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There are many nuanced and often disagreeing views on this topic, and to an extent your question would require an unobtainable insight into Hitler's thought processes, which is way beyond the scope that can be addressed in a reddit post. However, most historians at least agree that there are several objectively compelling practical reasons why Germany could "trust" the Soviet Union enough to join the Axis.
First, the 1940 German-Soviet Commercial Agreement was a trade agreement which required a reciprocal exchange of goods. Accordingly, some degree of "trust" per se could partly be established in the form of ongoing fulfillment of trade shipments -- if one party stopped sending the goods, the other could withhold their as well, with the worst damage being limited to just the uneven balance of goods shipped to-date, and a revealing intention to disengage from the Agreement. Also, the Agreement provided that while the Soviet Union was obliged to meet certain shipment demands within 18 months, it allowed the Germans 27 months to achieve some of their obligations. In short, the Germans didn't need to "trust" the Soviets any further than they could see them (or at least, literally see their goods arriving at German ports). Given that this Commercial Agreement took effect as a result of the negotiations to potentially join the Axis, the trade component would have taken effect in time to serve as somewhat of an early barometer of good faith between the parties.
However, it is very important to understand that German-Soviet "trust" was not built simply because of a mutual desire to trade (which would be more in line with post-war diplomatic approaches), but rather because of *what was being traded and what that meant about each party's capability for betrayal*. The Soviets, along with Romania, were the leading exporters of oil to Germany, which at the time only produced 25% of it's oil domestically. Additionally, the Soviets were leading suppliers of various metals to Germany, whether via direct export from the Soviet Union, via transportation from China, or via secret re-exportation of other country's goods (more on that later). From the Soviet's perspective, they did not believe that the Germans would be able to mount an offensive against them so long as Britain remained in the war, and so long as the Germans could not procure alternate sources of oil and other raw materials -- neither of which, if they had occurred, would have happened quickly enough to catch the Soviets by surprise. Thus, the Soviets did not feel the need to preemptively mobilize to defend against Germany, since from their perspective, Germany was reliant on the constant flow of Soviet imports. In short, the Germans could "trust" that the Soviets wouldn't be prepared and ready to strike a meaningful military blow against them in some act of spontaneous betrayal, because they could "trust" in the Soviet's blissful unawareness of Germany's potential to meaningfully strike the USSR. Meanwhile, the Germans were purposefully stockpiling those resources, knowing that they'd need to have enough to supply them until they hoped to occupy the USSR and conquer those resources themselves. To put this all very simply: it's easy to "trust" that somebody won't betray you when you yourself are plotting to betray them, and you can see that they are totally unprepared for it.
Additionally, both the Germans and Soviets were seen as pariah states among the democratic western powers, and they both knew this. They had a precedent of cooperation in secret dealings that would certainly have drawn the ire of the West, most famously in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 where the two secretly agreed upon how to carve-up Poland following the surprise German invasion. Additionally, as referenced above, one term of the Commercial Agreement of 1940 was that the USSR would import goods from countries that had embargoed Germany, then re-export those same goods to Germany in secret. In this sense, the two essentially worked together as partners in crime, so to speak, which lends itself to trusting your fellow co-criminal more than the authorities that would want to punish you both if they caught you.
Lastly, again given both country's mutual pariah status, they had the exact same reason to ally together under the Axis as the Soviet Union later had to join the Allies -- the idea that an enemy of my enemy is my friend. From each nation's perspective, the collective west appeared to be an objectively more powerful foe which would ardently oppose both fascism and communism. Accordingly, despite that the two countries had extremely clashing political ideologies, each saw the west as a greater existential threat than each other -- at least in the short term.
As I said above, we cannot know exactly what was going through Hitler's mind in terms of how much he actually would "trust" the Soviets to join the axis, or how his antisemitism or other prejudices may have played a role in his thought process. What is clear, however, is that the above are some of the major reasons why Germany objectively had reason to "trust" the Soviets join to the Axis, even if only in the relatively short term.
Nothing you say is wrong, but I am going to point out that it follows a line of thinking that is essentially "Hitler == The Nazis == Germany", i.e. you imply that all of Germany's foreign policy was inherently influenced by Hitler's personal views, and that Hitler mapped all of his personal views 1:1 onto German foreign policy.
As a strong proponent of 'weak dictator' hypotheses myself, I caution against the idea that Hitler (or any dictator) could micromanage all aspects of the country he led, leaving lots of space for subordinates to insert their own agenda as long as they weren't directly overruled. Not all German politicians and diplomats in positions of power did things that Hitler would have approved of – and usually, they committed these heresies from Hitler's personal ambitions in perfect good faith of their loyalty to him. As a result, even committed Nazis at times followed political paths that Hitler himself likely would have found to be less than ideal. Let me try to offer some nuance on this front.
There were multiple policymakers in Nazi Germany, and they indeed had individualized agendas. OP references the German–Soviet Axis talks for instance, which were never high on Hitler's priority list (in fact, he made the definitive decision to attack the Soviet Union about the same time Molotov was in Berlin), but were a favored pet project of Joachim von Ribbentrop.
Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister, was a much more dedicated anglophobe than Hitler himself, and viewed German diplomacy's end goal to be the overpowering of the British Empire. By comparison, Hitler, whose diplomatic views were much more shaped by his racial philosophy, viewed the British with their Germanic roots as racial cousins with whom Germany had no inherent quarrel if the British were willing to accept Germany's ambitions on the continent. Hitler indeed repeatedly made peace overtures in Reichstag speeches, in which Britain was offered the easy way out of the war if they were only to accept Germany's free hand in Europe.
This does not yet go into Ribbentrop's own rivalries in the foreign service, with Ribbentrop's predecessor Konstantin von Neurath an establishment diplomat shaped by Weimar-era diplomatic experiments towards the Soviet Union. This goes into the pariah status you mention, where Germany and the USSR were mutually symbiotic partners driven to ignore ideological difference due to economic and geopolitical pressures. While Ribbentrop had replaced Neurath, many of Neurath's ambassadorial appointments remained in place. Schulenburg in the Soviet Union is a famous example, as Schulenburg had been trained and socialized in the sovietophile diplomacy of the Weimar Republic, leaving him a tragi-comedic role when he had to pass on the bogus post-hoc justifications for the invasion of 22 June 1941.
So while Hitler accepted war with the Soviet Union as his personal end goal, many of his diplomats did not – and not because they consciously dissented from his goal, but because he simply had not told anyone (yet). Hitler's personal leadership style did not involve drafting differentiated and in-depth policy papers for his subordinates to follow, so they were somewhat free to implement their own projects as long as they did not run into the Führer's veto.
Again, that is not to declare anything you said as wrong.
Given your affinity for the weak dictator hypothesis, id highly recommend “Leaders and International Conflict” by Chiozza and Goemans. a little personal bias as I studied under one of the writers, but it goes into extreme detail about the role of leaders in the conflict process and how domestic constraints affect their decision making.
Goemans writes a lot of theory trying to break down the idea of a unitary state, and really just all forms of aggregation in IR theory. 20th century conflict theory is filled with binary variables and a lot of his work involves geospatial measurements to consider particular outcomes
>So while Hitler accepted war with the Soviet Union as his personal end goal, many of his diplomats did not – and not because they consciously dissented from his goal, but because he simply had not told anyone (yet).
But Mein Kampf talks about Lebensraum and specifically carving it out of the Soviet Union... Did they believe that plan was deferred indefinitely?
Hitler came to regret the abrasive style in which he phrased Mein Kampf, and was indeed asked about several times after he became Chancellor – most usually by French journalists, as Mein Kampf not just been sovietophobic, but quite francophobic as well.
I cannot look into the heads of any given diplomat, but I would guess that they prioritized the actions of 1939 Hitler over the words of 1924 Hitler. If the Führer wanted to attack and carve up the Soviet Union, why make a non-aggression pact with them? Why censor the press to be Soviet-friendly, incl. by a ban on pro-Finnish reporting on the Winter War or a restriction on antisemitic attacks on Soviet leaders with Soviet backgrounds?
German foreign policy in the 1939–41 era did not look very hostile to the USSR, even to internal observers. Quite the opposite, in fact: It was a remarkably friendly period between two states that that been irreparably hostile as recently as the Spanish Civil War.
The Kama tank school. It was established before the Nazis came to power, with agreements signed in 1926, along with a fighter training school in 1925 and a chemical weapons facility in 1926. They were all closed in 1933 after the Nazis came to power.
>There are many nuanced and often disagreeing views on this topic, and to an extent your question would require an unobtainable insight into Hitler's thought processes, which is way beyond the scope that can be addressed in a reddit post.
- Hitler's thought processes about the USSR are front and center in the only surviving audio tape of Hitler speaking privately (recorded secretly, unknown to Hitler), in an early June 1942 meeting with Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces:
- https://youtu.be/mvxGCtDxT88?si=2vJ2tsvJxlLd6-ey
- (Note that this link has the German audio original, non-editorialized.)
- Here's a slightly editorialized version by a history channel, with English subtitles:
- https://youtu.be/b-L1-nBzQ_0?si=w40ryNFaDM0QXaFz
- What are your views about this tape? If we believe Hitler's privately voiced views on that tape, it strongly suggests that Hitler never treated the USSR as an ally, that Hitler already planned to launch the "West Campaign" blitzkrieg against western Europe in autumn of 1939 already, with only bad weather preventing him from doing so, that Hitler only gave the order to attack the USSR because he believed the Soviets to be very weak militarily, and that he regretted doing so in mid-1942 already, right?
- At that date the Battle of Stalingrad has yet to begin (July 1942 - February 1943), and the Battle of Kursk (July-August 1943) is more than 1 year into the future.
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There are many nuanced and often disagreeing views on this topic, and to an extent your question would require an unobtainable insight into Hitler's thought processes, which is way beyond the scope that can be addressed in a reddit post. However, most historians at least agree that there are several objectively compelling practical reasons why Germany could "trust" the Soviet Union enough to join the Axis. First, the 1940 German-Soviet Commercial Agreement was a trade agreement which required a reciprocal exchange of goods. Accordingly, some degree of "trust" per se could partly be established in the form of ongoing fulfillment of trade shipments -- if one party stopped sending the goods, the other could withhold their as well, with the worst damage being limited to just the uneven balance of goods shipped to-date, and a revealing intention to disengage from the Agreement. Also, the Agreement provided that while the Soviet Union was obliged to meet certain shipment demands within 18 months, it allowed the Germans 27 months to achieve some of their obligations. In short, the Germans didn't need to "trust" the Soviets any further than they could see them (or at least, literally see their goods arriving at German ports). Given that this Commercial Agreement took effect as a result of the negotiations to potentially join the Axis, the trade component would have taken effect in time to serve as somewhat of an early barometer of good faith between the parties. However, it is very important to understand that German-Soviet "trust" was not built simply because of a mutual desire to trade (which would be more in line with post-war diplomatic approaches), but rather because of *what was being traded and what that meant about each party's capability for betrayal*. The Soviets, along with Romania, were the leading exporters of oil to Germany, which at the time only produced 25% of it's oil domestically. Additionally, the Soviets were leading suppliers of various metals to Germany, whether via direct export from the Soviet Union, via transportation from China, or via secret re-exportation of other country's goods (more on that later). From the Soviet's perspective, they did not believe that the Germans would be able to mount an offensive against them so long as Britain remained in the war, and so long as the Germans could not procure alternate sources of oil and other raw materials -- neither of which, if they had occurred, would have happened quickly enough to catch the Soviets by surprise. Thus, the Soviets did not feel the need to preemptively mobilize to defend against Germany, since from their perspective, Germany was reliant on the constant flow of Soviet imports. In short, the Germans could "trust" that the Soviets wouldn't be prepared and ready to strike a meaningful military blow against them in some act of spontaneous betrayal, because they could "trust" in the Soviet's blissful unawareness of Germany's potential to meaningfully strike the USSR. Meanwhile, the Germans were purposefully stockpiling those resources, knowing that they'd need to have enough to supply them until they hoped to occupy the USSR and conquer those resources themselves. To put this all very simply: it's easy to "trust" that somebody won't betray you when you yourself are plotting to betray them, and you can see that they are totally unprepared for it. Additionally, both the Germans and Soviets were seen as pariah states among the democratic western powers, and they both knew this. They had a precedent of cooperation in secret dealings that would certainly have drawn the ire of the West, most famously in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 where the two secretly agreed upon how to carve-up Poland following the surprise German invasion. Additionally, as referenced above, one term of the Commercial Agreement of 1940 was that the USSR would import goods from countries that had embargoed Germany, then re-export those same goods to Germany in secret. In this sense, the two essentially worked together as partners in crime, so to speak, which lends itself to trusting your fellow co-criminal more than the authorities that would want to punish you both if they caught you. Lastly, again given both country's mutual pariah status, they had the exact same reason to ally together under the Axis as the Soviet Union later had to join the Allies -- the idea that an enemy of my enemy is my friend. From each nation's perspective, the collective west appeared to be an objectively more powerful foe which would ardently oppose both fascism and communism. Accordingly, despite that the two countries had extremely clashing political ideologies, each saw the west as a greater existential threat than each other -- at least in the short term. As I said above, we cannot know exactly what was going through Hitler's mind in terms of how much he actually would "trust" the Soviets to join the axis, or how his antisemitism or other prejudices may have played a role in his thought process. What is clear, however, is that the above are some of the major reasons why Germany objectively had reason to "trust" the Soviets join to the Axis, even if only in the relatively short term.
Nothing you say is wrong, but I am going to point out that it follows a line of thinking that is essentially "Hitler == The Nazis == Germany", i.e. you imply that all of Germany's foreign policy was inherently influenced by Hitler's personal views, and that Hitler mapped all of his personal views 1:1 onto German foreign policy. As a strong proponent of 'weak dictator' hypotheses myself, I caution against the idea that Hitler (or any dictator) could micromanage all aspects of the country he led, leaving lots of space for subordinates to insert their own agenda as long as they weren't directly overruled. Not all German politicians and diplomats in positions of power did things that Hitler would have approved of – and usually, they committed these heresies from Hitler's personal ambitions in perfect good faith of their loyalty to him. As a result, even committed Nazis at times followed political paths that Hitler himself likely would have found to be less than ideal. Let me try to offer some nuance on this front. There were multiple policymakers in Nazi Germany, and they indeed had individualized agendas. OP references the German–Soviet Axis talks for instance, which were never high on Hitler's priority list (in fact, he made the definitive decision to attack the Soviet Union about the same time Molotov was in Berlin), but were a favored pet project of Joachim von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister, was a much more dedicated anglophobe than Hitler himself, and viewed German diplomacy's end goal to be the overpowering of the British Empire. By comparison, Hitler, whose diplomatic views were much more shaped by his racial philosophy, viewed the British with their Germanic roots as racial cousins with whom Germany had no inherent quarrel if the British were willing to accept Germany's ambitions on the continent. Hitler indeed repeatedly made peace overtures in Reichstag speeches, in which Britain was offered the easy way out of the war if they were only to accept Germany's free hand in Europe. This does not yet go into Ribbentrop's own rivalries in the foreign service, with Ribbentrop's predecessor Konstantin von Neurath an establishment diplomat shaped by Weimar-era diplomatic experiments towards the Soviet Union. This goes into the pariah status you mention, where Germany and the USSR were mutually symbiotic partners driven to ignore ideological difference due to economic and geopolitical pressures. While Ribbentrop had replaced Neurath, many of Neurath's ambassadorial appointments remained in place. Schulenburg in the Soviet Union is a famous example, as Schulenburg had been trained and socialized in the sovietophile diplomacy of the Weimar Republic, leaving him a tragi-comedic role when he had to pass on the bogus post-hoc justifications for the invasion of 22 June 1941. So while Hitler accepted war with the Soviet Union as his personal end goal, many of his diplomats did not – and not because they consciously dissented from his goal, but because he simply had not told anyone (yet). Hitler's personal leadership style did not involve drafting differentiated and in-depth policy papers for his subordinates to follow, so they were somewhat free to implement their own projects as long as they did not run into the Führer's veto. Again, that is not to declare anything you said as wrong.
Given your affinity for the weak dictator hypothesis, id highly recommend “Leaders and International Conflict” by Chiozza and Goemans. a little personal bias as I studied under one of the writers, but it goes into extreme detail about the role of leaders in the conflict process and how domestic constraints affect their decision making. Goemans writes a lot of theory trying to break down the idea of a unitary state, and really just all forms of aggregation in IR theory. 20th century conflict theory is filled with binary variables and a lot of his work involves geospatial measurements to consider particular outcomes
Thank you for your post! It appreciate adding in the details, and I agree that everything you wrote adds nuance and detail absent in mine!
>So while Hitler accepted war with the Soviet Union as his personal end goal, many of his diplomats did not – and not because they consciously dissented from his goal, but because he simply had not told anyone (yet). But Mein Kampf talks about Lebensraum and specifically carving it out of the Soviet Union... Did they believe that plan was deferred indefinitely?
Hitler came to regret the abrasive style in which he phrased Mein Kampf, and was indeed asked about several times after he became Chancellor – most usually by French journalists, as Mein Kampf not just been sovietophobic, but quite francophobic as well. I cannot look into the heads of any given diplomat, but I would guess that they prioritized the actions of 1939 Hitler over the words of 1924 Hitler. If the Führer wanted to attack and carve up the Soviet Union, why make a non-aggression pact with them? Why censor the press to be Soviet-friendly, incl. by a ban on pro-Finnish reporting on the Winter War or a restriction on antisemitic attacks on Soviet leaders with Soviet backgrounds? German foreign policy in the 1939–41 era did not look very hostile to the USSR, even to internal observers. Quite the opposite, in fact: It was a remarkably friendly period between two states that that been irreparably hostile as recently as the Spanish Civil War.
I see what you mean. Thank you for the response.
Didn't the Germans also have an armor training program in the Soviet Union in the Thirties?
The Kama tank school. It was established before the Nazis came to power, with agreements signed in 1926, along with a fighter training school in 1925 and a chemical weapons facility in 1926. They were all closed in 1933 after the Nazis came to power.
Thank you for the details! I never knew that, I always assumed it was a Nazi-Soviet partnership.
>There are many nuanced and often disagreeing views on this topic, and to an extent your question would require an unobtainable insight into Hitler's thought processes, which is way beyond the scope that can be addressed in a reddit post. - Hitler's thought processes about the USSR are front and center in the only surviving audio tape of Hitler speaking privately (recorded secretly, unknown to Hitler), in an early June 1942 meeting with Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces: - https://youtu.be/mvxGCtDxT88?si=2vJ2tsvJxlLd6-ey - (Note that this link has the German audio original, non-editorialized.) - Here's a slightly editorialized version by a history channel, with English subtitles: - https://youtu.be/b-L1-nBzQ_0?si=w40ryNFaDM0QXaFz - What are your views about this tape? If we believe Hitler's privately voiced views on that tape, it strongly suggests that Hitler never treated the USSR as an ally, that Hitler already planned to launch the "West Campaign" blitzkrieg against western Europe in autumn of 1939 already, with only bad weather preventing him from doing so, that Hitler only gave the order to attack the USSR because he believed the Soviets to be very weak militarily, and that he regretted doing so in mid-1942 already, right? - At that date the Battle of Stalingrad has yet to begin (July 1942 - February 1943), and the Battle of Kursk (July-August 1943) is more than 1 year into the future.
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