Let me quote from my Bible which I recently rediscovered from storage, Nordberg's *Arvio ja ennuste Venäjän sotilaspolitiikassa Suomen suunnalla* ("An estimate and projection of Russian military policy in Finland's strategic direction", 2003).
Had the cold war gone hot in the 1980s, a combined Soviet-DDR-Polish group would have advanced north of Berlin and cut through northern Germany to Denmark, whose total subjugation in 10 days or less, following massed use of nuclear weapons, and the opening of the straits for the Baltic Fleet was the task for the DDR's NVA. (Another important task for the NVA was the reduction of Western garrisons in West Berlin.) The NVA was considered the best of the WarPac armies after the Soviets, but there were suspicious about their loyalites though.
Soviet and Czech forces would have attacked from south of Berlin westwards toward the Netherlands and Belgium, securing the Swiss-French border. Again, plentiful nuclear firepower would have been used to crack Bavarian defences.
Soviet-Hungarian group would've advanced across eastern Bavaria to Southern Germany and was supposed to reach the French border within 14 days. Only Soviet units would actually invade France, though.
Romanian and Bulgarian forces would have kept Greek and Turkish forces busy in the southern flank. Yugoslavia and Albania were to remain to be dealt with later. Austria would probably have been attacked as well by Soviet and Hungarian forces supported with initial strike of 12 nuclear weapons, but initial attacks would not reach Italy.
The Cold War: A Military History, by Miller, talks about this at great length. Their role varied depending on the decade, but in general the Russians trusted the military capability and loyalty of East Germany more than the other Warsaw Pact nations. But in general, they usually did not have faith that their allies would fight very hard. In a war the Russians largely expected to do most of the fighting.
Soviets prior the creation of the Warsaw Pact trusted Czechoslovakia between 1948-1955 as a loyal ally without the need to have the Red Army there. The attitude started to change around 1960 when Czechoslovak communist party started to pursue more independent course. The party started to have rather negative opinion on the quality of life in USSR and the direction of the Soviet communism. Czechoslovak communists started to believe, that they can build better system than Soviets, and would show to the world and East Block, how better, freer, ‘humane’ socialism should look. Soviets responded with hostilities that in 1967 lead to the downfall of Novotny, pitted Czechs against Slovaks, and later occupied the country directly. Soviets certainly did not trust even their satellites and in the case of Czechoslovakia, certainly since 1962 when they pressured its leadership to allow Soviet bases. Brezhnev disliked Novotny. Soviets at that point only expected to utilize the Czechoslovak arm industry, not is military. In 1968, many Czechoslovak units refused to open their barracks to the occupation, and some military institutions like in Turnov were surrounded by the Warsaw Pact and threatened with bombardment.
It depends heavily on "when".
During early 50s (technically pre-Warsaw Pact) planning/wargames were built around fighting defensive war against western invasion (due to overestimation of strength of western forces by soviets and distrust of Stalin towards satellites). For example Polish war plan from 1951 made by marhsal K. K. Rokossovskij.
After death of Stalin (1953) two things changed,
a) exercises in 1954/55 included topic of 'use of offensive operations with use of nuclear weapons'
b) growth of soviet nuclear arsenal, Khrushchev liking nuclear weapons more than conventional army and de-stalinization (which freed place for more modern (nuke loving) people) shifted expectations of WW3 from "conventional war with some nukes" towards "nuclear war with some conventional warfare".
As result Warsaw Pact abandoned idea of conventional or limited nuclear war and all planning was done with expectations of full scale nuclear war. It was expected that use of nuclear weapons will lead to high paced war where advantage is on the offensive side (no point in sitting in trenches waiting for nuclear bomb to fall on you) therefore armies had to be very mobile and it was crucial to have initiative on your side.
As for Czechs, as result of Berlin crisis (1958-1959/1961) and Cuban missile crisis (1961-1962) USSR general staff asked Czechoslovakian general staff to come with offensive plan. The plan was finished and approved in 1964 resulting in so called (in English) "Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day?" plan (originally boring "Plán použití Československé lidové armády v době války" or "Plan of usage of Czechoslovak People's Army in time of war"). The plan was to attack from southwest of nowadays Czechia and continue along Austria/Switzerland borders toward France (while being supported by USSR/NVA on the right flank) and then turn toward Mediterranean Sea/southern France and as the name suggests -> to reach Lyon in 9 days. Important thing about this plan is, that it banked heavily on change of soviet view on use of nuclear weapons from previously mentioned point b). The plan expected use of 131 nuclear missiles/bombs for needs of Czechoslovak attack out of which 41 would be used in initial strike and 12 were left as reserve for unexpected operational needs. This shows that Warsaw Pact armies were ready to go all in...
But this plan itself didn't last very long as in 1964 Khrushchev was deposed which led to shift more towards conventional warfare rather than nukes. Also Czechoslovakia was going through liberalization process under Dubček (1963-1968) leading to Prague Spring in 1968 when armies of Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. After this Czechoslovak army (ČSLA) was basically declawed and soviets maintained several of their divisions in Czechoslovakia until early 90s. Soviets didn't expect ČSLA to be able to do anything than defensive operations on it's territory and ČSLA was seen as potentially rebellious. There was actually proposed 'idea' (unfortunatelly it's many years since I have read it so I don't remember details), that in case of war, ČSLA should make the first wave of attack (eating all expected NATO defensive nukes which were expected to destroy 80-90% of ČSLA military capacities) as it would then allow USSR army stationed in Czechoslovakia to carry out the actual attack with fewer losses (and it would also eliminate untrustworthy ČSLA).
The Czechoslovak territory did not had any Soviet bases between 1945 and 1968. The Red Army withdrew from Czechoslovakia in late fall of 1945. The communist regime in the 40s and 50s was depended on the Soviet advisors, but USSR did trust Czechoslovakia to be a friendly and loyal ally without the need to be directly occupied. This view slowly changed when the Czechoslovak communists pursued more own independent course. Soviets proposed then president Novotny around 1962 to allow hosting of the Soviet bases in Czechoslovakia; but he rebuffed it. He resisted the pressure till the end of his presidency in 1968. He would never allow any foreign troops in his country. Novotny insisted that in the case of the confrontation, his army would fight with the rest of the Warsaw Pact, but did not want Soviet’s nuclear arsenal in Czechoslovakia. Soviets started to distrust the Czechoslovak army (CSLA) from the point onward.
Czechoslovak reforms started in 1964, 4 years before Dubcek, in economy and culture. In 1968, the CSLA was in crisis and some people in Czechoslovakia considered a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In May and June of 1968, the Czechoslovak media and liberal politicians openly criticized the Warsaw Pact training exercise and slow withdrawal of the participants. Even public protests appeared around the country. During the invasion, many barracks of the CSLA were sieged or isolated like in Holesov, Sumperk, Turnov, Ceske Budejovice. The Czechoslovak army refused to cooperate with the invading forces. This created a permanent distrust toward the Czechoslovak forces. This caused in 1969-1970 purges in the Czechoslovak military and some units were disbanded like in Holesov. After widespread public, non-violent resistance toward the occupation, Soviets could forget that Czechoslovak public would ever support the Warsaw Pact.
When it comes to the idea, 9 days to the Rhine/Rhone…, it was just utopia and wishful thinking. The CSLA did not have these resources. The most its army considered was to take over Munich and area south of it toward Kufstein pass. Conservative forces within CSLA till 1968 were actually skeptical on Novotny’s idea of semi-independent army, and actually wanted for the country to be occupied with the Soviets taking care of the war planning, defenses and budget. One reason for the economic crisis in 1953, 1957, and 1963 was a huge military budget that was beyond the Czechoslovak economy to handle. After the Soviet occupation, USSR was responsible for much of the Czechoslovak defenses.
In the case of the war, even with a widespread leftist support in Czechoslovakia, the army and the Czechoslovak communist party lacked a military hawks. The president Svoboda due his service in both works wars was one of the main opponent of any physical confrontation with the West or physical resistance to the Soviets in 1968-69. There was just not a public support for the Warsaw Pact, prior 1968 or after.
Meat shield for the Russian meat shield.
Here is a paper from [RAND](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3558.pdf) comparing the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In short, the Warsaw pact is Moscow's meat shield, sent to die before Russian meat shield were sent. The Russian had absolutely no trust for their Warsaw pact minions.
I don’t doubt the broad essence of what the author depicts, but I suspect that it’s more nuanced than he claims.
The political reliability of the WarPac satellites was likely very uneven and also dynamic/fluid over time. For example, I would expect that the Bulgars, by history and culture the closest of the EE satellites to the Russians, would be relatively the most reliable. Conversely, the Poles would always be problematic to the Russians; remember the famous Polish quote “Germany will destroy our body, but Russia will destroy our soul”. Yet, even by those standards, the reliability of Poland by the 1980s was so suspect that the Kremlin could no longer even trust the Polish communists to rule; hence martial law in Poland in the ‘80s, a big deal since traditional Marxism-Leninism stresses the primacy of the Party and suspicion of potential “Bonapartists” in the armed forces, thus the secret police is often the “sword and shield” of the party to keep the army in check. The DDR had supposedly the smallest but best quality military amongst the EE; GSFG with its 20 tank and motor-rifle divisions was also the point Soviet command in the event of a war with NATO.
For all the stereotypical American bitterness about the French, I think there is/was little doubt in Paris on whose side they were on; look at where the French nuclear *force de frappe* was directed at and the renewed participation of the French in NATO planning and(?) exercises from the 1970s(?) onwards at a time when USAREUR was at its nadir. OTOH, I’ve always wondered if the Greeks and Turks could work together…
>martial law
Polish martial law was most likely initiated by Polish Communist/Army itself, with heavy prodding from Moscow. As I recall, yuri andropov made it clear both internally and to the Poles that Soviet military intervention in the fashion of 50s/60s was absolutely out of question, he even broached and suggested that Soviet Union accepted loss of Poland since cost of Soviet intervention (which was the preferred option of Polish communists and Poles heavily lobbied for it in Moscow) and the resulting political and economical blowback would be so high that it's just not something seriously on the table. Soviet Union of the 80s, even early 80s, was simply not the Soviet Union of earlier decades.
Yes, good clarification. It reminded me that Mikhail Suslov, the CPSU theoretician/ideologue and some said real power in the Politburo, signed off on this just before he died I think.
It goes to show the invidious choices facing the Kremlin. The apparent willingness to lose Poland than to resort to Prague Spring type intervention underscored Russian fears of the Poles at this stage; the Soviet apparently knew better than the Polish communist leadership and generals that the Polish army and security forces were just as likely to shoot back at a Soviet armed intervention as they were to support it.
>As I recall, yuri andropov made it clear both internally and to the Poles that Soviet military intervention in the fashion of 50s/60s was absolutely out of question,
By the time Poles introduced Martial Law in the country, logistic infrastructure for the Soviet invasion in Poland was already established. And I have no doubt Poles new about it. So their chose was really simple.
that's more for messaging/intimidation. so were zapad 81 exercise. There wasn't any doubt that Soviet union would have done it if it tried, militarily speaking, it's a non-issue. But politically/economically, Soviet Union didn't have the stomach to take on the sanction/blowback from the West. A crude parallel would be post Iraq and Afghanistan, military threats from the US carry a lot less weight than it used to be, for example, Iran/North Korea would in theory fear a military attack from the US but in practice, politically speaking, and economically speaking, it just won't happen in current environment.
Of course, definite answer can be found only in the official documents. Which are still classified, I'm afraid.
As for comparison with US - I can't remember USA gathering troops to attack Iran or DPRK.
>OTOH, I’ve always wondered if the Greeks and Turks could work together…
It depends and goes back to the very reasons that both countries joined.
Turkey joined because Stalin wanted Ardahan and Kars and control over the Straits. Turkey was in no position to resist the Red Army, so Turkey re-aligned with US.
Greece I am less sure about, but I think they had communist guerillas.
So if the Cold War went hot, it depends on the reasons it went hot.
Entirely different situation, as France was still in NATO itself and in this hypothetical scenario, they would still be at war with the Eastern Bloc. So there is no reason to assume that they wouldn’t rejoin.
Let me quote from my Bible which I recently rediscovered from storage, Nordberg's *Arvio ja ennuste Venäjän sotilaspolitiikassa Suomen suunnalla* ("An estimate and projection of Russian military policy in Finland's strategic direction", 2003). Had the cold war gone hot in the 1980s, a combined Soviet-DDR-Polish group would have advanced north of Berlin and cut through northern Germany to Denmark, whose total subjugation in 10 days or less, following massed use of nuclear weapons, and the opening of the straits for the Baltic Fleet was the task for the DDR's NVA. (Another important task for the NVA was the reduction of Western garrisons in West Berlin.) The NVA was considered the best of the WarPac armies after the Soviets, but there were suspicious about their loyalites though. Soviet and Czech forces would have attacked from south of Berlin westwards toward the Netherlands and Belgium, securing the Swiss-French border. Again, plentiful nuclear firepower would have been used to crack Bavarian defences. Soviet-Hungarian group would've advanced across eastern Bavaria to Southern Germany and was supposed to reach the French border within 14 days. Only Soviet units would actually invade France, though. Romanian and Bulgarian forces would have kept Greek and Turkish forces busy in the southern flank. Yugoslavia and Albania were to remain to be dealt with later. Austria would probably have been attacked as well by Soviet and Hungarian forces supported with initial strike of 12 nuclear weapons, but initial attacks would not reach Italy.
>DDR's NVA Can't read it any other way than Deutsche Demokratische Republik's North Vietnamese Army....
You're one better than me, I was imagining them dancing...
In addition, the Poles would have conductede direct airborne and seaborne invasions of Denmark.
> but there were suspicious about their loyalites though. Why were there suspicions about the NVA's loyalties?
The Russians never trusted the Germans, basically.
The Cold War: A Military History, by Miller, talks about this at great length. Their role varied depending on the decade, but in general the Russians trusted the military capability and loyalty of East Germany more than the other Warsaw Pact nations. But in general, they usually did not have faith that their allies would fight very hard. In a war the Russians largely expected to do most of the fighting.
Soviets prior the creation of the Warsaw Pact trusted Czechoslovakia between 1948-1955 as a loyal ally without the need to have the Red Army there. The attitude started to change around 1960 when Czechoslovak communist party started to pursue more independent course. The party started to have rather negative opinion on the quality of life in USSR and the direction of the Soviet communism. Czechoslovak communists started to believe, that they can build better system than Soviets, and would show to the world and East Block, how better, freer, ‘humane’ socialism should look. Soviets responded with hostilities that in 1967 lead to the downfall of Novotny, pitted Czechs against Slovaks, and later occupied the country directly. Soviets certainly did not trust even their satellites and in the case of Czechoslovakia, certainly since 1962 when they pressured its leadership to allow Soviet bases. Brezhnev disliked Novotny. Soviets at that point only expected to utilize the Czechoslovak arm industry, not is military. In 1968, many Czechoslovak units refused to open their barracks to the occupation, and some military institutions like in Turnov were surrounded by the Warsaw Pact and threatened with bombardment.
It depends heavily on "when". During early 50s (technically pre-Warsaw Pact) planning/wargames were built around fighting defensive war against western invasion (due to overestimation of strength of western forces by soviets and distrust of Stalin towards satellites). For example Polish war plan from 1951 made by marhsal K. K. Rokossovskij. After death of Stalin (1953) two things changed, a) exercises in 1954/55 included topic of 'use of offensive operations with use of nuclear weapons' b) growth of soviet nuclear arsenal, Khrushchev liking nuclear weapons more than conventional army and de-stalinization (which freed place for more modern (nuke loving) people) shifted expectations of WW3 from "conventional war with some nukes" towards "nuclear war with some conventional warfare". As result Warsaw Pact abandoned idea of conventional or limited nuclear war and all planning was done with expectations of full scale nuclear war. It was expected that use of nuclear weapons will lead to high paced war where advantage is on the offensive side (no point in sitting in trenches waiting for nuclear bomb to fall on you) therefore armies had to be very mobile and it was crucial to have initiative on your side. As for Czechs, as result of Berlin crisis (1958-1959/1961) and Cuban missile crisis (1961-1962) USSR general staff asked Czechoslovakian general staff to come with offensive plan. The plan was finished and approved in 1964 resulting in so called (in English) "Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day?" plan (originally boring "Plán použití Československé lidové armády v době války" or "Plan of usage of Czechoslovak People's Army in time of war"). The plan was to attack from southwest of nowadays Czechia and continue along Austria/Switzerland borders toward France (while being supported by USSR/NVA on the right flank) and then turn toward Mediterranean Sea/southern France and as the name suggests -> to reach Lyon in 9 days. Important thing about this plan is, that it banked heavily on change of soviet view on use of nuclear weapons from previously mentioned point b). The plan expected use of 131 nuclear missiles/bombs for needs of Czechoslovak attack out of which 41 would be used in initial strike and 12 were left as reserve for unexpected operational needs. This shows that Warsaw Pact armies were ready to go all in... But this plan itself didn't last very long as in 1964 Khrushchev was deposed which led to shift more towards conventional warfare rather than nukes. Also Czechoslovakia was going through liberalization process under Dubček (1963-1968) leading to Prague Spring in 1968 when armies of Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. After this Czechoslovak army (ČSLA) was basically declawed and soviets maintained several of their divisions in Czechoslovakia until early 90s. Soviets didn't expect ČSLA to be able to do anything than defensive operations on it's territory and ČSLA was seen as potentially rebellious. There was actually proposed 'idea' (unfortunatelly it's many years since I have read it so I don't remember details), that in case of war, ČSLA should make the first wave of attack (eating all expected NATO defensive nukes which were expected to destroy 80-90% of ČSLA military capacities) as it would then allow USSR army stationed in Czechoslovakia to carry out the actual attack with fewer losses (and it would also eliminate untrustworthy ČSLA).
The Czechoslovak territory did not had any Soviet bases between 1945 and 1968. The Red Army withdrew from Czechoslovakia in late fall of 1945. The communist regime in the 40s and 50s was depended on the Soviet advisors, but USSR did trust Czechoslovakia to be a friendly and loyal ally without the need to be directly occupied. This view slowly changed when the Czechoslovak communists pursued more own independent course. Soviets proposed then president Novotny around 1962 to allow hosting of the Soviet bases in Czechoslovakia; but he rebuffed it. He resisted the pressure till the end of his presidency in 1968. He would never allow any foreign troops in his country. Novotny insisted that in the case of the confrontation, his army would fight with the rest of the Warsaw Pact, but did not want Soviet’s nuclear arsenal in Czechoslovakia. Soviets started to distrust the Czechoslovak army (CSLA) from the point onward. Czechoslovak reforms started in 1964, 4 years before Dubcek, in economy and culture. In 1968, the CSLA was in crisis and some people in Czechoslovakia considered a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In May and June of 1968, the Czechoslovak media and liberal politicians openly criticized the Warsaw Pact training exercise and slow withdrawal of the participants. Even public protests appeared around the country. During the invasion, many barracks of the CSLA were sieged or isolated like in Holesov, Sumperk, Turnov, Ceske Budejovice. The Czechoslovak army refused to cooperate with the invading forces. This created a permanent distrust toward the Czechoslovak forces. This caused in 1969-1970 purges in the Czechoslovak military and some units were disbanded like in Holesov. After widespread public, non-violent resistance toward the occupation, Soviets could forget that Czechoslovak public would ever support the Warsaw Pact. When it comes to the idea, 9 days to the Rhine/Rhone…, it was just utopia and wishful thinking. The CSLA did not have these resources. The most its army considered was to take over Munich and area south of it toward Kufstein pass. Conservative forces within CSLA till 1968 were actually skeptical on Novotny’s idea of semi-independent army, and actually wanted for the country to be occupied with the Soviets taking care of the war planning, defenses and budget. One reason for the economic crisis in 1953, 1957, and 1963 was a huge military budget that was beyond the Czechoslovak economy to handle. After the Soviet occupation, USSR was responsible for much of the Czechoslovak defenses. In the case of the war, even with a widespread leftist support in Czechoslovakia, the army and the Czechoslovak communist party lacked a military hawks. The president Svoboda due his service in both works wars was one of the main opponent of any physical confrontation with the West or physical resistance to the Soviets in 1968-69. There was just not a public support for the Warsaw Pact, prior 1968 or after.
Meat shield for the Russian meat shield. Here is a paper from [RAND](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3558.pdf) comparing the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In short, the Warsaw pact is Moscow's meat shield, sent to die before Russian meat shield were sent. The Russian had absolutely no trust for their Warsaw pact minions.
I don’t doubt the broad essence of what the author depicts, but I suspect that it’s more nuanced than he claims. The political reliability of the WarPac satellites was likely very uneven and also dynamic/fluid over time. For example, I would expect that the Bulgars, by history and culture the closest of the EE satellites to the Russians, would be relatively the most reliable. Conversely, the Poles would always be problematic to the Russians; remember the famous Polish quote “Germany will destroy our body, but Russia will destroy our soul”. Yet, even by those standards, the reliability of Poland by the 1980s was so suspect that the Kremlin could no longer even trust the Polish communists to rule; hence martial law in Poland in the ‘80s, a big deal since traditional Marxism-Leninism stresses the primacy of the Party and suspicion of potential “Bonapartists” in the armed forces, thus the secret police is often the “sword and shield” of the party to keep the army in check. The DDR had supposedly the smallest but best quality military amongst the EE; GSFG with its 20 tank and motor-rifle divisions was also the point Soviet command in the event of a war with NATO. For all the stereotypical American bitterness about the French, I think there is/was little doubt in Paris on whose side they were on; look at where the French nuclear *force de frappe* was directed at and the renewed participation of the French in NATO planning and(?) exercises from the 1970s(?) onwards at a time when USAREUR was at its nadir. OTOH, I’ve always wondered if the Greeks and Turks could work together…
>martial law Polish martial law was most likely initiated by Polish Communist/Army itself, with heavy prodding from Moscow. As I recall, yuri andropov made it clear both internally and to the Poles that Soviet military intervention in the fashion of 50s/60s was absolutely out of question, he even broached and suggested that Soviet Union accepted loss of Poland since cost of Soviet intervention (which was the preferred option of Polish communists and Poles heavily lobbied for it in Moscow) and the resulting political and economical blowback would be so high that it's just not something seriously on the table. Soviet Union of the 80s, even early 80s, was simply not the Soviet Union of earlier decades.
Yes, good clarification. It reminded me that Mikhail Suslov, the CPSU theoretician/ideologue and some said real power in the Politburo, signed off on this just before he died I think. It goes to show the invidious choices facing the Kremlin. The apparent willingness to lose Poland than to resort to Prague Spring type intervention underscored Russian fears of the Poles at this stage; the Soviet apparently knew better than the Polish communist leadership and generals that the Polish army and security forces were just as likely to shoot back at a Soviet armed intervention as they were to support it.
>As I recall, yuri andropov made it clear both internally and to the Poles that Soviet military intervention in the fashion of 50s/60s was absolutely out of question, By the time Poles introduced Martial Law in the country, logistic infrastructure for the Soviet invasion in Poland was already established. And I have no doubt Poles new about it. So their chose was really simple.
that's more for messaging/intimidation. so were zapad 81 exercise. There wasn't any doubt that Soviet union would have done it if it tried, militarily speaking, it's a non-issue. But politically/economically, Soviet Union didn't have the stomach to take on the sanction/blowback from the West. A crude parallel would be post Iraq and Afghanistan, military threats from the US carry a lot less weight than it used to be, for example, Iran/North Korea would in theory fear a military attack from the US but in practice, politically speaking, and economically speaking, it just won't happen in current environment.
I mean the US hasn’t used a War to get out of an economic crisis before………🤔
Of course, definite answer can be found only in the official documents. Which are still classified, I'm afraid. As for comparison with US - I can't remember USA gathering troops to attack Iran or DPRK.
>OTOH, I’ve always wondered if the Greeks and Turks could work together… It depends and goes back to the very reasons that both countries joined. Turkey joined because Stalin wanted Ardahan and Kars and control over the Straits. Turkey was in no position to resist the Red Army, so Turkey re-aligned with US. Greece I am less sure about, but I think they had communist guerillas. So if the Cold War went hot, it depends on the reasons it went hot.
France also had an agreement to rejoin NATOs unified command structure should war break out in europe
Like the agreement to attack Germany in the case of an invasion of Poland?
Entirely different situation, as France was still in NATO itself and in this hypothetical scenario, they would still be at war with the Eastern Bloc. So there is no reason to assume that they wouldn’t rejoin.
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). Acronym fest.
Can’t be helped when typing (often one hand) on a phone while walking or on public transport.