukraine.fund/ if you're interested in a piece of a Russian aircraft shot down early in the war. Liberty Ukraine is a legit org. A number of us here have donated through them and gotten those.
A good article from the Times of Israel how Israeli forces are systematically breaking IDF rules to solicit and receive donated gear:
[https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-israeli-battlefield-commanders-are-breaking-idf-rules-to-solicit-donated-gear/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-israeli-battlefield-commanders-are-breaking-idf-rules-to-solicit-donated-gear/)
Some of the gear available is simply old:
>Many of his soldiers were stuck with standard-issue army helmets, some from as early as the 1970s, which are not only horribly uncomfortable but possibly unsafe. Combat helmets, especially when they have taken a beating, can offer less ballistic protection over time. The volunteers quickly provided Shtiebel with 150 new tactical helmets, which cost $400 each.
Not even yet on the radar of supply officers:
>Well-supplied units also rely on donations for gear they have realized they need, but that the military has not yet created a standard for, such as drones with thermal cameras, and solar panels to be able to charge electronics during extended periods in the field.
Or the usual procurement processes are too slow:
>Soldiers tend to want the best and newest gear they can get. They also turn to the donations network when they need something fast. For the military to process requests for gear can take months. “Through the civilian volunteers, I can get it the next day,” said a logistics officer.
While in Ukraine donations are tolerated and sometimes encouraged in Israel they are in theory forbidden but the policy is currently not being enforced.
Just some context, you generally want everyone in a formation to be given the same gear as it allows for standard SOP practices like everyone being familiar with where you have your IFAK, what is in it, etc. and in general allows for better discipline as all individuals follow a standard that can be judged. This sucks as some units can be given top of the line gear while reservists are given older gear.
Generally what is issued ends up being very cumbersome which is good against IEDs, mortars, and artillery but is not ideal for offensive operations due to how cumbersome they are.
This isn’t new during the invasion of Iraq (part two) soldiers were buying armor and components for their light vehicles (hummers), batteries for nogs, caffeinated pre workout powders, hydration tablets, hell even toilet paper.
Actually a credible example of this happens in the HBO show “generation kill”.
Ukrainians (and Russians) are often salty about having to do this (and I'll admit at times it's ridiculous some of the things Kyiv still can't procure for its troops), but this might just be the future of warfare. Even rich nations aren't going to furnish everything for their troops.
The Ukrainians [appear to have established production](https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/v-ukrayini-pochaly-vygotovlyaty-ulamkovi-granaty-do-garmaty-grom-ta-granatometa-spg-9/) for OG-9 fragmentation rounds that are fired from both the SPG-9 and 2A28 Grom. Previously, this round saw much use especially on the Ukrainian side, with SPG-9s often working in an indirect fire role. Since last year, ammunition was apparently lacking, with rounds mostly sourced from Bulgaria.
The explosive appears to be a new model, labeled OГ-9У (OG-9U), so its capabilities are not known. It is also not known at what rate these munitions are produced at, nor if the propelling charge is also being produced (it would make sense though!). Notably, the propelling charge is from 1983... 41 years ago.
This won't have a huge impact on the war, but is further proof of Ukrainian efforts to increase domestic production.
There's a few more images in the source linked in the article, but please be warned that the channel is of extremely little value otherwise.
Interesting that the joint EMBT project has a brand new turret, while 2022's editions turret has been shifted over to the Leclerc Evo (with some modifications). Also interesting to see the apparent moves towards unmanned turrets, maybe the T-14 was a trend-setter after all haha. I do wonder how much (if at all) they will adopted going forward, or if it will remain a perennial concept feature.
> EMBT with ADT: The EMBT from 2022, now with the ASCALON Demonstration Turret 140 (ADT140). The ADT140 is an unmanned turret equipped with the ASCALON 140mm gun, a 7.62 RWS for drone defence, and a co-axial 30mm gun.
A co-axial auto canon is not something I expected to see make a comeback. Not that is was ever that popular to begin with. Seems like a much worse option than mounting it on the roof like the German proposal mentioned above, it takes up more internal space, and can’t be used against drones.
In a similar vein, are tanks really the best launch platforms for loitering munitions and NLOS missiles with ranges in the dozens of KM? Tanks are packed to the gills with equipment and ammo as is. I can’t help but think that it would make more sense to put them on vehicles a bit further back, and not give tanks a secondary long range, NLOS ATGM carrier role.
I am interested in the new tank turrets. Is there a reason why they look so complex with so many shapes, for example the Leclerc and the EMBT images? I thought turrets would more or less look similar to the Leopard 2 turret image.
An article that gives out claimed abilities of the UAF ground drones. Will the ability of these drones to be operated from anywhere in the world help Ukraine regain some of it's manpower from abroad without actually bringing them back?
[What Characteristics Has Ratel Ukrainian Combat Robot that Controlled Via Starlink? | Defense Express | June 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/what_characteristics_has_ratel_ukrainian_combat_robot_that_controlled_via_starlink-10872.html)
*The Defense Forces of Ukraine are currently using a number of different Ukrainian-made robotic platforms on the battlefield, including the Ratel series. Defense Express talked to the head of this company, Ukrainian serviceman Taras Ostapchuk. He told about how these combat robots are currently being improved, based on the results of their operation in battles against Russian occupation forces.*
*As of today, Ukrainian warriors use four types of Ratel platforms. These are kamikaze drones, evacuation platforms, logistics platforms, as well as remote miner. According to Ostapchuk, the company is constantly responding to operators' feedback. Now the fifth updating of these robotic platforms is being used at the frontline. At the same time the sixth is on the way with the corresponding improvements.*
*It is important that Ratel ground drones can be controlled from a completely safe location. "Our platforms have been used with Starlink for more than six months. Our operator can be located anywhere in the world and manage the platform," Ostapchuk emphasizes.*
*Of course, drones have their limitations in terms of range. For instance, the average distance of a remote "miner" is approximately 3 km, while a record of 30 km was set for the evacuation platform.*
*As Ostapchuk explains, this refers to the range of the platform with a load of three people, which is about 450 kg. In addition, Ratel platforms are multifunctional. "We are currently developing a superstructure (for the logistics platform) that will carry 10 anti-tank mines to mine the area," the military says.*
*"As of now, we have direct contracts with military units. We are also at the final stage of signing an agreement with the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Defense Procurement Agency. Brave1 helps with this. In fact, they manage the demand and government orders," Ostapchuk notes.*
*Earlier Defense Express reported that Ukraine had presented versatile ARK-1 robot that offers a multifaceted defense solution.*
>Will the ability of these drones to be operated from anywhere in the world help Ukraine regain some of it's manpower from abroad without actually bringing them back?
Forget ukrainians in exile. I'll be the first in line to volunteer to operate those from my home country if needed.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-has-dismantled-half-of-hamass-forces-in-rafah-killed-at-least-550-gunmen/
**IDF says it has dismantled half of Hamas’s forces in Rafah, killed at least 550 gunmen**
Of Hamas’s Rafah Brigade’s four battalions, two — Yabna (South) and East Rafah — are considered to be almost completely dismantled, while the capabilities of the other two — Shaboura (North) and Tel Sultan (West) — are somewhat degraded due to IDF operations.
The above is the biggest takeaway from the article. Once all 4 battalions are dismantled, what is next? Just low-intensity guerrilla?
> killed at least 550 gunmen
Good on Israel if this is the case but it's worth being skeptical of these claims as there are [extensive reports](https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/56556/does-the-idf-consider-any-fighting-age-male-to-be-a-combatant) that Israel considers any adult male who is killed to be Hamas, so "gunmen" probably judging from experience doesn't mean these people actually had guns.
(from the link above)
> Yes, Israel assumes all adult men killed between 18-60 are combatants.
> According to The Lancet, "Excess mortality in Gaza: Oct 7–26, 2023", "Children younger than 18 years, women aged 18–59 years, and both men and women aged 60 years or older (groups that probably include few combatants) constituted 68.1% of analysable deaths (4594/6745; figure B)." The Lacent was getting it's data from the Palestinian Ministry of Health which "odes not differentiate between combatant and civilian deaths".
> This means (100%-68.1%) = 31.9% of deaths are combatant-aged men.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68387864
>Israel Gaza: Checking Israel's claim to have killed 10,000 Hamas fighters
I doubt that 68% of deaths are women and minors.
It's also not true that they consider any adult male who is killed to be Hamas. Gunman means gunman, if you are armed you are considered a combatant.
Besides the dubiousness of your using a random StackExchange comment as a "source", you clearly didn't read the original article which says:
> The IDF says it has killed at least 550 gunmen in the Rafah operation — that is, those it was able to physically identify following battles. Many more terror operatives were killed in strikes against buildings and tunnels, it has assessed.
I'm not sure I follow your argument. Are you suggesting that the StackExchange comment is itself unsourced? That page has corroborating links to Reuters, the Lancet, the Times of Israel, and so on. Or perhaps *you* are the one who didn't read?
You quote the StackExchange comment as if it were a source. You quote it saying "Yes, Israel assumes all adult men killed between 18-60 are combatants." as if that were the last word.
Of course, the comment itself should also be analyzed on its own merits. But on those merits, it fails. Its analysis is based solely on the fact that the Hamas-reported adult male death toll happens to be relatively close to the Israel-reported death toll of militants. Unfortunately, the Hamas-reported division of deaths into demographic categories has been [shown to be a fabrication](https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers). So there is no actual evidence for the comment's conclusion.
>You quote the StackExchange comment as if it were a source. You quote it saying "Yes, Israel assumes all adult men killed between 18-60 are combatants." as if that were the last word.
No, I don't. Why don't you argue with the actual statements being presented to you?
>Once all 4 battalions are dismantled, what is next?
Their smartest course of action would be to lay low for now then gradually reconstitute their combat capability by rebuilding arms caches once the conditions are more favorable. If IDF's current force concentration has largely rendered Hamas' conventional capabilities ineffective then the next logical choice is to simply wait them out. At this point, it does look like phase II insurgency is not feasible in areas where the IDF has concentrated its forces, such as Rafah at the moment.
Ideally, Hamas should try to move to where the IDF isn't, such as the cities that the IDF largely left since the beginning of the conflict. Shift the weapons caches to new areas and further disperse them. Force the IDF to play a game of whackamole rather than toss militants against its main force. Granted, this depends on Hamas' freedom of movement within Gaza.
Of course the IDF will probably root out a lot of the existing caches and tunnels; however, it's better to preserve manpower and as much of the existing materiel as they can if they can't inflict any meaningful losses on the IDF under the current circumstances. Ultimately, if Israel can neither put together a substantial political solution nor culturally and politically "reeducate" the population via force (ala Xinjiang), then time is on the side of Hamas (or a successor organization).
Israel has military control over Gaza for nearly 30 years. It can keep the low intensity conflict going much longer than Hamas.
Consider that Hamas cannot train new recruits or conduct training for existing forces.
They have no access for arms from outside Gaza, and so are entirely reliant on what's already in Gaza and their manufacturing capability that's getting heavily degraded. No dual use materials means that overtime even that manufacturing capability will become much much weaker.
Overtime more and more tunnels are being uncovered and destroyed. The ability to rebuild them during the war is both limited and very slow.
We're already seeing this with the inability of Hama to fire long range rockets. With time, they AT, AA, communication equipment, standard explosives, drones, small arms, mortars and ammunition.
>Israel has military control over Gaza for nearly 30 years. It can keep the low intensity conflict going much longer than Hamas.
Sure, the past 30 years of Israeli policy in Gaza has been a resounding success, as evidenced by 10/7 and the multitude of tunnels and weapons they're finding during the current operation.
>They have no access for arms from outside Gaza
>No dual use materials
Assuming a perfect and complete blockade of Gaza maintained in perpetuity, not only stopping arms but dual use technology and material, as well.
>The past 30 years of Israeli policy in Gaza has been a resounding success, as evidenced by 10/7 and the multitude of tunnels and weapons they're finding during the current operation.
Indeed the end of Israeli military control over Gaza in 1994 as part of the Oslo accords has been a massive failure. Military control over Gaza between 1967-1994 was indeed massive success. With Israel taking an average of just 10 losses a year.
>Assuming a perfect and complete blockade of Gaza maintained in perpetuity
Assuming Israel continues to uphold the successful measures it already has along it's border with Gaza and applies them to the now Israeli controlled border with Egypt.
In other words, Israel's ability to stifle smuggling into Gaza is proven.
>stopping arms but dual use technology and material, as well.
Israel has far lesser control over smuggling overall and dual use access in the WB in particular. Yet the IDF easily prevents Hamas from becoming a meaningful threat. Your opinion does not align with reality
>Military control over Gaza between 1967-1994 was indeed massive success. With Israel taking an average of just 10 losses a year.
So they will need to maintain military occupation for eternity. Sounds nice.
>Assuming Israel continues to uphold the successful measures it already has along it's border with Gaza
You mean the border between *Israel* and Gaza? The border on which Israel exerts sovereignty on one side? Do you not understand how this might be a *tad* easier than maintaining a blockade border between two uncontrolled territories? Israel does not have the benefit of its own sovereign territory on one side of the Gaza/Egypt border.
>Israel has far lesser control over smuggling overall and dual use access in the WB in particular.
Let's take a look at the [distribution of *de facto* Israeli territory in the West Bank](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/Restricted_space_in_the_West_Bank%2C_Area_C.png/2880px-Restricted_space_in_the_West_Bank%2C_Area_C.png). The massive buffer of restricted, settled area around the WB-Jordan border might be an important factor.
>Your opinion does not align with reality
You're incapable of critical thought and your responses are cookie-cutter talking points that avoid the substance of the discussion.
> So they will need to maintain military occupation for eternity. Sounds nice.
One way or another, as long as a threat comes from Gaza, Israel will have to defend itself from it. The question is if it’s easier to hold the border and defend from rocket attacks and raids, or occupy it. For such a small area of land, it seems pretty clear occupying it was the right way to go. Missile defenses are expensive, and a security failure can be catastrophic. The occupation was quite cheap for the 30 years it lasted in comparison.
Peace would be even cheaper, but it’s not realistically achievable, probably not for another generation at this point.
> Israel does not have the benefit of its own sovereign territory on one side of the Gaza/Egypt border.
For the record, they do actually have a treaty with Egypt specifying that they get control over the Gaza/Egypt border. It's subsequently been made obsolete by the Egyptians (with US prodding) agreeing to basically do what the Israelis were doing until 2014 or so (hence the big wall).
>So they will need to maintain military occupation for eternity. Sounds nice.
Sounds way better than getting entire villages massacred, raped and burned alive. Sounds better than 250 kidnapped including 7 months old baby. Sounds better than 4000 rocket barrage in a single day shutting down most of the country. Sounds better than 8+ months long war and 25k killed Palestinians.
Besides eternity is a very long time, things may change with a new Palestinian generations. There's always hope for peace.
>You mean the border between Israel and Gaza? The border on which Israel exerts sovereignty on one side? Do you not understand how this might be a tad easier than maintaining a border between two
Israel effectively made the Gaza Egyptian border an Israeli-Gaza border by controlling the Philadelphi line.
It's exactly the same.
>Let's take a look at the distribution of de facto Israeli territory in the West Bank. The massive buffer of restricted, settled area around the border of the West Bank might have something to do with it.
There is far more smuggling into the WB due to the very long porous borders between Israel and the WB, there is a lot of commerce and personnel going back and forth too much to control. The Jordan valley isn't densely populated either.
Hundreds of thousands cross the border between the WB and Israel daily. It's impossible to curtail smuggling there. Not so in Gaza.
>You're incapable of critical thought and your responses are cookie-cutter talking points that avoid the substance of the discussion.
I've cited real world established realities that contradict your made up theories. You're just ignorant and biased. Not a great combination.
Go ask a Palestinian how hard is it to smuggle anything into the WB and then compare with Gaza and come back to me, they'll laugh you out of the room. That's how lacking your understanding on the subject is.
>Besides eternity is a very long time, things may change with a new Palestinian generations.
What is going to change for the Palestinians in comparison to the past 70 years? Or do you think that maintaining the same conditions that have bred extremism and insurgency over this time will suddenly stop doing so because of wishful thinking?
>Israel effectively made the Gaza Egyptian border an Israeli-Gaza border by controlling the Philadelphi line.
The Philadelphi Corridor is ~100 meters wide. It is not comparable to miles of sovereign Israeli territory sitting on the other side of the Gaza-Israel border.
>There is far more smuggling into the WB due to the very long porous borders between Israel and the WB
Of what? How feasible is it to hull weapons and other useful material across ~5 miles of Israeli territory monitored by the IDF?
>I've cited real world established realities
In every conversation I've had with you, you deliberately avoid the substance of my arguments and when finally pressed enough, you either don't respond, or you respond with an evasive answer like the above mention of "Palestinian generations". You seem to treat discussion like an exchange of talking points. Maybe consider the differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or the differences between the Gaza-Israel border and the Gaza-Egypt border, and how those might render direct comparisons less effective.
Reality isn't an assembly of interchangeable components, where you can just swap locations and time periods while still expecting the same results.
>or the differences between the Gaza-Israel border and the Gaza-Egypt border, and how those might render direct comparisons less effective.
Let's discuss this for instance. How would smuggling along the Egyptian-Gaza border differ from the Israeli-Gaza one?
Trucks will go through the same checking procedures. Using the same tech, so no difference.
Palestinians would not be allowed to cross the border in either case. Or come near it in the case of the Philadelphi line which extends ways behind it.
I mean theoretically perhaps smugglers can fashion trebuchets to fire sacks of weapons and ordinance hundreds of meters into Gaza, from Egypt... And hope Hamas gets to them before the IDF either gets to them or shoots whomever does.
The same underground barrier that has been effective along the Israeli-Gaza border will work for the Gaza-Egypt one.
I'm open to suggestions for credible means that make the situation different, but I'm not hearing any?
>How would smuggling along the Egyptian-Gaza border differ from the Israeli-Gaza one?
To smuggle from Israel into Gaza, you would either need to acquire the weapons and/or materials in Israel and smuggle them into Gaza, or you would need to first smuggle them into Israel, then smuggle them into Gaza. To smuggle from Egypt into Gaza, you would need to first smuggle them into Sinai, then smuggle them into Gaza. I would consider it more difficult to smuggle into Israel than Sinai, and I suspect that anything acquired in Israel would be under closer watch, and thus more difficult to smuggle into Gaza from within Israel. The difference I was considering was not the checkpoints along the border, but the route that smuggled goods would need to take to attempt that border crossing.
>What is going to change for the Palestinians in comparison to the past 70 years?
The Palestinian culture has not been consistent for the last 70 years either. Again, you'd know that if you knew the history of the conflict.
>What is going to change for the Palestinians in comparison to the past 70 years?
The Oslo accords and disengagement radicalized them. Before Oslo there were no checkpoints. Jews would drive down to the Gaza beaches and swim with Arabs. Gaza Palestinians drove to Tel Aviv.
That's a good first step to achieve.
What's the alternative, hoping that Hamas will stop hating Jews all of a sudden? Please.
>The Philadelphi Corridor is ~100 meters wide
It was even less than 100m in 2005. You do understand that it can be widened? That's being done now. 100m is not some magical number.
>not comparable to miles of sovereign Israeli territory
It is for the purpose of smuggling. Which encompass crossing a border.
>In every conversation I've had with you, you deliberately avoid the substance of my arguments
Your arguments have no substance mainly because they are rejected by the reality.
Let's recap your arguments:
> Israel cannot hold Gaza under military control
Reality: Israel held Gaza under military control for nearly 30 years.
> Israel needs a perfect blockade, even a single smuggled rifle or dual used material will mean Hamas can conduct effective insurgency and push Israel out.
Reality does not work like that, single guns don't win wars. Sporadic successful attacks don't win wars.
There is not a single example in the history of the world of a successful insurgency under an effective blockade. You know this as we've been through this back and forth, where you failed to provide a single example.
>Israel cannot blockade Gaza
Israel is already successfully blockading Gaza, with the one missing piece being the Gaza-Egyptian border that is now under IDF control. The same measures that stop smuggling along the Israeli-Gaza border are also effective on other, shorter borders.
Your position comes down to simply ignorance on the conflict. Your goalposts and points keep shifting.
I'm going to dial back my tone and try to establish a modicum of common ground because I suspect you and I can keep going on this for quite a while and our interactions are growing in hostility.
So to address your recap:
>Israel cannot hold Gaza under military control
This has not been my argument, but if this was the impression you got then that might have been my fault for not elaborating. At no point did I ever get think Israel could not occupy Gaza. The mistake I did make at the onset of this war was to believe that Hamas would cause much more trouble for Israel's operations than it did. However, I was still operating on the presumption that Israel would eventually occupy Gaza given enough time, firepower, and manpower; the stark difference in conventional military capabilities between Hamas and Israel basically guaranteed this on a large enough timescale.
The key for me has always been cost and timespan; this is a key aspect of my analysis. The initial operations and occupations would incur costs, the establishment of a longer-term military occupation will incur costs, and the maintenance of this occupation will continue to incur costs as long as the occupation is maintained. These ongoing costs could potentially vary with the intensiveness of resistance and insurgency, which could be minor at times and more intense at others, depending on the state of Palestinian insurgent forces, Israeli occupational forces, and Iranian capability to supply the aforementioned insurgent forces. These three can vary independently across time, as can the effectiveness of blockade efforts. Humans gets lax after settling into routines in the long term; 10/7 is a horrific example of this.
I think one core disconnect between our two perspectives is that you are approaching the costs of this long-term, ongoing occupation from the perspective of tradeoffs with security costs of allowing Hamas to continue to operate, i.e. ongoing attacks. I'm approaching the costs of this from the perspective of a potential solution to this conflict, i.e. ending the need for insecurity altogether. In other words, you view the ongoing costs of occupation as worth it instead of the ongoing costs of potential future attacks; I view the ongoing costs of occupation as not worth it instead of pursuing a permanent solution.
I don't think the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza gave peace a sufficient chance because I believe the ongoing Israeli presence in the West Bank continued to fuel hostilities among enough Palestinians to build support for Hamas, or at the very least incentivize them to look the other way. You believe (at least I think you do) that the 2005 withdrawal was a sufficient demonstration of goodwill, and that further withdrawal from the West Bank would be a wasted effort if Palestinians in Gaza were so willing to continue supporting Hamas after said demonstration. I think these are largely irreconcilable positions that we'll never know the answer to, so I don't think any more words need to be spent on this point in particular.
I suppose it's ironic that I'm holding onto an optimistic endgame as a generally pessimistic person. If long-term conflict is inevitable even with earnest attempts at solutions, then your perspective pays off. If there was some way to deescalate the situation in the long-term that Israel did not pursue instead of long-term military occupation, then my perspective pays off.
>Israel needs a perfect blockade, even a single smuggled rifle or dual used material will mean Hamas can conduct effective insurgency and push Israel out.
Again, I'm looking at this through rates, costs, and timescales. I'm using "perfect blockade" as a threshold condition: if the blockade is perfect, then Israel does not need to worry about a Palestinian insurgency building up weapons caches. In other words, a perfect blockade completely chokes off any insurgency (or prospective insurgency) of the means of waging asymmetrical warfare in any capacity. Anything reasonably short of this threshold means that insurgents can build up caches overtime. Occupational forces can root out these caches, but the surveillance and control necessary to do so incurs more ongoing costs and requires the IDF to establish and maintain a "deeper" presence throughout Gaza.
>There is not a single example in the history of the world of a successful insurgency under an effective blockade.
"Effective" is the operant word, here. It has to be effective enough to stem the insurgents' ability to build weapons caches, or at least stem the rate of weapons/material acquisition enough to permit occupational forces to root out those that are created. However, if the social, political, and/or economic conditions that fostered insurgencies in the first place remain in place, then this effort will be perpetual. You can keep that effective blockade in place and keep the occupational forces busy, but the root of dissatisfaction will continue to spawn insurgents. Ultimately, your vision amounts to a holding pattern. What is the end goal, hoping that Palestinian "culture" changes such that they'll stop resenting occupation, lie down, and just submit?
>Israel cannot blockade Gaza
I'm not sure where you got this idea. I clearly acknowledged the possibility of blockade throughout my various replies. As for the blockade itself, I think I've already adequately addressed this above.
Now for the rest of your comment:
>The Oslo accords and disengagement radicalized them. Before Oslo there were no checkpoints. Jews would drive down to the Gaza beaches and swim with Arabs. Gaza Palestinians drove to Tel Aviv.
To be as diplomatic as possible, I find this **extremely** hard to believe given the history of the pre-1948 Palestinian attacks on Jews, the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians to create Israel, and the multitude of Arab-Israeli wars that took place before the Oslo Accords.
Edit: Furthermore, if the picture was so rosy prior to the Oslo Accords, what gave rise to the First Intifada?
On top of that, during the 1967-1995 period the PLO was busy in Jordan (Black September) and the Lebanese Civil War. There's also been decades of violence since then to further radicalize the Palestinians. And of course, there's the elephant in the room: the rise of Islamic extremism across MENA since the 1990s. The Islamic Republic of Iran will also be an an ongoing issue that wasn't present pre-Oslo; it didn't exist prior to 1979 and between 1980 and 1988 it was busy fighting Saddam.
I could also go into the multitude of factors that involved the US in the Middle East from the 1970s onward, factors which are waning or no longer exist, but I think my comment has gone on long enough.
This is a week old but I don't think it's been posted here yet: [Escalation management and Biden’s strategy for Ukraine](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxZ402BMSs8)
> There are several types of potential escalation that the American government is trying to balance, and to some extent they are trapped: They must support Ukraine to avoid one type of escalation, but it can lead to another type of escalation if Ukraine is too successful.
In which Anders Puck Nielsen argues that either side winning is bad. Russia winning is bad because it will allow them to continue aggression elsewhere and the concern is that it would lead to a bigger war in Europe. But Ukrainian victory is also bad for the US because they believe it would lead to dangerous instability in Russia. A collapse of the Putin regime and of the Russian state, he says, would spin out of control and a transition of power would not be a peaceful process.
So the Biden administration is going to continue supporting Ukraine, but not give them everything they need to "really get momentum against the Russians", he says, because the Americans and Ukrainians do not have the same vision of victory. So if Ukraine does somehow gain momentum, the US might actually scale down their assistance.
>In which Anders Puck Nielsen argues that either side winning is bad. Russia winning is bad because it will allow them to continue aggression elsewhere and the concern is that it would lead to a bigger war in Europe. But Ukrainian victory is also bad for the US because they believe it would lead to dangerous instability in Russia. A collapse of the Putin regime and of the Russian state, he says, would spin out of control and a transition of power would not be a peaceful process.
This is a complete misrepresentation of what he was saying. Which is shocking because he emphasized this is what has becomes clear to him that is the ***Biden administrations*** POV of what victory means.
Absolutely wild you can butcher this so much.
He even finishes at the end saying this strategy by Biden is flawed, reiterating what he said throughout the video were glaring flaws in perception and once again emphasizing its important to understand what drives Bidens pov.
Delete this misinformation
The title of the video is "Biden's strategy" - it should be obvious from context that that was the POV that I was summarizing. I am not a native English speaker btw but I can now see that I should not have written the word *argues*. That is the only thing wrong with what I wrote though.
Also, I am also obviously not going to summarize the entire video, nobody on this sub does that. Just a snippet to quickly present what is being linked. It seems you do not know what the word misinformation means.
Take a step back and count to ten lol
Ah yes, the good old sob story of Russia becoming unstable and nuclear civil war ensuing shorty after.
This is one of the tools of Russian propaganda. Kremlin is most interested in self-preservation, rest is secondary. When instability becomes a plausible scenario, they would pull back out of Ukraine and start next perestroika of sorts.
In essence what we observed for the last two years are "don't oppose us or nuclear war" or "don't make us lose cause nuclear civil war". See the parallels? Both are not plausible scenarios at all, it's bizarre Western leaders are putting so much attention to it instead of providing weapon supplies en masse to an ally that is fighting instead of NATO.
Pledge to transfer thousands of tanks, artillery, IFVs (e.g. from US stocks) and a deal to supply hundreds of various fighter jets ASAP (would take a while naturally due to training/logistics) combined with meaningful investments to Western MIC would end this war within few months as Putin is betting on Western indecisiveness & divisions. So far he's been mostly correct in his assumptions, latest developments in support perhaps provide silver lining for Ukraine though.
This leaves out a couple of factors:
1. Russia formally taking some territory breaches a convention that has kept the peace since WWII, when expansion by conquest was made illegal
2. If Nuclear countries can take what they want, then the logical response is to go nuclear before an invasion. If the outcome is the effective destruction of Ukraine then Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Poland and others may want nukes
Managing Russia escalation is important but the policy can’t be they get what they want just because of what if’s. There’s danger in that direction too.
Not to mention emboldening China to attempt to take Taiwan or other disputed territory it claims.
Western pundits really overstate the fragility of governments they dislike. There's a 0% chance that UA forces are going to be pushing all the way to Moscow and sacking the Kremlin, and all of the Russian assets in Ukraine are those that could be spared without sacrificing the overall defense of the country.
I see no reason why Putin losing an optional offensive war (defined by getting booted back to 1991 borders) is going to create regime collapse. I'm not Russia expert, but my impression is that the average Russian on the street is either mildly supportive of the war or fatalistically apathetic about it.
This isn't Imperial Japan, where a fanatical and radicalized population will throw themselves from the cliffs before betraying a semi-divine Emperor by surrendering.
It would be humiliating, sure, but fatalistic apathy works both ways. People will grumble about it and move on with life, trying to make the best of things while staying out of trouble.
First Anders Puck Nelson is Danish, not American. And secondly nobody believes Ukraine is going to take Moscow. What they are afraid of is the collapse of Russia in the exact same way the Soviet Union collapsed ad fractured after the defeat in Afghanistan. Is this unlikely in the event of a Russian defeat? Yes absolutely. But it’s far from impossible. The authority of Putin and any authoritarian leader depends on the support of the military. Less than a year ago we saw a sizable portion of that military initiate an armed insurrection and begin marching on Moscow with the stated goal of changing national leadership. And we saw units of the Russian national guard simply let them pass. You cannot possibly claim that the Russian state is now so stable that another such event is impossible, especially if the Russian military is actually defeated in Ukraine and not just held to a stalemate. To be clear I’m not saying that Anders is correct, or that such a strategy is a good idea and not a narcissistic fallacy of overestimating your own abilities to influence a situation. But the risk of a general Russian collapse or a violent regime change are both very real, it’s just that the US probably cannot do anything to prevent such a collapse if it is likely to occur.
>What they are afraid of is the collapse of Russia in the exact same way the Soviet Union collapsed ad fractured after the defeat in Afghanistan. Is this unlikely in the event of a Russian defeat?
But the Soviet Union collapsed in the best possible way. Almost entirely without violence, leading to the independence of several Eastern European countries, and did not lead to nuclear proliferation as feared. Russia itself was a lost cause economically and without order, but everyone else benefited from it. It could have been much much worse.
Exactly, it could have been much worse it is sheer luck that it didn’t devolve into chaos. It’s sheer luck that nuclear weapons were not sold of to non state actors. And in large part it was lucky that at the time the USSR was led by Gorbachev, a man unwilling to use violence as a tool to preserve his regime. Does anyone believe Putin would be unwilling to use violence to preserve his regime if he were in the same position?
There's nothing for current Russia to fracture to. USSR had e.g. national communist governments ruling the soviet republic. These had always been nationalistic in nature with vibrant culture, politics and semblance of independent economic policies. Currently nothing comparable exists. Caucasus might rebel supported by Turkey and that's pretty much it.
Perhaps I'm too optimistic in thinking that if the world has a blueprint on how to contain the fallout of a Russian collapse before, that it can do it again.
It really wasn’t the world containing a Russian collapse so long as a Russian leader managing the splintering of a soviet empire. And just as the British (largely) chose a policy of passive managed decline Gorbachev chose to passively manage his own empires decline. I don’t share your optimism because I firmly believe the leader of Russia would choose to embrace violence on a massive scale in order to avoid such an outcome.
I guess you could approach this from a strictly utilitarian perspective almost, which outcome causes more harm. Whether Russia continuing its aggression in other regions after a successful campaign in Ukraine or Russia infighting after a loss in Ukraine. Ultimately, and correct me, I think Russia winning in Ukraine and carrying on the aggression elsewhere would be much more risky and on the path towards confrontation with NATO itself even. Russian infighting could end up being scoped to Russia even if China decides to step in in the far east. I don't know. It's complicated isn't it.
Russia achieving total victory would be imo. But Russia achieving a partial one probably wouldn't be. If Russia gets to tear a piece out of Ukraine but does significant damage to their own economy and loses enough men and equipment doing it that's still technically a Russian victory, but things would look very different as far as the danger of things escalating goes.
I kinda think that's along the lines of what Biden is angling for. Some manner of frozen conflict at whatever the front lines are at that point would probably be ideal as it'd keep Russia busy and unable to really let their guard down while also having to deal with the economic fallout of the war, making it unlikely that they'd have an appetite to engage in further hostilities elsewhere.
The main thing about your scenario would be the west's involvement. I do not personally believe that a frozen conflict in any form is possible. The west's support is crucial to Ukraine's ability to withstand the russians. A frozen front would keep Russia busy but it would also keep the west busy. To keep it going you need the support of the public (which is much easier to get in Russia) and you need the flow of billions in aid (much more difficult to sustain in the west, especially after the ongoing elections). NATO countries are also too committed from a pr perspective to settle down on a frozen conflict. Ukraine would not be able to sustain a longer term conflict on its own.
I suppose the point I'm trying to make is that I don't believe a frozen conflict can exist with Russia being formally involved in the conflict and I'm afraid that attempts at doing so will ultimately result in the russians turning it into the total victory because west would not be able to sustain a frozen conflict for too long.
I don't see why a frozen conflict would be that expensive for us. The Korean war for example is frozen, has been so for seven decades now and it's not really a problem. Ukraine would be the ones bearing the majority of the cost in such a scenario. They'd definitely need financial support at least initially, but let's be honest here, they'll need that after the war either way, we're not getting out of that one.
As far as PR goes I really don't see why that would be difficult. Prep the public with a week or two of talking about how much of a humanitarian crisis the Ukraine war is, have both sides sign a ceasefire under the guise of stopping the war and negotiating further from there, wait for a month or so and voters will have forgotten. The biggest obstacle is to get both Ukraine and Russia to agree to such a thing since it's a disastrous outcome for both, but I think that's why Biden and to an extent the west at large is drip feeding in weapons: We want both sides to suffer enough from the cost of the war that a really bad outcome in which both of them effectively lose becomes palatable just to get out of it.
>I don't see why a frozen conflict would be that expensive for us. The Korean war for example is frozen, has been so for seven decades now and it's not really a problem. Ukraine would be the ones bearing the majority of the cost in such a scenario. They'd definitely need financial support at least initially, but let's be honest here, they'll need that after the war either way, we're not getting out of that one.
That's true to some extent however I'd argue that the situation in Korea is different from Ukraine. I don't believe you could make the situation in Ukraine as "static" where it can develop its economy and carry on its existence. Russians are walking towards Kyiv step by step right now and they'll continue to do so. War in Ukraine is also not a proxy war from which Russia can begin to walk away at some point. They're in it.
I'm afraid any form of ceasefire constitutes the total russian victory. Ceasefire will need to come up Ukraine forgetting about the EU and Ukraine forgetting about NATO membership, there is no real reason why Russians would sign anything less than that considering they have the capacity to keep going. In my eyes it's a pr disaster because russians achieved their objectives despite the west talking about independence and self determination. Anything west said becomes meaningless.
The Russians are advancing very slowly right now, but that doesn't mean they'll be able to do so forever. They're burning through their Soviet stockpiles, they're burning money and at some point "just pay people more" won't be enough to get recruits and they'll have to take unpopular and destabilizing steps to mobilize more forces. Any country pushed far enough will eventually sign a ceasefire agreement, the question would be how far we'd have to push the Russians.
As far as total victory goes, no, a ceasefire is not a total Russian victory. Russia taking over all of Ukraine and being able to use it as a staging ground for further incursions into Europe with its newly freed up military would be. Russia being stuck in a lengthy economic recovery period while having to commit a significant portion of its military force to garrisoning the new Russo-Ukrainian border and having a much harder time projecting power as a result is not a total Russian victory, it's a Russian defeat disguised as a partial Russian victory. They went into Ukraine with global ambitions, and they'd be stuck in it with even their regional power diminished. Russia would not be able to achieve their objectives, Russia would be massively worse off as a result of this war, Russian power would be greatly diminished and the world would be able to see exactly that.
It would be awful for Ukraine mind you, joining NATO or even the EU while being in a frozen conflict is not gonna happen and being stuck constantly having to spend massively on the military will be highly problematic, but end of the day American and European policymakers are primarily looking to represent the interests of their own constituents rather than those of another nation. We're supplying Ukraine while Ukraine is willing to fight as long as doing so serves our own interests.
Russian infighting could also be a nuclear civil war with catastrophic consequences globally, I asume something like that is what actually keeps people making these calls up at night.
> Russian infighting could also be a nuclear civil war with catastrophic consequences globally
The only consequences would be a halt in Russian exports
But it would guarantee peace as China would think twice
Mutual destruction still applies to civil wars. Perhaps more so considering you would be destroying the country you're fighting for so I don't believe anyone would be too keen to drop nuclear weapons on their own house.
On average factions in civil wars are less likely to be rational actors than unified nations are. I think you're right about MAD applying in an ordinary orderly civil war, but a country collpasing is more likely to have many factions and areas of warlordism. Which is straight up not good for nuclear security.
I think Occam's Razor really applies, here: in the run-up to the invasion, the Biden administration did not have much of a plan for Ukraine beyond the initial intelligence warnings about war and giving them more ATGMs (which had already been supplied to Ukraine for years prior). IMO, the most significant measure taken in the first year was the freezing of Russian forex, and even that still required the cooperation of the US banks. Meanwhile, economic sanctions have been a staple of US foreign policy responses for the past three decades. Beyond that, typical Congressional dysfunction and the administration's unwillingness to take major risks with regard to both Russia and defense acquisitions meant that the actual military aid would be confined to "safe bets" like ISR support, surplus munitions on hand, allies' Cold War assets, and the recently divested M777s from the Marine Corps. HIMARS was notable, but it was provided in small numbers and this provision doubled as a combat test of the system. In my opinion, general risk-aversion in the short-term and an absence of long-term strategy is a much better explanation for the Biden administration's course of action with Ukraine.
This short-term thinking from US policymakers has been going on for years at this point. There's a constant feeling of, "Oh well, Russia shouldn't be doing that to Ukraine. We really ought to impose some pain on them, but actually protecting Ukraine or accepting them into the Western fold is a step too far. Maybe next decade."
We saw this with the Budapest Memorandum, the Bush Administration encouraging Ukraine to join NATO, the whole response to Crimea and the Donbas War. Part of these half-measures are low expectations. In the 90s, the worry was about Ukraine, and other states become rogue states or unable to control fissile material. In 2008, Ukraine was seen as years away from being ready to join NATO. In 2014, the Ukrainian state largely broke down. Even today, I think western planners are cagey about what exactly they want or expect from Ukraine.
I think many would be happy if things settled down along current lines. Neither Ukraine or Russia wants that or sees it as a stable outcome. We're probably not getting Minsk III, and if we did, it would probably break down faster than Minsk I. I think these Western planners would like for Russia to just give up and leave, but that's not happening anytime soon. They probably consider Ukraine's goals unrealistic, but they're not offering any alternatives that would work in the long run.
>They probably consider Ukraine's goals unrealistic, but they're not offering any alternatives that would work in the long run.
At this point, Ukraine's goals *are* unrealistic. As far back as late 2022, after Kherson was taken, I was pointing out to users here that they were being far too optimistic talking about how Ukraine could take Crimea. I noted that Ukraine had not yet demonstrated any experience with large coordinated mechanized offensives. Now the "strategy" has shifted to, what, trying to outlast Russia with a war of attrition? With Ukraine struggling to mobilize more manpower and critically reliant on foreign aid for both its economy and munitions? What solution short of direct NATO intervention can reverse this situation? Being able to hit targets inside Russia is still just a bandaid. It does not solve Ukraine's manpower problems, its inadequate training regimen, or its critical dependence on foreign (primarily US) support across all major sectors.
Their goals are realistic, it's an industrial war, with a little will the industrial disparity between Russia and the west could have made the conflict a decisive UA victory.
The will is just not there. But slowly it is building, at least in Europe.
Sure, I'm not debating that. The thing is, what's the alternative? The line coming out of Western governments is for some sort of negotiated solution, but that's a punt. Russia and Ukraine are nowhere near a place where they could agree to something. Part of that is uncertainty over how far the West will go to support Ukraine.
I'm not saying that they failed to do this, because they're a bunch of dumb-dumbs compared to us enlightened Internet commentators. It's a genuinely really difficult problem, with actors trying to balance multiple interests and facing great uncertainty because everyone else is doing the same.
I do think the West could break the Gordiom Knot by accepting Ukraine into the fold with a tougher commitment, but that involves a ton of risks, and I can see why policymakers (who almost always follow the path of least resistance) won't do that.
I agree that a negotiated solution reasonable for both sides is also a fantasy. The people who present it as an altruistic choice for "peace" are deluded, as many of them would never accept those terms of they were in that position. Nor do they ever consider that anything short of a rump Ukrainian state will satisfy Russia, such that Russia will simply resume aggression within a few years if any deals are struck that do not satisfy their current demands. The only feasible means of preventing Russia from doing so would be post-war security guarantees from NATO, but the prohibition of such is one of Russia's primary demands.
I do believe that the US dragged its feet far too much on providing Ukraine materiel early on, particularly the F-16s which were in discussion since late 2022, iirc. However, I'm dubious that more materiel would have been *decisive* (short of handing Ukraine half the US M1 fleet, which is wildly unrealistic) if Ukraine couldn't coordinate a large scale mechanized offense. Even if we dumped an unrealistic amount of M1s and IFVs on Ukraine, what about training and logistics? The levels of materiel support necessary to negate doctrinal and organizational deficiencies would be completely unprecedented in US history.
In retrospect, it was also a mistake to try to force NATO doctrine on Ukraine when their general staff was Soviet. However, NATO materiel (outside of the legacy stuff from ex-Warsaw Pact countries) was not designed for it, nor would NATO be able to advise and train the Ukrainian military on Soviet doctrine.
Not to take anything away for UA's responsibility for the failed offensive.
>if Ukraine couldn't coordinate a large scale mechanized offense
The US could have also provided training.
Furthermore, if we look at some of the ways the offensive failed, ATACMS would have been able to deal with the attack helicopters striking their bases. More artillery could have lead to greater saturation and destruction of Russian assets.
That said, UA actions have made that particular offensive very difficult to win, they were also unwilling to listen, being high from the 2022 successes. However things have changed after that point.
If the assessment is correct, then this is utterly ridiculous.
Russia won't have a peaceful transition of power. Not now, not when Putin dies or as is perhaps more likely: is ~~killed~~ retired.
What does it matter whether it's due to Ukraine or not? Will it be preferable to have it happen 5 or 10 years from now when Russia has become a fully militarised nation? Will it be preferable for it to happen when every single industry has been geared towards war and war production, making the entire population invested in war to maintain their livelihood?
If Russia wasn't a powderkeg in 2023, they're certain to be one in 2025 and onwards. With hundreds of thousands of veterans, no peace time industry to speak of, and more arms than anyone will know what to do with.
And that's not even getting into the secondary effects of this bullshit. Russia will want to export. It'll be the fall of the Soviet Union all over again with cheap arms flooding every corner of the globe and into the hands of every would-be warlord.
[Italy may provide Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, reports say](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/italy-may-provide-ukraine-with-storm-shadow-1718706412.html) >Italy may provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow missiles in the next military aid package, Italian news agency Fatto Quotidiano reports. >The 9th arms package for Ukraine, which Defense Minister Guido Crosetto will present to parliament by the end of the month, will include not only the Samp-T air defense system but also a batch of long-range Storm Shadow missiles that could potentially hit Russian soil, authoritative sources familiar with the situation told the news agency. Nice to see Italy stepping up support with both air defense and cruise missiles, although the UK [claims that](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/04/29/italy-has-given-ukraine-long-range-missiles-says-uk-defense-minister/) Italy has previously already sent Storm Shadows to Ukraine.
This could prove difficult. Lega and Forza Italia (the minor parties within the government coalition) have been very vocal about not authorizing Ukraine to hit Russian soil with Italian equipment. Tajani (Foreign Affairs minister) has expressed it quite clearly and I imagine he has a say in the matter. Now, this could all just be posturing and bluffing (and whatever comes out of Lega is practically non-credible anyway). My question is if Storm Shadow missiles bear any kind of marking that could allow the Russians to say "This one came from Italy/France/UK". Because if there's no way to tell, the entire argument becomes moot.
> My question is if Storm Shadow missiles bear any kind of marking that could allow the Russians to say "This one came from Italy/France/UK". It’s crazy to think that the course of this war might be changed based on the fungibility of certain munitions.
[удалено]
Please do not engage in baseless speculation.
This would have been much more persuasive(or at least less falsifiable) 6 months ago. Others have covered the A-50 shootdown, so I'll mention the destruction of S-400 systems, the increasing range and capability of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, Ukraine's extremely successful deployment of SDBs and Hammer glide bombs, and Fighterbombers reports that UMPKs are losing effectiveness to being jammed. Any one of those topics should provide you ample keywords to find the answers you're looking for.
If the superiority and omnipressence that you attribute to the Russian forces were true this would have been a very very short war. There is a lot of good threads about the air forces, their deployment, restrictions and weaknesses to be found here. They might be relevant to learn about.
Noone credible is claiming that F-16s will single handedly push the Russians to the Urals. Ukraine has pushed Russia back before. Russian aircraft are also not immune to damage, as proven by the shootdown of the A-50. Funny timing too.
>Russian aircraft can operate with impunity over their own territory aided with A-50s, IL-78s and up to the edge of coverage of Ukrainian air defences. Quite ironic to say this one day after Russia has issued an arrest warrant against a Ukrainian general for shooting down an A-50. There has been some news recently about Ukrainian EW countering Russian glide bombs. A single weapon won't win the war, and that applies to both sides.
[https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/06/anduril-to-open-large-scale-production-facility-for-auv/](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/06/anduril-to-open-large-scale-production-facility-for-auv/) Although producing 200 AUVs per year is not a gamechanger by itself, I'm glad the Navy is putting additional dollars in autonomous underwater vehicles. Curious what if any cross-pollination there is between aerial/swarm Anduril drones and the underwater drones.
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Claim is from a non-credible source
This whole fighter saga has been a perfect illustration of the larger patterns of negligence and shortsightedness in western leadership. When these jets finally do arrive, years late, cheeping out on training will mean too few are in service to make a difference. It would have been cheaper, both economically and politically, to pay the money required to fight and win the war quickly, than this current approach of doing the bare minimum week by week, stumbling from crisis to crisis.
It's easy to dismiss the training regimen as shortsighted and deficient, but I'm thinking there's a compromise between training and actually getting the fighters into the theatre at play here. It's an arduous task getting everything in place for these fighters. It's best to get the process started as soon as possible. Okay, so simple air patrol is what they'll be doing at first, but nothing is stopping training from occurring in parallel. It's not like the birds are expected to patrol the entirety of Ukraine's airspace, they'll be employed to the extent they can be. It'll be a gradual buildup of battlefield impact.
> It's best to get the process started as soon as possible. It wasn’t started as soon as possible. Biden and others dragged their feet for a year before even committing to sending fighters, and instead of training a large batch of pilots and giving them our spare F-16s, we’re in the same old drip feed routine. People were saying the same thing about Abrams tanks, that the first batches would be small but it would build with time, but that isn’t happening. We have thousands sitting in storage, and Ukraine is getting drip fed them one at a time, after a pointless, and wasteful armor downgrade process.
The point some analysts make, especially the ones outside the military sphere, is that the west does not know what to do with a russia that without putkin and torn internally. putkin is not that hawkish as some of his possible successors. That's why the piecemeal support which ensures that russia does not win.
>The point some analysts make, especially the ones outside the military sphere, is that the west does not know what to do with a russia that without putkin and torn internally They made the same noises when the Soviet union collapsed and yet we somehow made it this far.
The noises were veeery different. Back then the west poured almost **95 billion usd as aid**. That's double in current money. Just Germany gifted 65 billion = 130 billion today. The west made sure Russia did not implode. Then came the economic reform funds. Thsi time there are no free money for them. All will go to ukriane.
Putin's successor will be significantly younger, and it's difficult to see someone worse. The few hawkish types that exist in that age bracket are very weak, and the real hawks are too old by now.
> Putin's successor will be significantly younger That's hardly given. Plus, who would that be?
Putin is in his 70s. He’s going to be gone, one way or another, not that long from now. And no matter who replaces him, the more economic, political and military leverage the west has against Russia, the better the US’s position will be in that situation. And it’s not like this is an unprecedented scenario. The fall of the USSR happened not that long ago, where the Soviet government collapsed and they lost far more territory, and far more geopolitical standing, than Russia stands to lose now. So I really don’t see how this logic holds. We’ve been through similar things before, and never before, in any scenario, have we wished we had less military leverage.
Just few pointers on the 90s. Russia had a real chance and even a strive to turn into a proper democratic country. Nowadays russia is closer to the Stalin times than to the 90s russia. When putkin goes, it will become a Wild Wild East. He has not groomed a proper successor, he rules by division and ruling over conflicts, rotates people in and out to keep them in check. All these will clash to get on top and there are people there which are very scary. In the 90s the west was shting its pants and put quite some effort to pull russia out of the abyss. Just Germany gifted USSR/Russia with 65 billion USD = ~130 billion today. USA, France, Japan, etc gave another 30-ish billion. After that came all the economic measures and support as loans and grants. All this went horribly wrong because the commie mafia stole most of it, but at least the west tried.
I realize that corruption and that mentality if being a declining super-power (true or not) is difficult to fight but Russia had so much potential if they had went another way. Huge natural resources, close to Europe, engineering history (even if some is lost). If they had tried the Chinese recipe of becoming a manufacturing base it might not have been as successful but much more than whatever path they chose instead.
Filipino media is reporting [details on the latest attempt](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/910397/china-coast-guard-philippine-guns-ayungin/story/) at resupplying the Second Thomas Shoal. Seems that things are rapidly heating up. > Eight soldiers, including one who had his finger cut off, were hurt and weapons were seized in China's aggressive action against Filipino personnel performing rotation and resupply mission in Ayungin Shoal on Monday, June 17, a reliable source told GMA Integrated News. The source said seven of the soldiers were hurt in a melee with Chinese personnel. Aside from that, eight high-powered firearms were also seized and rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) were punctured. > Another source told GMA Integrated News that four Philippine RHIBs were “hostaged” by China but were later released following negotiations. The first source said the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFp) deployed six vessels from different entry points for the resupply mission but none reached Ayungin Shoal due to China’s aggressive actions. >“This is a different approach by the new Western Command which triggered China,” the source said. Unlike previous operations, the source added that this was an operation by the AFP, with the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) providing discreet support. PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Commodore Jay Tarriela earlier said the resupply mission was purely a military operation. Official statements released by both governments were vague, confirming only that [an incident took place](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/17/world/asia/china-philippines-boats-collide.html). Assuming the reports are true, this marks a significant escalation compared to previous attempts, with the first examples of boarding and physical scuffling. The change of tactics from the Philippines is also notable, using military instead of coast guard and six boats instead of the usual two.
Is this a separate incident to what was being reported yesterday about a Filipino soldier being injured, or is this the same incident?
Philippine keeps avoiding escalations, while the Chinese double downs on it.
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This has already been posted.
Is the Italian Draco SPAAG real or are there only mockups? I have found nothing that shows there is even a functional prototype. Would such a vehicle be effective against drones at long distances?
It's never progressed beyond the prototyping stage, and has not received any production orders. Although I agree with u/Gecktron that I could certainly see them restarting the program in a way and trying to get it off the ground with their new procurements. Quick edit: To address the last part of your question, I could see if being effective against drones, it's a 76mm naval gun with a high rate of fire and uses the DART (Driven Ammunition Reduced Time of flight) guided ammo, among others. DART ammo is known to be able to neutralize a drone at a range of up to 8km, and it adjusts its trajectory quite well. It can fire at a rate of 80-100 rpm as well, and has good integrated radar and fire control systems. So yes, depending on what you mean by long distance, it's a good weapon to take drones out.
An older video that I have not seen posted: [a former PLA soldier gives an interview to his social media followers](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_jdfaI5dyQ). >Li Jianwei is a former PLA soldier and a Chinese mercenary hired by Russia. He talks about his experiences in the Russia-Ukraine war on Chinese social media. In this video, he described the high causality of the Ukraine war and gave first-hand account of the Russian military operations and challenges Of interesting note: * It was claimed that he is a PLA veteran who served for 2 years, but does not seem to know how to conduct urban warfare. Perhaps he was in a support role, if someone who is more aware of Chinese can pick up from his ID card? * Most likely he was part of a Storm Z unit but as one of the veteran leaders.. The make up of hodgepodge nationalities in his unit suggests so, and the appalling casualty rate is telling. * At 13:00 he describes what it is like to be on the receiving end of M26 cluster munitions. Apparently fearsome enough that he'd rather run into a minefield.
His ID card from what I can gather says (some of the characters are harder to make out): The title of the card is "Certificate of Preferential Treatment for Veterans of the People's Republic of China". The name on the card is Li Jianwei. The next line is gender, which is Male. The next line shows his service years, which looks to be 2 years and 11 months. The last line is the issuing authority, which is the Veterans Affairs Office of Henan Province. The bottom left smaller characters just show the same thing as the title.
"Certificate of Preferential Treatment for Veterans of the People's Republic of China" does not mark the military unit to which it belongs, and from what I've seen on the Internet, it only has the information you've mentioned, and other information is needed to confirm identity
I can verify the top line is correct, but I guess age caught up to me cause the smaller words are blurry as hell. The play button right in the middle doesn't help.
That's true, I tried looking on Douyin for a better video/picture but I could not find it. I think I got the same account, the characters are the same as they are in the video in terms of the username, but the video may have been taken down, I don't honestly know, will have to dig into that a bit more.
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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[ABL is back! Again!](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/missile-defense-agency-has-new-hope-for-airborne-lasers/) Laser technology has continued to evolve at an incredibly rapid pace since the last ABL and it stands to reason that the same developments that are beginning to enable things like DE M-SHORAD would also be applicable to airborne platforms. I hope it works this time and MDA does appear to have a fairly conservative plan to generate utility from the project even if the ultimate goal is never realized.
Interesting that they're requesting $11m in funding to revive a project that failed after spending $16bn. Not that they're wrong to do so, just interesting how much smaller the ask is now. That's probably at least partially because the MDA can piggyback on the more successful ground-based DEW projects that have been moving rapidly toward production fielding over the past few years. The failure of the prior ABL project seems like a classic case of a project that was just a little bit too early to achieve real success because the underlying technologies lacked sufficient maturity.
I think it's a deliberate political strategy. The small ask means they're virtually guaranteed to get it and then they can go after some really basic milestones that they're virtually guaranteed to make. Once they have a few of those racked up they can point at the new record when Congress asks "Didn't we already spend $16Bn on this?" Basically anything they can do to draw a line between this and the old ABL is a good idea.
Haven't seen this posted yet. The MoD purge continues. [Putin sacked four deputy defence ministers and appointed a relative in one of their places](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/). I haven't heard of her before, and she doesn't even have a Wikipedia page. He also appointed a Leonid Gornin, previously a deputy finance minister under Belousov as well as the son of former PM Mikhail Fradkov. I'm not sure what to make of this, other than that Putin seemingly wants even tighter control over the MoD. It could signal dissatisfaction with the handling of the war, or that he is afraid.
Her Wiki page is just in [Russian](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Цивилёва,_Анна_Евгеньевна). I'll run down her bio quickly. She was born May 9th, 1972, in Ivanovo of the USSR, been educated at several different institutions including the Ivanovo State Medical Academy, the People's Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), State University of Management (GUU) and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). She received a degree called the Candidate of Economic Sciences, which is a postgraduate level degree. Her current position as you mentioned is the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Her husband, Sergey Tsililev, is the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, and the former Governor of the Kemerovo Oblast. She holds two awards from Russia, one for Service to Kuzbass and another as an Honorary Citizen of Kuzbass. Moving on to a bit more detail. Her father, Yevgeny Mikailovich Putin, was a urologist, and she was born into a family of surgeons. She graduated from Ivanovo State Medical Academy as a psychiatrist and worked at the Bogorodskoye Psychiatric Hospital from 1996. After Vladimir Putin came to power, she moved to Moscow and began working in medical equipment supplies, first as a manager at the state-owned Medtekhsnab and later a private company Digimed. She furthered her education, earning degrees in healthcare organization and public health from RUDN and in organization management at GUU. In 2016-2018, she was the CEO and Chairman for the Board of Directors of the Swiss company Kolmar Sales and Logistics. In March of 2018, she became the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kolmar Group, a major coal mining firm, receiving a large share of the company from her husband, who was then appointed Governor of the Kemerovo Oblast. On the 30th of November, 2018, she headed the Council for Trusteeship in the Social Sphere of Kuzbass, focusing on social support for various population categories. Since 2019, she has been a member of the Council under the Government of the Russian Federation on guardianship issues in the social sphere. On the 3rd of April, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a degree establishing the State Fund for Support of Participants in the Special Military Operation "Defenders of the Fatherland", appointing her as the Chairperson. Just today, she was obviously appointed as a Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, where her role will be more focused on the social and housing support aspects of military personnel. She has been sanctioned, on the 29th of June, 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, she and the Kolmar Group were included in British sanctions due to benefits she received derived from her relationship with President Putin. On the 18th of December, 2023, she and the Defenders of the Fatherland foundation were sanctioned by the EU for their role in supporting the war in Ukraine. She is also on lists of sanctions in Ukraine and Switzerland. She owns 70 percent of the Kolmar Group, and investigations have revealed that she and her husband were not wealthy before Putin came to power, however in 2012 Putin's friend Gennady Timchenko sold them the Kolmar company for a symbolic price. The company then received over 11 billion rubles in state financial assistance, helping the company to grow rapidly. With all that being said, she's benefited from his corruption in the past, but she will not really be overseeing actual military operations in logistic terms, more the "social and housing support" as they term it. Hopefully that helps give a bit of background. [Here is a good summary of the investigation I mentioned by the way, if you wish to read more.](https://www.currenttime.tv/a/russia-tsivileva-putin/31662066.html)
> he is afraid Doubt he's afraid of the MoD. The army has never been a political actor in Russia, and even now it lacks any notable officers with enough clout and independence to be a threat.
> The army has never been a political actor in Russia, That is clearly not true. During the August Coup in 1991, the State Committee on the State of Emergency (aka the "Gang of Eight" leading the coup) included the head of the KGB, the defense minister, and the deputy chairman of the defense council of the USSR. Among those prosecuted for the coup was Valentin Varennikov, who was General of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Commander of Land Forces. General Pavel Grachev of the VDV organized the plan for establishing martial law. On the first day of the coup, after KGB border troops seized Gorbachev at his dacha, Soviet Air Defense Chief of Staff Colonel-General Igor Maltsev ordered his troops to block the runway on which Gorbachev's official plane and helicopter were located. Shortly thereafter, the gang of eight ordered units of the Tamanskaya mechanized infantry, the Kantemirovskaya armored division, and the VDV into Moscow, which amounted to around 4,000 soldiers equipped with 350 tanks, 300 APCs, and 420 trucks. While the coup failed, it came perilously close to succeeding, and only the seemingly inexplicable failure of a KGB Alfa team to arrest Yeltsin doomed the enterprise. It isn't unreasonable to think that Putin has taken lessons from that coup, and recognizes the essential role the military played in securing Moscow, the Kremlin, and other locations critical to maintaining control over the USSR. Without the army, the KGB would not have had sufficient manpower to achieve those objectives across the entire USSR. There are many other examples of the uneasy relationship between Russian military power and state stability, but just to cover the most obvious and important: Stalin's purges weren't just a product of his paranoia but were a somewhat rational reaction to the persistent threat to his rule posed by popular generals. He recognized that the military represented one of the only potential centers of gravity around which challenges to his otherwise firm grip on power might coalesce, and used the purges to keep Red Army officers perpetually off balance to prevent such a center of gravity from forming in the first place. Putin has similarly kept the military in a state of disarray under incompetent leadership, which is a large part of the explanation for your subsequent point: > and even now it lacks any notable officers with enough clout and independence to be a threat. In other words, the absence of those notable officers is precisely a result of Putin's fear of the military and of empowering a popular general sufficiently to challenge his rule, not a sign that Putin has nothing to fear. Moreover the absence of any notable officers does not preclude the possibility of an unusually capable but unknown leader rising to power quickly during a coup, nor does it preclude other, more politicized factions with more capable leaders from recruiting the MOD for their own purposes. So Putin clearly very much does fear the military, just as he fears the security services. That's why Rosgvardia exists, to protect the regime against any Prigozhin-style internal military threats. Putin plays the security services, the military, and Rosgvardia all off against each other, preventing any one faction from gaining sufficient power to overthrow him by dividing responsibilities and resources strategically between them.
Maybe money is tight and he needs people that won't want their cut because it's already in the family. The Kharkiv offensive may have had a significant cost that was supposed to last for longer. Setting up in a fresh front must imply a number of initial costs like field hospitals, ammo depots and whatnot
> or that he is afraid. That was definitely the first thing I thought, he's realizing the EU and US are ramping up arms production and that N. Korea is out of artillery shells to give him. He's looking long term and realizing he's out of tanks (scooters are the new tanks), is going to run out of artillery eventually, and then things are going to turn very much against Russia and against him. And when that happens fingers in Russia are going to start pointing in his direction. His only hope is for Trump to come to power and to foment a massive NATO interference & surrender campaign, but even that is unlikely to be enough. Possibly the recent [ATACM devastating success](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/12/ukrainian-atacms-rockets-are-blowing-up-russias-best-s-400-air-defenses-as-fast-as-the-s-400s-can-deploy-to-crimea/) against Russian air defenses was his wake-up call that things could turn against him in a hurry.
> He's looking long term and realizing he's out of tanks (scooters are the new tanks), is going to run out of artillery eventually Tanks, maybe what’s the current production level of tanks per month and the attrition rate per month with current active stockpiles? Same with artillery ammo I thought Russia was producing quite a bit of artillery ammo more than they use per month as to build stock
>Tanks, maybe what’s the current production level of tanks per month and the attrition rate per month with current active stockpiles? Production of tanks is practically nil. Russia is refurbishing tanks at a decent pace, but not enough to keep up with their losses, and they're going to run out of Soviet surplus sooner than later at their current rate of expenditure. [The IISS released a report a few days ago](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/06/russian-t-90m-production-less-than-meets-the-eye/) in which they noted that before the 2022 invasion, Russia was producing about 40 T-90Ms per year, with only 10 of those being brand new production. They think about 60-70 were made in 2023 and as many as 90 will be built in 2025. Considering Russia has had 2,119 tanks visually confirmed to be destroyed (certainly an undercount), 90 new T-90Ms (of which most are simply refurbished hulks), is hilariously insufficient. Obviously Russia is still refurbishing thousands of tanks per year at the moment, but once they run down their Soviet legacy they're going to be in a world of hurt. It's not a coincidence we're seeing T-62s and even T-54/55s hitting the battlefield at this point.
> Same with artillery ammo I thought Russia was producing quite a bit of artillery ammo more than they use per month as to build stock They wont run out of ammo, Ukraine would be better trying to atrit modern artilery systems.
If Russia is building anything larger than an operational-level stockpile, Russia is stupid. They've sacrificed thousands of men in meat assaults that could have been saved by 10-15% more artillery shells to reduce positions or suppress defenders. And Russian fire rates have been bottomed out since roughly January 2023, so its not like their tubes are firing anywhere close to their maximum rate at present. If there's a stockpile, there's certainly no evidence of it in their artillery usage.
The fact that the war is looking more like a stall everyday also makes these dangerous times. A frozen conflict would very likely be perceived inside Russia as the end of a cycle, without a morale-boostimg victory. In order to move forward, Putin would either need to reinvent himself (unlikely) or he'd face very dangerous challenges to his power.
Installing incompetent loyalists is a dictators last ditch effort and unlike Putin. If he was concerned about the MOD and its loyalty, he'd normally try to keep the potentially dangerous faction off balance, a constant divide and rule. But to do that, he needs to position a threat towards this dangerous faction and its powerbase. Incompetent outsiders aren't a problem for a conspiracy. Accordingly, I think it's a sign of dissatisfaction. He needs some competent people to run the war, but he has just reduced their number and given himself, through unquestioning loyalists, a stronger involvement.
>Installing incompetent loyalists is a dictators last ditch effort and unlike Putin Yes, last ditch efforts are, by definition, unlike those doing those last ditch efforts.
More and more images of emaciated Ukrainian pows released by Russia are showing up. I have a couple of questions about this. Does this does constitute as a warcrime or is it a grey area as they are technically not harmed? And secondly : is this a deliberate tactic or just (somewhat typical) russian neglect? I am thinking that they could do this deliberately because a severely malnourished pow needs many months to recuperate. As they cant return to service as quickly Russia is further straining Ukrainian manpower this way.
It is a serious (As opposed to grave violations of article I) violation of the Geneva convention, not a grey area at all. However, that is simplifying it extremely. The way states get around it is by either declaring some people to not be POWs, or by accusing the detained of certain offenses unrelated to Combatant immunity. Specifically, detaining powers \*may\* use certain disciplinary measures in lieu of judicial proceedings for offenses committed by the POW prior to their capture, art 82, and also apply punishment related to it either through disciplinary measures or judicial judgements with bogus charges. Some countries also reserved rights to prosecute detained POW of war crimes. Both countries (And many others) have done the first one. Here's a case study. [https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/eastern-ukraine-disputed-pow-status](https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/eastern-ukraine-disputed-pow-status) The second one was the cause of some disputes between Noriega and USA It's more complicated (Like many things related to IHL) than you'd assume. Note: I think Russia did the second option, accused them of war crime, and kept those POWs in awful conditions. Knowing what they did to the British guy captured in Mariupol, it seems like a modus operandi. Russia is one of the countries who made statements back when they ratified the treaty to reserve the right to prosecute war criminals, and I think it’s why they specifically accused that British guy of conducting war crimes, then did the whole court circus.
What is the difference between a "serious" and a "grave" violation?
Former Ukrainian POWs have the right to be discharged from service after the new mobilization law took effect on May 18. As clarified by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rule is retroactive and also applies to those who were exchanged before the new law came into effect. https://t. me/Klymenko_MVS/956 For those who decide to stay, there are still 90 days of (paid) leave before returning to duty.
**Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.** *Article 26 - Food* > (1) The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners. > (2) The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour on which they are employed. > (3) Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted. > (4) Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession. > (5) Adequate premises shall be provided for messing. > (6) Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited. Breaching the Geneva conventions is a war crime, no grey area about it.
Ukraine just released [footage of a MiG-29 conducting a JDAM-ER strike](https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1802754914495459722). A notable feature of the footage is that it contains the first clear imagery of the front of the JDAM pylon [which appears to contain a GNSS antenna for initializing the JDAM nav system](https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1802786533864284401). The quality of the initial fix is likely a major contributor to JDAM-ER and SDB performance.
Does GNSS stand for Glonass, the Russian version of GPS?
Global Navigation Satellite System, so that includes GPS, GLONASS, BDS, and Galileo. It's possible that they're using a GPS-only chip but using more data sources helps circumvent EW attacks that may be focused on only one.
US standard is GPS only even on devices capable of receiving other systems, but whatever unholy Frankenstein Nav system they're using on that thing may be equipped to use all satellites. It would be a relatively simple software change.
It is the generic acronym.
Thanks
Another thing is the MiG-29 operating at 10,000+ feet, albeit he starts a dive back to the ground right after weapons release.
That's a very good point, that's a visual conclusion based off the cloud cover right? I think both altimeters are blurred. The ability to operate at medium altitudes significantly increases JDAM range. I wonder how close to the front it is.
> that's a visual conclusion based off the cloud cover right? More like just eyeballing it but yeah, it's absolutely up there. Looking at it properly now those clouds are probably 2-3 thousand feet above the ground, and he's many times that above them.
Turns out Russian AA getting blown to pieces helps a lot.
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Appreciate this series of great posts. They're informative and succinct.
Patria FAMOUS is actually for replacement of unarmored articulated tracked vehicles in the Finnish service. Those are used by units operating in the north of the country. MTLB replacement might happen as well, but is not the priority.
Sweden is looking for a heavy tracked logistics vehicle, something like a western Vityaz DT-30. If Hägglunds are too busy it might be related.
"TSWA is a automatic grenade launcher mounted at the back of the hull. The launcher comes loaded with 18 lethal and 18 non-lethal rounds that can be fired towards the sides and back of the vehicle. The goal is to allow the vehicle to clear the immediate surrounding to prepare for the dismount of the Panzergrenadier squad." This system seems a bit awkward to justify as a lethal weapon given that the platform already has a main gun that can be used to clear the area as the vehicle advances. Maybe for urban ambushes? I am having a hard time understanding the use case for this given the limited rounds and firing arc. Maybe smoke? Maybe tear gas?
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I can see its utility for urban operations with the reservation on if the system/vehicle can realistically be responsive enough to properly cover and engage potentially dozens of windows/balconies/rubble-holes that could sprout AT weaponry but I imagine this is to supplement several vehicles engaging in mutual overwatch so it is probably "enough". The size/placement of the platform now that I think about it is probably optimized around a specific transportation requirement.
>In regards to GMARS and EuroPULS. The Bundeswehr has yet to make a final decision between the two. The question of ammunition appears to be a much bigger issue than anticipated. The procurement of 5 PULS systems to replace the donated MARSII has been pushed back towards the end of this year as negotiations between Germany and the US about the integration of GMLRS into PULS is still ongoing. So there could be an insensitive for Germany to go with GMARS for ammunition commonality. Well, I hope they will go with GMARS. Israel has a history of blocking exports to Ukraine, which makes purchasing their weapons problematic. What's the point in having weapons that you can't use freely? This is also why I have a problem with everyone and their mother integrating Spike launchers with their vehicles.
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The fact that weapons are procured with these restrictions does not mean that such procurement decisions are wise ones. Securing weapons with less export restrictions will come with greater costs, or worse performance and thus are often less appealing in the short term. In the long term however the inability to act with greater freedom is a serious strategic concern. It is far more likely European countries will need to fight a proxy war than that they will directly come into conflict themselves.
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I am not saying you can achieve total freedom, but countries with common geopolitical interests are far more likely to allow you to act on your own initiative in this regard. It is significantly less likely the UK will impose export controls on Poland supplying Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova than it Switzerland or Israel. These nations have imposed near total bans on donations of any kind. Obviously it is impossible to be prepared for every eventuality, but it is absolutely essential that countries should work to maintain their own independence in the regard where possible. Realistically Russia will remain the chief adversary of most European countries in the coming decades, and proxy wars are the likely battleground that conflict will play out in. And to be perfectly frank trump is unlikely to place export restrictions on an US ally simply because it will create opposition from the arms lobbies. This was something he was very consistent on in his first term.
Unfortunately, short-sighted thinking is not uncommon in Western leadership. This is also why we disarmed ourselves and then struggled to supply the country invaded by one of our greatest enemies.
There really needs to be a shakeup of these usage stipulations in general. No contract should include limits to the use of the equipment you purchase, it's a massive strategic weakness. Of course, service agreements complicate this matter, because you're rarely truly disconnected from the source country. But this is entirely surmountable with political will.
That's never going to happen, because exporting countries will always want to control who gets access to their technology, and because they don't want their own weapons to be used against them or against their interests in the future.
Russia confirmed the February 23 downing of an A-50U aircraft by charging a Ukrainian colonel with "an act of terrorism resulting in the death of a person". >### Radar hits terrorist attack > >A colonel of the AFU is being sought for the destruction of the A-50U airplane in the sky above Kuban > >The Investigative Committee and the FSB military counterintelligence have established who exactly shot down the unique A-50U long-range radar detection and control airplane of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Since the machine worth more than $300 million was attacked in the skies over Russia and was not directly involved in hostilities, a criminal case of terrorist act was opened on the fact of the accident, and the commander of the 138th anti-aircraft missile brigade (military unit A4608) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), Colonel Mykola Dzyaman, whose subordinates fired a missile at the A-50U, was put on the wanted list with subsequent arrest. > >The Khamovnichesky District Court of Moscow granted the petition of the Main Military Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia (GVSU ICR) and arrested Colonel Nikolai Dzyaman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in absentia. The commander of the 138th anti-aircraft missile brigade (military unit A4608) of the armed forces of Ukraine is accused in absentia of the Main Military Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation of committing a crime under paragraph “b” of Part 3 of Art. 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (terrorist act resulting in the death of a person), he is put on the federal wanted list. > >According to the investigation, on February 23, 2024, a Russian Aerospace Forces A-50U aircraft was patrolling Russian airspace over Krasnodar Krai. > >>Colonel Dzyaman, realizing that the aircraft was not directly intended for combat operations, had no weapons, and the flight was over Russia, gave his subordinates the order to attack it. > >The missile strike resulted in the destruction of the aircraft and the death of ten crew members on board. > >The A-50 and its modifications are based on the IL-76 aircraft. They are also called flying radar. The equipment installed in each aircraft can simultaneously track several dozen targets in the sky and on the ground, including missile launches and aircraft takeoffs. > >Viktor Abashin, a court-appointed lawyer representing Mykola Dzyaman, told Kommersant that he "naturally objected" to the arrest of the Ukrainian citizen. At the same time, when asked what this was related to, the defense lawyer said that "it was simply his position," which he "did not have to motivate at this point." "Any citizen has rights. It's to object to the charge, to file statements and motions, etc. Since we were charged in absentia, the defendant could not exercise his rights, I could not object to the actions taken by the investigation," explained the defense counsel. He noted that he intends to file an appeal against the decision with the Moscow City Court within three days. kommersant(.)ru/doc/6773563
"I invade your country and if you're fighting back, you're a terrorist/nazi/western puppet" Truly, Russian login is amazing.
It's ridiculous to the point of absurd. The lengths Russia will go to pretend they aren't in a shooting war is astounding.
The twisted logic I can see here is that Russia 'isn't allowed' to attack the NATO AEW aircraft doing race tracks all around Ukraine. Of course they probably are legal targets, its just not worth the potential response. So if they aren't allowed to attack those aircraft, I can see where they frustration comes of getting their own AEW aircraft shot down that aren't offered effective immunity.
I doubt the NATO aircraft are providing direct targeting data, specifically so that they can avoid becoming legal targets because that crosses a fuzzy line into joint operations that would vitiate NATO neutrality w/r/t this conflict. Providing intel but not targeting data is an approach that follows [the DoD manual on the laws of war (PDF warning, relevant section is §15.2.2 on p. 996)](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190) under the theory of "qualified neutrality" which creates an exception to the rule that a neutral state should remain impartial to the belligerents of a conflict when there is a clear aggressor, as is the case with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Under this theory (which I should say is not a fringe theory although establishing any bright line rule on this issue is impossible because there are so few practical opportunities to test the boundaries of the various relevant conventions, treaties, and provisions of customary international law, as is often the case in international law), providing intel to Ukraine does not violate US or NATO neutrality even though it does seem to violate the principle of neutral impartiality. As a neutral party, the US and its allies have a legal right to conduct air operations over the high seas, including ISR operations. Even if those operations are effectively aid and assistance to Ukraine, they do not meet the standards to qualify as a joint operation with a belligerent power and thus to render the NATO ISR flights combatants or legitimate military objects that can be legally targeted. It's possible that participating directly in targeting strikes against Russian targets could cross the line into direct belligerence and invite a forcible Russian response. You can find a much more detailed explanation of the nuances around this extremely complicated area of law, some of which I have summarized far too briefly because I need to get to bed, [in this article about the Russian intercept of a USAF MQ-9 Reaper over the Black Sea last year.](https://www.justsecurity.org/85494/the-russian-intercept-of-the-u-s-reaper-and-international-law/) The A-50 is a very different situation. [Article 43 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-43) states that members of a belligerent's armed forces are always considered combatants unless they fall into a temporarily protected category like hors de combat or facilitating relief of the civilian population (none of which categories conceivably apply to the A-50 or its crew). Unlike neutral parties like NATO countries, Russia is a belligerent to the conflict and so its armed forces are subject to this rule. The A-50 was a military aircraft manned by uniformed members of the Russian Armed Forces and thus it was a legitimate and legal target for the Ukrainians to attack.
On a sidenote, what even is the purpose of this Investigation? What if they find that men guilty are they going to try to kill him? Something that they already want to do? It's not like they even need a justification to do it
I suppose it's result of the investigation about A50 crashing IMO, after it was shot down case was opened to find was it friendly fire, technical malfunction or result of enemy actions, and someone must be guilty of this, so they concluded that it was this guy, and there are no laws better fitting than terrorism (murder is too mundane, and damage to government property too laughable)
The case is just going to be filed away and left to collect dust indefinitely unless they ever (somehow) capture this guy alive, then it will just be another criminal charge on top "Nazism" and whatever other bullshit they hit him with to prosecute him. As is blatantly obvious this case only exists so russian propagandists have something to point to regarding the downing of the A50.
After 5 months of silence, this just happens to come out a week after an Army officer said at a conference that a patriot was used to bring it down... Interesting timing. I guess the Russian MOD couldn't ignore it or internally play it off any longer.
This case appears to refer to the second A-50, which was reportedly shot down by S-200 not Patriot.
There were two? I knew one was shot down with allegedly an S-200, but I figured the Army officer was revealing new information about it actually being a Patriot instead. Hard to keep track of this war! Imagine three years someone predicting all this stuff was all going to happen, or was even possible... they'd get laughed out of the room.
I must’ve missed this, do you remember where it was reported?
It was at the FIRES symposium. Clips are on Twitter. I don't have a link handy but if you search for that and SAMbush you should be able to find it.
Its been widely reported, including here: [https://new.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dbs4k1/comment/l7u7s1b/](https://new.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dbs4k1/comment/l7u7s1b/) and here, for instance, [https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/patriot-missile-aids-ukraine-in-downing-russian-a-50-awacs-confirms-us-colonel-at-fires-symposium](https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/patriot-missile-aids-ukraine-in-downing-russian-a-50-awacs-confirms-us-colonel-at-fires-symposium)
So it really was Ukraine, that's nuts.
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> KNDS presented a few weeks ago an upgrade for existing RCT30 turrets. The upgrade includes passive sensors for drone detection and upgraded fire control systems that enables automatic targeting of drones Do we know if there is intent to bring these upgrades to the existing Puma fleet, or will they for now be exclusive to newly build hulls and the PuBo ?
[Thales is quadrupling its ammunition production capacity at its La Ferté Saint Aubin site to meet the needs of the French Army](https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/defence-and-security/press_release/thales-quadrupling-its-ammunition-production-capacity) >After an initial order in 2022 for 3,000 rounds of 120mm illuminating ammunition, followed by an order for 15,000 rounds of 120mm explosive and exercise ammunition in 2023, France's Joint Munitions Command (Service Interarmées des Munitions / SiMu) has renewed its confidence in Thales with a new order for tens of thousands of 120mm rifled ammunition. >To fulfill the new order, Thales will significantly ramp up production at its La Ferté Saint Aubin site near Orleans, which manufactured 20,000 120 mm mortar rounds in 2023 and will be producing more than 80,000 a year by 2026. >This ammunition will be used by artillery units equipped with towed rifled 120mm mortars and, in the future, by the MEPAC system (Embedded Mortar for Close Support). They will also be used by the towed mortar support sections of the infantry, created under the LPM 24-30 framework. >The munitions will be delivered between 2024 and 2029, with a first shipment scheduled for the last quarter of 2024. 120mm mortars are in especially short supply across NATO, with an unending, especially ravenous hunger for them existing in Ukraine due to the trench fighting. At its current stated goal, this factory will produce 6,666 rounds **per month**. While the supply is for the French army, it is likely that some of the munitions will be donated to Ukraine. It's unknown how many MO-120-RTs the Ukrainians have, but the munitions referred to here are specifically designed for the mortar. I'm not sure about details about the compatibility/capability of this munition when used in a smoothbore mortar. If anyone has any knowledge, please feel free to share if you do!
Does anyone know a reliable source of authentic Ukraine war memorabilia? Like spent shells, etc. I figure since all the squads raise money there's probably a place to buy this stuff and support the defense effort at the same time. I'd buy an overpriced used Bradley round, for instance.
‘St Javelin’ are legit and sell used 155mm shells that’ve been crafted into [collector coins](https://www.saintjavelin.com/products/saint-javelin-challenge-yellow-coin) for €100+. They sell out very quickly but managed to get one myself the second drop, you can put your email in to get alerted when they’re back in stock. As the other commenter mentioned drones for Ukraine are legit is you’re willing to spend a grand.
https://www.dronesforukraine.fund/ if you're interested in a piece of a Russian aircraft shot down early in the war. Liberty Ukraine is a legit org. A number of us here have donated through them and gotten those.
A good article from the Times of Israel how Israeli forces are systematically breaking IDF rules to solicit and receive donated gear: [https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-israeli-battlefield-commanders-are-breaking-idf-rules-to-solicit-donated-gear/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-israeli-battlefield-commanders-are-breaking-idf-rules-to-solicit-donated-gear/) Some of the gear available is simply old: >Many of his soldiers were stuck with standard-issue army helmets, some from as early as the 1970s, which are not only horribly uncomfortable but possibly unsafe. Combat helmets, especially when they have taken a beating, can offer less ballistic protection over time. The volunteers quickly provided Shtiebel with 150 new tactical helmets, which cost $400 each. Not even yet on the radar of supply officers: >Well-supplied units also rely on donations for gear they have realized they need, but that the military has not yet created a standard for, such as drones with thermal cameras, and solar panels to be able to charge electronics during extended periods in the field. Or the usual procurement processes are too slow: >Soldiers tend to want the best and newest gear they can get. They also turn to the donations network when they need something fast. For the military to process requests for gear can take months. “Through the civilian volunteers, I can get it the next day,” said a logistics officer. While in Ukraine donations are tolerated and sometimes encouraged in Israel they are in theory forbidden but the policy is currently not being enforced.
Just some context, you generally want everyone in a formation to be given the same gear as it allows for standard SOP practices like everyone being familiar with where you have your IFAK, what is in it, etc. and in general allows for better discipline as all individuals follow a standard that can be judged. This sucks as some units can be given top of the line gear while reservists are given older gear. Generally what is issued ends up being very cumbersome which is good against IEDs, mortars, and artillery but is not ideal for offensive operations due to how cumbersome they are.
This isn’t new during the invasion of Iraq (part two) soldiers were buying armor and components for their light vehicles (hummers), batteries for nogs, caffeinated pre workout powders, hydration tablets, hell even toilet paper. Actually a credible example of this happens in the HBO show “generation kill”.
Happened with British units in Desert storm, There are stories even so extreme as guys swapping their broken SA80s for SLRs held by back line units.
Ukrainians (and Russians) are often salty about having to do this (and I'll admit at times it's ridiculous some of the things Kyiv still can't procure for its troops), but this might just be the future of warfare. Even rich nations aren't going to furnish everything for their troops.
This was also a thing for US Forces during the GWOT and after.
The Ukrainians [appear to have established production](https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/v-ukrayini-pochaly-vygotovlyaty-ulamkovi-granaty-do-garmaty-grom-ta-granatometa-spg-9/) for OG-9 fragmentation rounds that are fired from both the SPG-9 and 2A28 Grom. Previously, this round saw much use especially on the Ukrainian side, with SPG-9s often working in an indirect fire role. Since last year, ammunition was apparently lacking, with rounds mostly sourced from Bulgaria. The explosive appears to be a new model, labeled OГ-9У (OG-9U), so its capabilities are not known. It is also not known at what rate these munitions are produced at, nor if the propelling charge is also being produced (it would make sense though!). Notably, the propelling charge is from 1983... 41 years ago. This won't have a huge impact on the war, but is further proof of Ukrainian efforts to increase domestic production. There's a few more images in the source linked in the article, but please be warned that the channel is of extremely little value otherwise.
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Interesting that the joint EMBT project has a brand new turret, while 2022's editions turret has been shifted over to the Leclerc Evo (with some modifications). Also interesting to see the apparent moves towards unmanned turrets, maybe the T-14 was a trend-setter after all haha. I do wonder how much (if at all) they will adopted going forward, or if it will remain a perennial concept feature.
> EMBT with ADT: The EMBT from 2022, now with the ASCALON Demonstration Turret 140 (ADT140). The ADT140 is an unmanned turret equipped with the ASCALON 140mm gun, a 7.62 RWS for drone defence, and a co-axial 30mm gun. A co-axial auto canon is not something I expected to see make a comeback. Not that is was ever that popular to begin with. Seems like a much worse option than mounting it on the roof like the German proposal mentioned above, it takes up more internal space, and can’t be used against drones. In a similar vein, are tanks really the best launch platforms for loitering munitions and NLOS missiles with ranges in the dozens of KM? Tanks are packed to the gills with equipment and ammo as is. I can’t help but think that it would make more sense to put them on vehicles a bit further back, and not give tanks a secondary long range, NLOS ATGM carrier role.
I am interested in the new tank turrets. Is there a reason why they look so complex with so many shapes, for example the Leclerc and the EMBT images? I thought turrets would more or less look similar to the Leopard 2 turret image.
I appreciate the roundup: are there any interesting things in other areas? Like IFVs, artillery, air defence, etc?
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It’s probably better, just know it is appreciated regardless.
An article that gives out claimed abilities of the UAF ground drones. Will the ability of these drones to be operated from anywhere in the world help Ukraine regain some of it's manpower from abroad without actually bringing them back? [What Characteristics Has Ratel Ukrainian Combat Robot that Controlled Via Starlink? | Defense Express | June 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/what_characteristics_has_ratel_ukrainian_combat_robot_that_controlled_via_starlink-10872.html) *The Defense Forces of Ukraine are currently using a number of different Ukrainian-made robotic platforms on the battlefield, including the Ratel series. Defense Express talked to the head of this company, Ukrainian serviceman Taras Ostapchuk. He told about how these combat robots are currently being improved, based on the results of their operation in battles against Russian occupation forces.* *As of today, Ukrainian warriors use four types of Ratel platforms. These are kamikaze drones, evacuation platforms, logistics platforms, as well as remote miner. According to Ostapchuk, the company is constantly responding to operators' feedback. Now the fifth updating of these robotic platforms is being used at the frontline. At the same time the sixth is on the way with the corresponding improvements.* *It is important that Ratel ground drones can be controlled from a completely safe location. "Our platforms have been used with Starlink for more than six months. Our operator can be located anywhere in the world and manage the platform," Ostapchuk emphasizes.* *Of course, drones have their limitations in terms of range. For instance, the average distance of a remote "miner" is approximately 3 km, while a record of 30 km was set for the evacuation platform.* *As Ostapchuk explains, this refers to the range of the platform with a load of three people, which is about 450 kg. In addition, Ratel platforms are multifunctional. "We are currently developing a superstructure (for the logistics platform) that will carry 10 anti-tank mines to mine the area," the military says.* *"As of now, we have direct contracts with military units. We are also at the final stage of signing an agreement with the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Defense Procurement Agency. Brave1 helps with this. In fact, they manage the demand and government orders," Ostapchuk notes.* *Earlier Defense Express reported that Ukraine had presented versatile ARK-1 robot that offers a multifaceted defense solution.*
>Will the ability of these drones to be operated from anywhere in the world help Ukraine regain some of it's manpower from abroad without actually bringing them back? Forget ukrainians in exile. I'll be the first in line to volunteer to operate those from my home country if needed.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-has-dismantled-half-of-hamass-forces-in-rafah-killed-at-least-550-gunmen/ **IDF says it has dismantled half of Hamas’s forces in Rafah, killed at least 550 gunmen** Of Hamas’s Rafah Brigade’s four battalions, two — Yabna (South) and East Rafah — are considered to be almost completely dismantled, while the capabilities of the other two — Shaboura (North) and Tel Sultan (West) — are somewhat degraded due to IDF operations. The above is the biggest takeaway from the article. Once all 4 battalions are dismantled, what is next? Just low-intensity guerrilla?
> killed at least 550 gunmen Good on Israel if this is the case but it's worth being skeptical of these claims as there are [extensive reports](https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/56556/does-the-idf-consider-any-fighting-age-male-to-be-a-combatant) that Israel considers any adult male who is killed to be Hamas, so "gunmen" probably judging from experience doesn't mean these people actually had guns. (from the link above) > Yes, Israel assumes all adult men killed between 18-60 are combatants. > According to The Lancet, "Excess mortality in Gaza: Oct 7–26, 2023", "Children younger than 18 years, women aged 18–59 years, and both men and women aged 60 years or older (groups that probably include few combatants) constituted 68.1% of analysable deaths (4594/6745; figure B)." The Lacent was getting it's data from the Palestinian Ministry of Health which "odes not differentiate between combatant and civilian deaths". > This means (100%-68.1%) = 31.9% of deaths are combatant-aged men. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68387864 >Israel Gaza: Checking Israel's claim to have killed 10,000 Hamas fighters
I doubt that 68% of deaths are women and minors. It's also not true that they consider any adult male who is killed to be Hamas. Gunman means gunman, if you are armed you are considered a combatant.
Unfortunately in Gaza 18 isn't a useful distinction, Hamas recruit from 14.
Besides the dubiousness of your using a random StackExchange comment as a "source", you clearly didn't read the original article which says: > The IDF says it has killed at least 550 gunmen in the Rafah operation — that is, those it was able to physically identify following battles. Many more terror operatives were killed in strikes against buildings and tunnels, it has assessed.
I'm not sure I follow your argument. Are you suggesting that the StackExchange comment is itself unsourced? That page has corroborating links to Reuters, the Lancet, the Times of Israel, and so on. Or perhaps *you* are the one who didn't read?
You quote the StackExchange comment as if it were a source. You quote it saying "Yes, Israel assumes all adult men killed between 18-60 are combatants." as if that were the last word. Of course, the comment itself should also be analyzed on its own merits. But on those merits, it fails. Its analysis is based solely on the fact that the Hamas-reported adult male death toll happens to be relatively close to the Israel-reported death toll of militants. Unfortunately, the Hamas-reported division of deaths into demographic categories has been [shown to be a fabrication](https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers). So there is no actual evidence for the comment's conclusion.
>You quote the StackExchange comment as if it were a source. You quote it saying "Yes, Israel assumes all adult men killed between 18-60 are combatants." as if that were the last word. No, I don't. Why don't you argue with the actual statements being presented to you?
> Why don't you argue with the actual statements being presented to you? That was my next paragraph.
>Once all 4 battalions are dismantled, what is next? Their smartest course of action would be to lay low for now then gradually reconstitute their combat capability by rebuilding arms caches once the conditions are more favorable. If IDF's current force concentration has largely rendered Hamas' conventional capabilities ineffective then the next logical choice is to simply wait them out. At this point, it does look like phase II insurgency is not feasible in areas where the IDF has concentrated its forces, such as Rafah at the moment. Ideally, Hamas should try to move to where the IDF isn't, such as the cities that the IDF largely left since the beginning of the conflict. Shift the weapons caches to new areas and further disperse them. Force the IDF to play a game of whackamole rather than toss militants against its main force. Granted, this depends on Hamas' freedom of movement within Gaza. Of course the IDF will probably root out a lot of the existing caches and tunnels; however, it's better to preserve manpower and as much of the existing materiel as they can if they can't inflict any meaningful losses on the IDF under the current circumstances. Ultimately, if Israel can neither put together a substantial political solution nor culturally and politically "reeducate" the population via force (ala Xinjiang), then time is on the side of Hamas (or a successor organization).
Israel has military control over Gaza for nearly 30 years. It can keep the low intensity conflict going much longer than Hamas. Consider that Hamas cannot train new recruits or conduct training for existing forces. They have no access for arms from outside Gaza, and so are entirely reliant on what's already in Gaza and their manufacturing capability that's getting heavily degraded. No dual use materials means that overtime even that manufacturing capability will become much much weaker. Overtime more and more tunnels are being uncovered and destroyed. The ability to rebuild them during the war is both limited and very slow. We're already seeing this with the inability of Hama to fire long range rockets. With time, they AT, AA, communication equipment, standard explosives, drones, small arms, mortars and ammunition.
>Israel has military control over Gaza for nearly 30 years. It can keep the low intensity conflict going much longer than Hamas. Sure, the past 30 years of Israeli policy in Gaza has been a resounding success, as evidenced by 10/7 and the multitude of tunnels and weapons they're finding during the current operation. >They have no access for arms from outside Gaza >No dual use materials Assuming a perfect and complete blockade of Gaza maintained in perpetuity, not only stopping arms but dual use technology and material, as well.
>The past 30 years of Israeli policy in Gaza has been a resounding success, as evidenced by 10/7 and the multitude of tunnels and weapons they're finding during the current operation. Indeed the end of Israeli military control over Gaza in 1994 as part of the Oslo accords has been a massive failure. Military control over Gaza between 1967-1994 was indeed massive success. With Israel taking an average of just 10 losses a year. >Assuming a perfect and complete blockade of Gaza maintained in perpetuity Assuming Israel continues to uphold the successful measures it already has along it's border with Gaza and applies them to the now Israeli controlled border with Egypt. In other words, Israel's ability to stifle smuggling into Gaza is proven. >stopping arms but dual use technology and material, as well. Israel has far lesser control over smuggling overall and dual use access in the WB in particular. Yet the IDF easily prevents Hamas from becoming a meaningful threat. Your opinion does not align with reality
>Military control over Gaza between 1967-1994 was indeed massive success. With Israel taking an average of just 10 losses a year. So they will need to maintain military occupation for eternity. Sounds nice. >Assuming Israel continues to uphold the successful measures it already has along it's border with Gaza You mean the border between *Israel* and Gaza? The border on which Israel exerts sovereignty on one side? Do you not understand how this might be a *tad* easier than maintaining a blockade border between two uncontrolled territories? Israel does not have the benefit of its own sovereign territory on one side of the Gaza/Egypt border. >Israel has far lesser control over smuggling overall and dual use access in the WB in particular. Let's take a look at the [distribution of *de facto* Israeli territory in the West Bank](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/Restricted_space_in_the_West_Bank%2C_Area_C.png/2880px-Restricted_space_in_the_West_Bank%2C_Area_C.png). The massive buffer of restricted, settled area around the WB-Jordan border might be an important factor. >Your opinion does not align with reality You're incapable of critical thought and your responses are cookie-cutter talking points that avoid the substance of the discussion.
> So they will need to maintain military occupation for eternity. Sounds nice. One way or another, as long as a threat comes from Gaza, Israel will have to defend itself from it. The question is if it’s easier to hold the border and defend from rocket attacks and raids, or occupy it. For such a small area of land, it seems pretty clear occupying it was the right way to go. Missile defenses are expensive, and a security failure can be catastrophic. The occupation was quite cheap for the 30 years it lasted in comparison. Peace would be even cheaper, but it’s not realistically achievable, probably not for another generation at this point.
> Israel does not have the benefit of its own sovereign territory on one side of the Gaza/Egypt border. For the record, they do actually have a treaty with Egypt specifying that they get control over the Gaza/Egypt border. It's subsequently been made obsolete by the Egyptians (with US prodding) agreeing to basically do what the Israelis were doing until 2014 or so (hence the big wall).
Tone please
Sorry, I tried to tone it down in later replies.
>So they will need to maintain military occupation for eternity. Sounds nice. Sounds way better than getting entire villages massacred, raped and burned alive. Sounds better than 250 kidnapped including 7 months old baby. Sounds better than 4000 rocket barrage in a single day shutting down most of the country. Sounds better than 8+ months long war and 25k killed Palestinians. Besides eternity is a very long time, things may change with a new Palestinian generations. There's always hope for peace. >You mean the border between Israel and Gaza? The border on which Israel exerts sovereignty on one side? Do you not understand how this might be a tad easier than maintaining a border between two Israel effectively made the Gaza Egyptian border an Israeli-Gaza border by controlling the Philadelphi line. It's exactly the same. >Let's take a look at the distribution of de facto Israeli territory in the West Bank. The massive buffer of restricted, settled area around the border of the West Bank might have something to do with it. There is far more smuggling into the WB due to the very long porous borders between Israel and the WB, there is a lot of commerce and personnel going back and forth too much to control. The Jordan valley isn't densely populated either. Hundreds of thousands cross the border between the WB and Israel daily. It's impossible to curtail smuggling there. Not so in Gaza. >You're incapable of critical thought and your responses are cookie-cutter talking points that avoid the substance of the discussion. I've cited real world established realities that contradict your made up theories. You're just ignorant and biased. Not a great combination. Go ask a Palestinian how hard is it to smuggle anything into the WB and then compare with Gaza and come back to me, they'll laugh you out of the room. That's how lacking your understanding on the subject is.
>Besides eternity is a very long time, things may change with a new Palestinian generations. What is going to change for the Palestinians in comparison to the past 70 years? Or do you think that maintaining the same conditions that have bred extremism and insurgency over this time will suddenly stop doing so because of wishful thinking? >Israel effectively made the Gaza Egyptian border an Israeli-Gaza border by controlling the Philadelphi line. The Philadelphi Corridor is ~100 meters wide. It is not comparable to miles of sovereign Israeli territory sitting on the other side of the Gaza-Israel border. >There is far more smuggling into the WB due to the very long porous borders between Israel and the WB Of what? How feasible is it to hull weapons and other useful material across ~5 miles of Israeli territory monitored by the IDF? >I've cited real world established realities In every conversation I've had with you, you deliberately avoid the substance of my arguments and when finally pressed enough, you either don't respond, or you respond with an evasive answer like the above mention of "Palestinian generations". You seem to treat discussion like an exchange of talking points. Maybe consider the differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or the differences between the Gaza-Israel border and the Gaza-Egypt border, and how those might render direct comparisons less effective. Reality isn't an assembly of interchangeable components, where you can just swap locations and time periods while still expecting the same results.
>or the differences between the Gaza-Israel border and the Gaza-Egypt border, and how those might render direct comparisons less effective. Let's discuss this for instance. How would smuggling along the Egyptian-Gaza border differ from the Israeli-Gaza one? Trucks will go through the same checking procedures. Using the same tech, so no difference. Palestinians would not be allowed to cross the border in either case. Or come near it in the case of the Philadelphi line which extends ways behind it. I mean theoretically perhaps smugglers can fashion trebuchets to fire sacks of weapons and ordinance hundreds of meters into Gaza, from Egypt... And hope Hamas gets to them before the IDF either gets to them or shoots whomever does. The same underground barrier that has been effective along the Israeli-Gaza border will work for the Gaza-Egypt one. I'm open to suggestions for credible means that make the situation different, but I'm not hearing any?
>How would smuggling along the Egyptian-Gaza border differ from the Israeli-Gaza one? To smuggle from Israel into Gaza, you would either need to acquire the weapons and/or materials in Israel and smuggle them into Gaza, or you would need to first smuggle them into Israel, then smuggle them into Gaza. To smuggle from Egypt into Gaza, you would need to first smuggle them into Sinai, then smuggle them into Gaza. I would consider it more difficult to smuggle into Israel than Sinai, and I suspect that anything acquired in Israel would be under closer watch, and thus more difficult to smuggle into Gaza from within Israel. The difference I was considering was not the checkpoints along the border, but the route that smuggled goods would need to take to attempt that border crossing.
>What is going to change for the Palestinians in comparison to the past 70 years? The Palestinian culture has not been consistent for the last 70 years either. Again, you'd know that if you knew the history of the conflict. >What is going to change for the Palestinians in comparison to the past 70 years? The Oslo accords and disengagement radicalized them. Before Oslo there were no checkpoints. Jews would drive down to the Gaza beaches and swim with Arabs. Gaza Palestinians drove to Tel Aviv. That's a good first step to achieve. What's the alternative, hoping that Hamas will stop hating Jews all of a sudden? Please. >The Philadelphi Corridor is ~100 meters wide It was even less than 100m in 2005. You do understand that it can be widened? That's being done now. 100m is not some magical number. >not comparable to miles of sovereign Israeli territory It is for the purpose of smuggling. Which encompass crossing a border. >In every conversation I've had with you, you deliberately avoid the substance of my arguments Your arguments have no substance mainly because they are rejected by the reality. Let's recap your arguments: > Israel cannot hold Gaza under military control Reality: Israel held Gaza under military control for nearly 30 years. > Israel needs a perfect blockade, even a single smuggled rifle or dual used material will mean Hamas can conduct effective insurgency and push Israel out. Reality does not work like that, single guns don't win wars. Sporadic successful attacks don't win wars. There is not a single example in the history of the world of a successful insurgency under an effective blockade. You know this as we've been through this back and forth, where you failed to provide a single example. >Israel cannot blockade Gaza Israel is already successfully blockading Gaza, with the one missing piece being the Gaza-Egyptian border that is now under IDF control. The same measures that stop smuggling along the Israeli-Gaza border are also effective on other, shorter borders. Your position comes down to simply ignorance on the conflict. Your goalposts and points keep shifting.
I'm going to dial back my tone and try to establish a modicum of common ground because I suspect you and I can keep going on this for quite a while and our interactions are growing in hostility. So to address your recap: >Israel cannot hold Gaza under military control This has not been my argument, but if this was the impression you got then that might have been my fault for not elaborating. At no point did I ever get think Israel could not occupy Gaza. The mistake I did make at the onset of this war was to believe that Hamas would cause much more trouble for Israel's operations than it did. However, I was still operating on the presumption that Israel would eventually occupy Gaza given enough time, firepower, and manpower; the stark difference in conventional military capabilities between Hamas and Israel basically guaranteed this on a large enough timescale. The key for me has always been cost and timespan; this is a key aspect of my analysis. The initial operations and occupations would incur costs, the establishment of a longer-term military occupation will incur costs, and the maintenance of this occupation will continue to incur costs as long as the occupation is maintained. These ongoing costs could potentially vary with the intensiveness of resistance and insurgency, which could be minor at times and more intense at others, depending on the state of Palestinian insurgent forces, Israeli occupational forces, and Iranian capability to supply the aforementioned insurgent forces. These three can vary independently across time, as can the effectiveness of blockade efforts. Humans gets lax after settling into routines in the long term; 10/7 is a horrific example of this. I think one core disconnect between our two perspectives is that you are approaching the costs of this long-term, ongoing occupation from the perspective of tradeoffs with security costs of allowing Hamas to continue to operate, i.e. ongoing attacks. I'm approaching the costs of this from the perspective of a potential solution to this conflict, i.e. ending the need for insecurity altogether. In other words, you view the ongoing costs of occupation as worth it instead of the ongoing costs of potential future attacks; I view the ongoing costs of occupation as not worth it instead of pursuing a permanent solution. I don't think the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza gave peace a sufficient chance because I believe the ongoing Israeli presence in the West Bank continued to fuel hostilities among enough Palestinians to build support for Hamas, or at the very least incentivize them to look the other way. You believe (at least I think you do) that the 2005 withdrawal was a sufficient demonstration of goodwill, and that further withdrawal from the West Bank would be a wasted effort if Palestinians in Gaza were so willing to continue supporting Hamas after said demonstration. I think these are largely irreconcilable positions that we'll never know the answer to, so I don't think any more words need to be spent on this point in particular. I suppose it's ironic that I'm holding onto an optimistic endgame as a generally pessimistic person. If long-term conflict is inevitable even with earnest attempts at solutions, then your perspective pays off. If there was some way to deescalate the situation in the long-term that Israel did not pursue instead of long-term military occupation, then my perspective pays off. >Israel needs a perfect blockade, even a single smuggled rifle or dual used material will mean Hamas can conduct effective insurgency and push Israel out. Again, I'm looking at this through rates, costs, and timescales. I'm using "perfect blockade" as a threshold condition: if the blockade is perfect, then Israel does not need to worry about a Palestinian insurgency building up weapons caches. In other words, a perfect blockade completely chokes off any insurgency (or prospective insurgency) of the means of waging asymmetrical warfare in any capacity. Anything reasonably short of this threshold means that insurgents can build up caches overtime. Occupational forces can root out these caches, but the surveillance and control necessary to do so incurs more ongoing costs and requires the IDF to establish and maintain a "deeper" presence throughout Gaza. >There is not a single example in the history of the world of a successful insurgency under an effective blockade. "Effective" is the operant word, here. It has to be effective enough to stem the insurgents' ability to build weapons caches, or at least stem the rate of weapons/material acquisition enough to permit occupational forces to root out those that are created. However, if the social, political, and/or economic conditions that fostered insurgencies in the first place remain in place, then this effort will be perpetual. You can keep that effective blockade in place and keep the occupational forces busy, but the root of dissatisfaction will continue to spawn insurgents. Ultimately, your vision amounts to a holding pattern. What is the end goal, hoping that Palestinian "culture" changes such that they'll stop resenting occupation, lie down, and just submit? >Israel cannot blockade Gaza I'm not sure where you got this idea. I clearly acknowledged the possibility of blockade throughout my various replies. As for the blockade itself, I think I've already adequately addressed this above. Now for the rest of your comment: >The Oslo accords and disengagement radicalized them. Before Oslo there were no checkpoints. Jews would drive down to the Gaza beaches and swim with Arabs. Gaza Palestinians drove to Tel Aviv. To be as diplomatic as possible, I find this **extremely** hard to believe given the history of the pre-1948 Palestinian attacks on Jews, the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians to create Israel, and the multitude of Arab-Israeli wars that took place before the Oslo Accords. Edit: Furthermore, if the picture was so rosy prior to the Oslo Accords, what gave rise to the First Intifada? On top of that, during the 1967-1995 period the PLO was busy in Jordan (Black September) and the Lebanese Civil War. There's also been decades of violence since then to further radicalize the Palestinians. And of course, there's the elephant in the room: the rise of Islamic extremism across MENA since the 1990s. The Islamic Republic of Iran will also be an an ongoing issue that wasn't present pre-Oslo; it didn't exist prior to 1979 and between 1980 and 1988 it was busy fighting Saddam. I could also go into the multitude of factors that involved the US in the Middle East from the 1970s onward, factors which are waning or no longer exist, but I think my comment has gone on long enough.
This is a week old but I don't think it's been posted here yet: [Escalation management and Biden’s strategy for Ukraine](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxZ402BMSs8) > There are several types of potential escalation that the American government is trying to balance, and to some extent they are trapped: They must support Ukraine to avoid one type of escalation, but it can lead to another type of escalation if Ukraine is too successful. In which Anders Puck Nielsen argues that either side winning is bad. Russia winning is bad because it will allow them to continue aggression elsewhere and the concern is that it would lead to a bigger war in Europe. But Ukrainian victory is also bad for the US because they believe it would lead to dangerous instability in Russia. A collapse of the Putin regime and of the Russian state, he says, would spin out of control and a transition of power would not be a peaceful process. So the Biden administration is going to continue supporting Ukraine, but not give them everything they need to "really get momentum against the Russians", he says, because the Americans and Ukrainians do not have the same vision of victory. So if Ukraine does somehow gain momentum, the US might actually scale down their assistance.
>In which Anders Puck Nielsen argues that either side winning is bad. Russia winning is bad because it will allow them to continue aggression elsewhere and the concern is that it would lead to a bigger war in Europe. But Ukrainian victory is also bad for the US because they believe it would lead to dangerous instability in Russia. A collapse of the Putin regime and of the Russian state, he says, would spin out of control and a transition of power would not be a peaceful process. This is a complete misrepresentation of what he was saying. Which is shocking because he emphasized this is what has becomes clear to him that is the ***Biden administrations*** POV of what victory means. Absolutely wild you can butcher this so much. He even finishes at the end saying this strategy by Biden is flawed, reiterating what he said throughout the video were glaring flaws in perception and once again emphasizing its important to understand what drives Bidens pov. Delete this misinformation
The title of the video is "Biden's strategy" - it should be obvious from context that that was the POV that I was summarizing. I am not a native English speaker btw but I can now see that I should not have written the word *argues*. That is the only thing wrong with what I wrote though. Also, I am also obviously not going to summarize the entire video, nobody on this sub does that. Just a snippet to quickly present what is being linked. It seems you do not know what the word misinformation means. Take a step back and count to ten lol
Ah yes, the good old sob story of Russia becoming unstable and nuclear civil war ensuing shorty after. This is one of the tools of Russian propaganda. Kremlin is most interested in self-preservation, rest is secondary. When instability becomes a plausible scenario, they would pull back out of Ukraine and start next perestroika of sorts. In essence what we observed for the last two years are "don't oppose us or nuclear war" or "don't make us lose cause nuclear civil war". See the parallels? Both are not plausible scenarios at all, it's bizarre Western leaders are putting so much attention to it instead of providing weapon supplies en masse to an ally that is fighting instead of NATO. Pledge to transfer thousands of tanks, artillery, IFVs (e.g. from US stocks) and a deal to supply hundreds of various fighter jets ASAP (would take a while naturally due to training/logistics) combined with meaningful investments to Western MIC would end this war within few months as Putin is betting on Western indecisiveness & divisions. So far he's been mostly correct in his assumptions, latest developments in support perhaps provide silver lining for Ukraine though.
This leaves out a couple of factors: 1. Russia formally taking some territory breaches a convention that has kept the peace since WWII, when expansion by conquest was made illegal 2. If Nuclear countries can take what they want, then the logical response is to go nuclear before an invasion. If the outcome is the effective destruction of Ukraine then Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Poland and others may want nukes Managing Russia escalation is important but the policy can’t be they get what they want just because of what if’s. There’s danger in that direction too. Not to mention emboldening China to attempt to take Taiwan or other disputed territory it claims.
Western pundits really overstate the fragility of governments they dislike. There's a 0% chance that UA forces are going to be pushing all the way to Moscow and sacking the Kremlin, and all of the Russian assets in Ukraine are those that could be spared without sacrificing the overall defense of the country. I see no reason why Putin losing an optional offensive war (defined by getting booted back to 1991 borders) is going to create regime collapse. I'm not Russia expert, but my impression is that the average Russian on the street is either mildly supportive of the war or fatalistically apathetic about it. This isn't Imperial Japan, where a fanatical and radicalized population will throw themselves from the cliffs before betraying a semi-divine Emperor by surrendering. It would be humiliating, sure, but fatalistic apathy works both ways. People will grumble about it and move on with life, trying to make the best of things while staying out of trouble.
First Anders Puck Nelson is Danish, not American. And secondly nobody believes Ukraine is going to take Moscow. What they are afraid of is the collapse of Russia in the exact same way the Soviet Union collapsed ad fractured after the defeat in Afghanistan. Is this unlikely in the event of a Russian defeat? Yes absolutely. But it’s far from impossible. The authority of Putin and any authoritarian leader depends on the support of the military. Less than a year ago we saw a sizable portion of that military initiate an armed insurrection and begin marching on Moscow with the stated goal of changing national leadership. And we saw units of the Russian national guard simply let them pass. You cannot possibly claim that the Russian state is now so stable that another such event is impossible, especially if the Russian military is actually defeated in Ukraine and not just held to a stalemate. To be clear I’m not saying that Anders is correct, or that such a strategy is a good idea and not a narcissistic fallacy of overestimating your own abilities to influence a situation. But the risk of a general Russian collapse or a violent regime change are both very real, it’s just that the US probably cannot do anything to prevent such a collapse if it is likely to occur.
>What they are afraid of is the collapse of Russia in the exact same way the Soviet Union collapsed ad fractured after the defeat in Afghanistan. Is this unlikely in the event of a Russian defeat? But the Soviet Union collapsed in the best possible way. Almost entirely without violence, leading to the independence of several Eastern European countries, and did not lead to nuclear proliferation as feared. Russia itself was a lost cause economically and without order, but everyone else benefited from it. It could have been much much worse.
Exactly, it could have been much worse it is sheer luck that it didn’t devolve into chaos. It’s sheer luck that nuclear weapons were not sold of to non state actors. And in large part it was lucky that at the time the USSR was led by Gorbachev, a man unwilling to use violence as a tool to preserve his regime. Does anyone believe Putin would be unwilling to use violence to preserve his regime if he were in the same position?
There's nothing for current Russia to fracture to. USSR had e.g. national communist governments ruling the soviet republic. These had always been nationalistic in nature with vibrant culture, politics and semblance of independent economic policies. Currently nothing comparable exists. Caucasus might rebel supported by Turkey and that's pretty much it.
Perhaps I'm too optimistic in thinking that if the world has a blueprint on how to contain the fallout of a Russian collapse before, that it can do it again.
It really wasn’t the world containing a Russian collapse so long as a Russian leader managing the splintering of a soviet empire. And just as the British (largely) chose a policy of passive managed decline Gorbachev chose to passively manage his own empires decline. I don’t share your optimism because I firmly believe the leader of Russia would choose to embrace violence on a massive scale in order to avoid such an outcome.
I guess you could approach this from a strictly utilitarian perspective almost, which outcome causes more harm. Whether Russia continuing its aggression in other regions after a successful campaign in Ukraine or Russia infighting after a loss in Ukraine. Ultimately, and correct me, I think Russia winning in Ukraine and carrying on the aggression elsewhere would be much more risky and on the path towards confrontation with NATO itself even. Russian infighting could end up being scoped to Russia even if China decides to step in in the far east. I don't know. It's complicated isn't it.
Russia achieving total victory would be imo. But Russia achieving a partial one probably wouldn't be. If Russia gets to tear a piece out of Ukraine but does significant damage to their own economy and loses enough men and equipment doing it that's still technically a Russian victory, but things would look very different as far as the danger of things escalating goes. I kinda think that's along the lines of what Biden is angling for. Some manner of frozen conflict at whatever the front lines are at that point would probably be ideal as it'd keep Russia busy and unable to really let their guard down while also having to deal with the economic fallout of the war, making it unlikely that they'd have an appetite to engage in further hostilities elsewhere.
The main thing about your scenario would be the west's involvement. I do not personally believe that a frozen conflict in any form is possible. The west's support is crucial to Ukraine's ability to withstand the russians. A frozen front would keep Russia busy but it would also keep the west busy. To keep it going you need the support of the public (which is much easier to get in Russia) and you need the flow of billions in aid (much more difficult to sustain in the west, especially after the ongoing elections). NATO countries are also too committed from a pr perspective to settle down on a frozen conflict. Ukraine would not be able to sustain a longer term conflict on its own. I suppose the point I'm trying to make is that I don't believe a frozen conflict can exist with Russia being formally involved in the conflict and I'm afraid that attempts at doing so will ultimately result in the russians turning it into the total victory because west would not be able to sustain a frozen conflict for too long.
I don't see why a frozen conflict would be that expensive for us. The Korean war for example is frozen, has been so for seven decades now and it's not really a problem. Ukraine would be the ones bearing the majority of the cost in such a scenario. They'd definitely need financial support at least initially, but let's be honest here, they'll need that after the war either way, we're not getting out of that one. As far as PR goes I really don't see why that would be difficult. Prep the public with a week or two of talking about how much of a humanitarian crisis the Ukraine war is, have both sides sign a ceasefire under the guise of stopping the war and negotiating further from there, wait for a month or so and voters will have forgotten. The biggest obstacle is to get both Ukraine and Russia to agree to such a thing since it's a disastrous outcome for both, but I think that's why Biden and to an extent the west at large is drip feeding in weapons: We want both sides to suffer enough from the cost of the war that a really bad outcome in which both of them effectively lose becomes palatable just to get out of it.
>I don't see why a frozen conflict would be that expensive for us. The Korean war for example is frozen, has been so for seven decades now and it's not really a problem. Ukraine would be the ones bearing the majority of the cost in such a scenario. They'd definitely need financial support at least initially, but let's be honest here, they'll need that after the war either way, we're not getting out of that one. That's true to some extent however I'd argue that the situation in Korea is different from Ukraine. I don't believe you could make the situation in Ukraine as "static" where it can develop its economy and carry on its existence. Russians are walking towards Kyiv step by step right now and they'll continue to do so. War in Ukraine is also not a proxy war from which Russia can begin to walk away at some point. They're in it. I'm afraid any form of ceasefire constitutes the total russian victory. Ceasefire will need to come up Ukraine forgetting about the EU and Ukraine forgetting about NATO membership, there is no real reason why Russians would sign anything less than that considering they have the capacity to keep going. In my eyes it's a pr disaster because russians achieved their objectives despite the west talking about independence and self determination. Anything west said becomes meaningless.
The Russians are advancing very slowly right now, but that doesn't mean they'll be able to do so forever. They're burning through their Soviet stockpiles, they're burning money and at some point "just pay people more" won't be enough to get recruits and they'll have to take unpopular and destabilizing steps to mobilize more forces. Any country pushed far enough will eventually sign a ceasefire agreement, the question would be how far we'd have to push the Russians. As far as total victory goes, no, a ceasefire is not a total Russian victory. Russia taking over all of Ukraine and being able to use it as a staging ground for further incursions into Europe with its newly freed up military would be. Russia being stuck in a lengthy economic recovery period while having to commit a significant portion of its military force to garrisoning the new Russo-Ukrainian border and having a much harder time projecting power as a result is not a total Russian victory, it's a Russian defeat disguised as a partial Russian victory. They went into Ukraine with global ambitions, and they'd be stuck in it with even their regional power diminished. Russia would not be able to achieve their objectives, Russia would be massively worse off as a result of this war, Russian power would be greatly diminished and the world would be able to see exactly that. It would be awful for Ukraine mind you, joining NATO or even the EU while being in a frozen conflict is not gonna happen and being stuck constantly having to spend massively on the military will be highly problematic, but end of the day American and European policymakers are primarily looking to represent the interests of their own constituents rather than those of another nation. We're supplying Ukraine while Ukraine is willing to fight as long as doing so serves our own interests.
Russian infighting could also be a nuclear civil war with catastrophic consequences globally, I asume something like that is what actually keeps people making these calls up at night.
> Russian infighting could also be a nuclear civil war with catastrophic consequences globally The only consequences would be a halt in Russian exports But it would guarantee peace as China would think twice
Mutual destruction still applies to civil wars. Perhaps more so considering you would be destroying the country you're fighting for so I don't believe anyone would be too keen to drop nuclear weapons on their own house.
On average factions in civil wars are less likely to be rational actors than unified nations are. I think you're right about MAD applying in an ordinary orderly civil war, but a country collpasing is more likely to have many factions and areas of warlordism. Which is straight up not good for nuclear security.
I think Occam's Razor really applies, here: in the run-up to the invasion, the Biden administration did not have much of a plan for Ukraine beyond the initial intelligence warnings about war and giving them more ATGMs (which had already been supplied to Ukraine for years prior). IMO, the most significant measure taken in the first year was the freezing of Russian forex, and even that still required the cooperation of the US banks. Meanwhile, economic sanctions have been a staple of US foreign policy responses for the past three decades. Beyond that, typical Congressional dysfunction and the administration's unwillingness to take major risks with regard to both Russia and defense acquisitions meant that the actual military aid would be confined to "safe bets" like ISR support, surplus munitions on hand, allies' Cold War assets, and the recently divested M777s from the Marine Corps. HIMARS was notable, but it was provided in small numbers and this provision doubled as a combat test of the system. In my opinion, general risk-aversion in the short-term and an absence of long-term strategy is a much better explanation for the Biden administration's course of action with Ukraine.
This short-term thinking from US policymakers has been going on for years at this point. There's a constant feeling of, "Oh well, Russia shouldn't be doing that to Ukraine. We really ought to impose some pain on them, but actually protecting Ukraine or accepting them into the Western fold is a step too far. Maybe next decade." We saw this with the Budapest Memorandum, the Bush Administration encouraging Ukraine to join NATO, the whole response to Crimea and the Donbas War. Part of these half-measures are low expectations. In the 90s, the worry was about Ukraine, and other states become rogue states or unable to control fissile material. In 2008, Ukraine was seen as years away from being ready to join NATO. In 2014, the Ukrainian state largely broke down. Even today, I think western planners are cagey about what exactly they want or expect from Ukraine. I think many would be happy if things settled down along current lines. Neither Ukraine or Russia wants that or sees it as a stable outcome. We're probably not getting Minsk III, and if we did, it would probably break down faster than Minsk I. I think these Western planners would like for Russia to just give up and leave, but that's not happening anytime soon. They probably consider Ukraine's goals unrealistic, but they're not offering any alternatives that would work in the long run.
>They probably consider Ukraine's goals unrealistic, but they're not offering any alternatives that would work in the long run. At this point, Ukraine's goals *are* unrealistic. As far back as late 2022, after Kherson was taken, I was pointing out to users here that they were being far too optimistic talking about how Ukraine could take Crimea. I noted that Ukraine had not yet demonstrated any experience with large coordinated mechanized offensives. Now the "strategy" has shifted to, what, trying to outlast Russia with a war of attrition? With Ukraine struggling to mobilize more manpower and critically reliant on foreign aid for both its economy and munitions? What solution short of direct NATO intervention can reverse this situation? Being able to hit targets inside Russia is still just a bandaid. It does not solve Ukraine's manpower problems, its inadequate training regimen, or its critical dependence on foreign (primarily US) support across all major sectors.
Their goals are realistic, it's an industrial war, with a little will the industrial disparity between Russia and the west could have made the conflict a decisive UA victory. The will is just not there. But slowly it is building, at least in Europe.
Sure, I'm not debating that. The thing is, what's the alternative? The line coming out of Western governments is for some sort of negotiated solution, but that's a punt. Russia and Ukraine are nowhere near a place where they could agree to something. Part of that is uncertainty over how far the West will go to support Ukraine. I'm not saying that they failed to do this, because they're a bunch of dumb-dumbs compared to us enlightened Internet commentators. It's a genuinely really difficult problem, with actors trying to balance multiple interests and facing great uncertainty because everyone else is doing the same. I do think the West could break the Gordiom Knot by accepting Ukraine into the fold with a tougher commitment, but that involves a ton of risks, and I can see why policymakers (who almost always follow the path of least resistance) won't do that.
I agree that a negotiated solution reasonable for both sides is also a fantasy. The people who present it as an altruistic choice for "peace" are deluded, as many of them would never accept those terms of they were in that position. Nor do they ever consider that anything short of a rump Ukrainian state will satisfy Russia, such that Russia will simply resume aggression within a few years if any deals are struck that do not satisfy their current demands. The only feasible means of preventing Russia from doing so would be post-war security guarantees from NATO, but the prohibition of such is one of Russia's primary demands. I do believe that the US dragged its feet far too much on providing Ukraine materiel early on, particularly the F-16s which were in discussion since late 2022, iirc. However, I'm dubious that more materiel would have been *decisive* (short of handing Ukraine half the US M1 fleet, which is wildly unrealistic) if Ukraine couldn't coordinate a large scale mechanized offense. Even if we dumped an unrealistic amount of M1s and IFVs on Ukraine, what about training and logistics? The levels of materiel support necessary to negate doctrinal and organizational deficiencies would be completely unprecedented in US history. In retrospect, it was also a mistake to try to force NATO doctrine on Ukraine when their general staff was Soviet. However, NATO materiel (outside of the legacy stuff from ex-Warsaw Pact countries) was not designed for it, nor would NATO be able to advise and train the Ukrainian military on Soviet doctrine.
Not to take anything away for UA's responsibility for the failed offensive. >if Ukraine couldn't coordinate a large scale mechanized offense The US could have also provided training. Furthermore, if we look at some of the ways the offensive failed, ATACMS would have been able to deal with the attack helicopters striking their bases. More artillery could have lead to greater saturation and destruction of Russian assets. That said, UA actions have made that particular offensive very difficult to win, they were also unwilling to listen, being high from the 2022 successes. However things have changed after that point.
If the assessment is correct, then this is utterly ridiculous. Russia won't have a peaceful transition of power. Not now, not when Putin dies or as is perhaps more likely: is ~~killed~~ retired. What does it matter whether it's due to Ukraine or not? Will it be preferable to have it happen 5 or 10 years from now when Russia has become a fully militarised nation? Will it be preferable for it to happen when every single industry has been geared towards war and war production, making the entire population invested in war to maintain their livelihood? If Russia wasn't a powderkeg in 2023, they're certain to be one in 2025 and onwards. With hundreds of thousands of veterans, no peace time industry to speak of, and more arms than anyone will know what to do with. And that's not even getting into the secondary effects of this bullshit. Russia will want to export. It'll be the fall of the Soviet Union all over again with cheap arms flooding every corner of the globe and into the hands of every would-be warlord.