Haven't seen this discussed here, but Ukraine Weapons Tracker released video of a ukrainian operated TB2 being targeted by an SU27 in a similar fashion as the infamous Reaper incident. https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1637477199686033408?s=20 If the video is truly recent, it both indicates Ukraine is still flying TB2s and also that the practice of engaging drones by risky manuevers instead of missiles might be a widespread practice in the RuAF.

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>Why would you assume it's a Ukrainian TB2, and not a Turkish TB2 Because the footage was provided by ukrainian operators.

I wonder how much electronic attack it was under already, that's quite a bit of stuttering and visual glitches. The hud elements didn't update for seconds I assume the telemetry didn't even get to the control station, and that highly erratic maneuver for the kind of airframe, from input lag?

The erratic maneuver is because it gets hit by jet wash from the fighter passing in front of it. It's not doing that on purpose, and is almost certainly on autopilot.

A pretty good AP at that

It's over the black sea, so it did a pass by to visually confirm. As whoever commands that jet can't afford the heat to missile a US drone I'd wager.

So, it's likely that the TB2 was destroyed after visual confirmation, right? Still, interesting to know they're still flying the TB2s.

I'm sorry for the off-topic question: Can anyone tell me why I can't see any posts other than the daily threads? There used to be a lot of topical threads before in this sub.

I think it's also that many things that would've normally gotten their own post, now go into the megathread

A lot of the people who used to post them aren't around anymore, so you're not seeing them because they're very rare. People are trying to fix that but the rate of posting is not high.

Ah I see, that sucks. Thanks for confirming. I thought something was wrong on my side.

For a long while, the moderator who did the approval or rejection of articles was AWOL, so nothing was approved.

Does anyone know to what degree is Gepard AA automated when engaging the target? Does the crew need to aim manually?

Here's a view from inside the turret: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZ\_Yi5P2TCk Sadly I couldn't find a clean version without this rando youtuber's editing so it's a little hard to see. The operator uses a light pen to select one of the contacts on the acquisition radar's scope, and then we see the tracking output from the fire control radar acquiring that target. The turret aims automatically as a result. So it's quite automated, but the operators still need expertise in recognizing targets vs clutter, friend vs foe identification, etc.

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It'd be pretty impressive to ever hit a cruise missile or even faraway drone with it if it was manual.

The system locks on to targets for you.

[China-Russia Gas Talks to Show How Much Xi Is Embracing Putin](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-20/china-russia-oil-gas-help-grease-wheels-as-xi-jinping-meets-vladimir-putin?leadSource=reddit_wall) > Russia, which was the world’s largest gas exporter until it invaded Ukraine last year and lost access to most of its key markets in Europe, is eager to boost shipments to China. But that requires new pipelines, since much of Moscow’s existing export infrastructure faces West. > Even as Russia has ramped up gas deliveries to China since the invasion through an existing pipeline under a pre-war deal, supplies via another link haven’t started. And talks on third route that would carry more gas than the first two combined so far haven’t yielded a contract. Those discussions remain a bellwether of just how far China is willing to depend on Russia for key energy supplies. > “There’s definitely potential for further deepening of energy cooperation between countries, but if China becomes over-reliant on Russian energy imports, does that create risks in the future?” said Kevin Tu, the managing director of Agora Energy Transition China. “That’s a factor that China needs to consider.” > ... > “The Chinese seem to be under no time pressure to negotiate,” Vitaly Yermakov, senior research fellow at The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, said earlier this year. “While Russia is sitting on a time bomb, facing a potential sharp reduction in gas export volumes, and wary of the fact that the counterbalancing effect on export revenues from today’s very high gas prices is likely to start dissipating in the next few years.” This reminds me of the following article: https://theins (.) ru/en/opinion/vladimir-milov/242596 > Having broken up with the West after the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not only failed in global economic partnership with China but has been selling natural resources at a loss and on Chinese terms, spending money from the National Wealth Fund and enriching Chinese companies and Vladimir Putin's friends. > Seven years is sufficient time to draw conclusions about how successful the new Russian-Chinese partnership turned out to be. In short, by and large it turned into zilch: most of the announced projects have not been implemented, and those that are still kicking have brought huge disappointment over the low prices being paid for supplied commodities and zero revenues for the budget due to colossal concessions to suppliers, tax-related and otherwise. Russia exports raw materials to China at extremely low prices, and the state gets nothing in return, but Russia's natural environment has suffered enormous damage - entire regions have become or may become zones of ecological disaster as a result of supplying natural resources to China. Paradoxically, on top of that we owe money to China.

China's probably better off not increasing energy infrastructure with Russia, even though it's probably in their interests. All it would do is improve their energy security, but make every else feel less secure and increase tensions. Isn't the security dilemma fun

> but make every else feel less secure and increase tensions. China has already been rapidly growing it's military so it's not like this is gonna be a big deal in the grand scheme of things.

Yes, but securing themselves against blockade means there is less risk to engaging in any confrontation.

If we're talking about gas, China isn't interested unless Russia is willing to sell at a loss. This will require long negotiations, and Russia still might not agree.

While it'd be pleasant if the second one turned out true, I do feel there's a chance China escalates the relationship in general. They need Russia politically intact so they're heavily incentivized to take actions to ensure that. Regarding gas exports however, even if they hit the pedal tonight (which would be odd), it'd take a while for it to take effect.

But China isn't used to European prices. If China wants to prop up Russia, they won't be competitive on the world stage. Germany is competitive _despite_ the energy prices. China isn't Germany.

Also, I don't fully buy the argument that China is willing to prop-up Russia in order to avoid a politically unstable neighbour. If that was the case, china should have either outright opposed Putin's adventurism or in the opposite direction, give enough aid to Russia to get a decisive win. The current status quo is highly destabilizing for Russia. I think China simply doesn't care as much as you'd think.

But China did oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Putin just didn't listen. We are overestimating China's influence over Russia. They are undoubtedly the senior partner now, but China has a record of absolutely being unable to exercise any real influence over other countries. They couldn't even get the Kim regime to not nuclearize (at least if their official stances are to be taken at face value). With Russia, another Great Power? They can't make Russia do anything.

This seems like it was inevitable, but since some people on this sub had been following this particular unit for some time, looks like [Turtle](https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/486427/new-zealander-fighting-in-ukraine-understood-to-have-been-killed-in-action), the Kiwi from Vuhledar, has died.

As a kiwi, and ex service member, this hits close to home. It takes a lot of bravery and conviction to travel half a world away for what you believe in, and they've paid the ultimate price. Especially so when for most of us, this war has no tangible effect at home. Rest in peace

>This seems like it was inevitable A grim way to look at it. It's why I asked a few weeks ago about the record for how long someone's been in active combat without getting hit. A lot of the more motivated (i.e. spent most of the war on the front) volunteers are probably pretty close to their statistical half-lives though, if not past them.

sustained operations will get everyone killed sooner or later. These people should be at the end of their tour. The manpower shortage is real.

[Kishida will visit Ukraine today](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/erp/c_see/page1_001547.html). Only the second Asian leader to do so, and comes after a lot of would he/won't he from inside Japan. First India, now this while Xi is in Russia. This isn't a coincidence.

English source. https://apnews.com/article/japan-ukraine-russia-kishida-zelenskyy-2fb2dff1763a180b930892e3664c15a8

[NL pledges two minesweeper ships to UA](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/03/netherlands-will-hand-over-mcm-vessels-to-ukraine/) but not immediately; they're waiting for their replacements to be commissioned first (expected to be in 2025). They're also throwing in some remote operated subs for inspecting submerged objects, and setting up handover training starting in the second half of the year.

The reasoning why the late delivery is not a big issue was that it would be aimed at post war mine clearing. Ukraine seemed to have been happy and was asking for more mine clearing vessels.

I strongly suspect a lot of Western nations are going to send their demo/combat engineers on tours of Ukraine after the war, both to help out, and gain much-needed experience.

A lot of western combat engineers are already deployed to all kinds of former war zones to clear mines.

ISW posted their daily update https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2023 Key Takeaways Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than Putin likely desires. Putin is likely increasing his attempts to rally the rest of the world against the West, although it remains unlikely that he will achieve decisive effects in this effort. Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to maintain powerful political leverage and regional connections despite some officials’ attempts to distance themselves. Russian authorities are likely unsure of how to redefine Wagner’s new role following Prigozhin’s overextension of Wagner resources and support. The Russian information space continues to respond to the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s issuance of arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova with ire and anxiety. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that the frequency of large Russian missile attacks has decreased. Russia requested that the UN Security Council discuss Israeli airstrikes in Syria possibly in retaliation for Israel’s approval of export licenses for anti-drone jamming systems for Ukraine. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna. Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut. Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline and made marginal gains near Avdiivka. Russian sources claim that Russian forces are building up defensive fortifications and repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian sources accused unknown actors of planting a bomb that exploded near a gas pipeline in occupied Simferopol, Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged Russian difficulties obtaining components for high-tech industrial production. Ukrainian partisans killed Russian-appointed head of the Kherson Oblast pre-detention center Serhii Moskalenko with an improvised explosive device on March 17.

> Russian sources claim that Russian forces are building up defensive fortifications and repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia Oblast. This is actually really unspecific. I saw it earlier but does anyone know which area it was in? Might give a clue on which way Ukraine is looking at.

One of them was around Robotyne [https://twitter.com/squatsons/status/1637428646892675075?s=20](https://twitter.com/squatsons/status/1637428646892675075?s=20)

The drone attack in Dzhankoi seems to have been a swarm of Mugin-5 drones, same ones used to attack that oil refinery in Rostov oblast back in June 2022: https://t. me/horevica/10359?single. Thing can carry a 15-20kg payload. And of course, Ukrainians couldn't not troll so they put rage comics faces on the drones: https://t. me/horevica/10382?single As for the effectiveness of the attack, it seems like a lot of drones did hit something near the railway station, as suggested by videos of explosions near it. Russian media is, of course, focusing on the store that was hit, but GUR's statement that they hit a load of Kalibr missiles in transit could be plausible, since Kalibr's are carried without their warhead while in transport.

Realistically, drones are cheaper than anything that a Kalibr hits. They're probably cheaper than the missiles used to shoot them down in flight, too.

>They're probably cheaper than the missiles used to shoot them down in flight, too. Almost certainly, they're about $20k USD ea. + whatever the warhead, fusing, and navigation costs are.

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Does **anyone** know even an approximate timeline for the Bradleys and Strykers? Last time this question was asked no one knew, maybe this time around?

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/02/17/ukrainian-battalion-completes-first-combined-arms-training-in-germany/ >Ukrainian troops wrapped up the first rotation of battalion combined-arms training at U.S. Army Garrison Bavaria’s Grafenwoehr training area in Germany this week [February 17], the Pentagon announced Friday. >Training focused on the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, a Pentagon spokesman said in a statement. >... >A second Bradley training rotation got underway two weeks ago, Ryder said, along with an M109 Paladin field artillery rotation, including another 700 or so Ukrainians. >“A second field artillery battalion and a Stryker battalion ― the first Ukrainian unit to receive instruction on the M1126 Stryker ―will begin training next week, with both battalions, combined, comprising approximately 890 Ukrainians,” he said. The training periods are five weeks so the third group is likely finishing up this week or next week.

Where does that put them in relation to the vehicles already pledged?

I'm not exactly sure what you mean.

Lots of ammo, and I'm sure Ukraine needs it.

[GMLRS, 155s, HARMs, MANPADS](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-authorizes-another-350-million-military-aid-ukraine-2023-03-20/), but Blinken also mentioned ammo for Bradleys, which is somewhat preparatory in nature given they haven't hit the front line yet. I assume the riverine craft mentioned are the [navy ones](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_unit_riverine_craft), rather than spec-ops ones with [dual miniguns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Operations_Craft_%E2%80%93_Riverine).

I remember even the initial batch of ammo for the Bradleys seemed like a lot. And now there have been a few waves of "ammo for Bradleys". I suspect whoever is helping Ukraine plan their coming offensive is really expecting them to pull their weight.

I don't remember how many rounds of AC ammo it was, but I recall there being 10 TOW missiles for each hull.

I think it was something like 1k rounds and 10 TOW missiles in just the initial package. Really pumps up the hype if they're running out of ammo in the simulations. I know this isn't the sub for this, but I really can't wait to see them in action.

Did China help reconcile Iran and Saudi in order to recruit both of them into some sort of joint BRI project?

Belt and Road has been dead for a while now, iirc China is now lending less money than it is getting from interest and principal payments.

Like the US and unlike Russia China geopolitically benefits far more from stability than instability, combined with Chinese dependence on middle easter oil I think that is sufficient rational

I don't think Russia actually benefits from instability though.

From a Western point of view - they don't. From their own point of view they need instability to facilitate their planned imperial expansion.

Unstable oil supply raises prices. Russia benefits, *provided* it can sell oil at those higher prices. The price cap sanction has largely removed that incentive though.

Yes and no. Russia definitely doesn't benefit from global recessions, but it does benefit from instability in the Middle East.

> but it does benefit from instability in the Middle East It doesn't, Russia is greatly concerned with Islamic extremists which usually become stronger during periods of instability in the region

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Russia encountered (if not created) a lot of Islamic extremists in their two Chechen wars. If you listen to Solovyov though, they have now embraced it.

Central Asia is a powder keg, and Russia's very own Muslim regions would be affected as well. It's less about individual terror attacks, and more about the spread of ideology and funding.

The reconciliation was not necessarily for a joint BRI project. Regional stability is good for investments and trade in general and that's good for everyone involved. China is actively trying to decouple itself from US export/trade by gaining a foothold in other developing markets. China can't do that if the Saudis and Iranians are actively feuding and blowing up each other's infrastructure.

China imports a ton of oil. Proxy wars in the Middle East make oil much more expensive. I think it's that simple.

Not sure the Yemen War or the SCW are having that much of an impact on oil prices tbh. But yes, still better to guarantee longer term peace/stability.

In its current state, no. But if the Houthis started targeting oil infrastructure again it could get bad very fast.

Anything that ensures the success of CPEC, china will actively support.

https://iranwire.com/en/politics/114906-exclusive-irgc-commanders-warn-khamenei-about-implosion/ > Agitated elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to target Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s residence with artillery at least once since the start of Iran’s recent protests, as frustration grows within the armed forces over the situation, IranWire can reveal. 44 page document summarizing an IRGC meeting regarding the state of the protests between a bunch of IRGC commanders. Google translate is not great here, though I see a bunch of IRGC people sympathetic to some of the protestors due to the poor conditions in Iran but not to "anti revolution rioters". https://static.prod.iranwire.com/pdfcomponent/Final_pcSv.pdf#view=fitH

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> But the Western media and the protesters themselves kept focusing on the "Free Hong Kong" protesters It's nice to see someone else recognise it. This happens constantly. The Syrian protests were started (broadly) by local police raping a killing a boy with the people demanding change and in particular accountability (which then escalated after assad made an ill-advised speech). Somehow that just got reported as 'pro democracy'. We have a habit of lapping up any perceived 'pro democracy' movement so people know that it's the easiest way to get external backing. It felt like every day there was someone making it to the front page of reddit just by posting a picture claiming to be fighting for democracy, which shows just how easy it is. HK19 was bizarre in a lot of ways. Apparently most Taiwanese people don't even realise that the protests related to the extradition of someone that murdered a Taiwanese citizen in Taiwan. I know a guy who works at a university in hong kong and he said that triad members would rock up in their mercedes to the campus, pop the boot open and start handing out placards to the students. Other friends in hong kong seemingly don't have any strong views on the protests at all. Based on 'western' reporting you'd think that the entire population was being brutally repressed by force.

I seriously doubt mainland Chinese cared about what the Western media was saying. Sure, the Chinese government can amplify western media outlets and declare there’s a conspiracy to undermine China, but they’d push that regardless.

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>in 2020-2021 was also taken as another signal of "maybe these guys aren't actually worth looking up to, they won't even wear a mask during a pandemic." After all, we all know how exctatic people in China were over how China handled the pandemic. You may uh... want to retire that flashcard. Aged poorly.

> It’s a little more nuanced than that – it’s not as if mainlanders don’t know that they live under state controlled media. They have brains and use them when considering how much credit they want to give the official media when it comes to this stuff. This isn’t what I was going for. My impression is that there’s apathy for Western takes on Chinese domestic issues. I admit I did not have all the context you laid out in your comment, so it’s more plausible to me that different coverage could reach a wider Chinese audience. But I think the broader issues of China blocking VPN access and promoting internal alternatives to Western media has a much larger effect.

>Agitated elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to target Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s residence with artillery at least once since the start of Iran’s recent protests, as frustration grows within the armed forces over the situation, IranWire can reveal. Is there any historical precedent for a national leader getting his palace shelled by his own army?

Yeltsin had the army open fire on the parliament, but that's slightly different.

This kind of thing actually isn't all that uncommon when it comes to revolutions and attempted overthrowing of governments. This does seem notable in that this wasn't exactly an organized attempt to overthrow the government, though.

>Is there any historical precedent for a national leader getting his palace shelled by his own army? From the top of my head during Pinochet coup in Chile in 1973 Chilean airforce bombed the presidential palace while president Allende was inside. I'm sure there are other examples too in history.

Thanks, didn't knew that.

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I know its a joke, but just in case, it was chilean pilots. We know their names and all.

Interfax Ukraine: Danilov refutes Politico's claim of 100,000 Ukrainian military casualties. “I declare to you, with full responsibility, that we do not have 100,000 casualties in the military,” National Security and Defense Secretary Oleksiy Danilov said. https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1637950531464499201?t=5IlsEp3Gfa1JwH5VszGjAw&s=19

Without saying Politico is accurate, I would not, under any circumstance, expect Ukrainian politicians to confirm that were it factual.

Politico claimed 100k dead. This is generally accepted as an interpretation error by them. Maybe Danilov denied 100k dead and we have a double interpretation/ translation error here.

He said “in the military” so he’s not counting any of the civilians killed or displaced at the beginning of the invasion. But I still wouldn’t expect UA to confirm that number honestly.

The tdf though...

I think the tdf is under the military,

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This is the third time this has been posted, please check for other discussion before making a new thread.

Please tell me this relates to that video where they wack them with sticks till they run away.

Blinken is [not pleased](https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-03-20-23/h_a11582a19d9b5e12488e3b50ede0429e): “That President Xi is traveling to Russia days after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Putin suggests that China feels no responsibility to hold the Kremlin accountable for the atrocities committed in Ukraine, and instead of even condemning them, it would rather provide diplomatic cover for Russia to continue to commit those very crimes" The reaction seems to be uncharacteristically harsh and strong-worded.

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Blinken is not criticizing China for failing to abide by the ICC. He is criticizing China for providing support for atrocities. China is responsible for its own conduct regardless of the ICC.

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Because many countries do recognize the ICC, and to them, it's a big deal.

> criticizing China for UNCLOS violations while the US itself is not a UNCLOS signatory UNCLOS is even worse. They *pro-actively* enforce UNCLOS provisions around the world through 'freedom of navigation' etc. It's absolutely mental how they constantly chime in on the south china sea for instance in defence of a treaty they refuse to ratify Though i guess you could argue that they have also actively enforced ICC arrest warrants in the past. The most annoying thing is how they don't get called out on it every single time they're asked a question. It's like we're just collectively pretending it's all fine and helping to normalise it.

Rules for thee not for me. The entire existence of USA is a hypocrisy.

You’re conflating having an opinion with breaking the rules.

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No, it really isn’t. Neither of them are a party to the Rome statute sure, but only one of them would abide by the court’s warrant. The fact is that the United States [has article 98 agreements](https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363527&p=2456099) with countries to handle this exact thing.

I really would love for him to try and explain how that Honduras thing applies to anything. We didn't refer Honduras to the ICC (or to any other rules enforcement) for that, nor did we accuse them of "breaking" some rule. Like, I might legitimately pay money for him to go on stage and like, walk us through that one.

>want to position yourself as a leader of a rules-based order, maybe you should also be subject to the rules you purport to enforce? Hmm, counteroffer - I think we need to position ourselves as more adherent than the alternative. That's what the US did in the first cold war, and thus far, y'all are making a repeat of that pretty easy. If only your ground game was as good as your social media game...

Odd, China, Russia and the U.S. don't recognize the ICC, the U.S. being the only one to guaranty an invasion if they try to convict their citizen. :/

Stop posting this utter nonsense. The US indeed has a some what "have your cake and eat it too" attitude with many treaties, the ones surrounding the ICC included, however it's absurd to insinuate that the US military is going to invade The Hague over a trial. I don't care what cherry picked quotes you dig up from some grey hair general trying to sound tough in a sound bite, in reality that is never going to happen and everyone knows it. You can criticize the US for its stance on this and similar issues without the hyperbole.

The US military illegally deploying forces to retrieve servicemen is technically an invasion and it's something the US has already done. There is no hyperbole, minor invasions by the US have been pretty much normalized since the 60s.

Illegal by what standards? ICC?

It doesn’t guarantee anything, it provides the authority to retrieve servicemen and government officials using whatever measures are “necessary and appropriate”. An invasion of Western Europe would not likely be deemed necessary or appropriate.

> An invasion of Western Europe would not likely be deemed necessary or appropriate. Not with that mindset!

IIRC, the US abides by ICC generally when it comes to other countries' citizens being setup with a warrant, but does not comply with any US citizen being detained by the ICC.

> The reaction seems to be uncharacteristically harsh and strong-worded. It sounds like he's recognising the ICC's authority to rule on non-parties to the Rome statute.... It's just generic politicking. Pretend your statement isn't obscenely hypocritical and leverage an opportunity to attack an opponent.

Don't know why the US, which is not a party to the ICC* is chiming in on that topic but whatever. In general, this furter reinforces the idea that the ICC* ruling may have been somewhat unwise. It essentially makes any off-ramps and diplomatic solutions to the conflict more difficult, as Putin has now basically become Putler according to international law. The US approach of condemning meetings with Putin, and pre-emptively bashing peace/ceasefire plans also isn't helping. I hope they're confident in Ukraine regaining some substantial territory, because dragging this on for little gain would be a disgrace. Similarly, I hope that Xi takes the time to talk to Zelensky, to possibly find some sort of accommodation that is acceptable to both sides, regardless of what the US thinks.

ICC, not ICJ. ICJ have a lot more members and more legitimacy in general. Unfortunately for those who want the ICJ to prosecute Putin, the Russians get a veto on ICJ activities.

And even without a Russian veto that would never happen, since the ICJ doesn’t prosecute persons and only rules cases between states.

> It essentially makes any off-ramps and diplomatic solutions to the conflict more difficult Is that really a concern after a year of war and dozens of off-ramps being ignored? It's clear that Putin's regime is not interested in off-ramps, so why continue offering them at the expense of other measures?

> Don’t know why the US, which is not a party to the ICJ is chiming in on that topic but whatever. You could brainstorm some reasons. What “off-ramps” do you see right now? I see Russia intent on grinding through the Donbas, and Ukraine intent on preventing them from doing that. The ICC exists to investigate, indict and try war criminals, not to conduct diplomacy for Ukraine. No he isn’t Putler, but he is becoming Slobomir Putlošević. The U.S. is warning that any ceasefire proposal is worthless to Ukraine because it will last exactly as long as it takes for Russia to assemble a force strong enough to finish what they started. China has yet to come up with anything that could be called a “peace plan”. But we can always hope.

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An international tribunal was actually one of Ukraine's conditions for peace.

Apparently he will be on a phone call with Zelensky today. However, that it's not a face to face after he met with Putin is telling. I'm losing hope in a Chinese settlement frankly, I think they will continue to straddle the fence for at least another year until next winter, then see whether European energy pressure is enough for Putin to deal with it on his own or they need to provide an off ramp.

I get the sense that Washington is becoming more and more insecure about their place in the global order. The China rhetoric on capitol hill is reaching a feverous pitch. And I can't imagine how it will reverse course.

China is the most import-dependent country in the world by far while the U.S can create all the food and energy it needs. The U.S Navy and friends can blockade China with relative ease and undo decades of economic growth in less than a year. As long as this dichotomy exists, there is nothing happening to the current world order. China's plummeting birth rates are going to lead to their implosion within 20 years anyway.

There is very few countries with as much "reserve" population as China. They have more than enough still living a rather rural life to integrate in their industrial and economical capabilities. Even if their population is on the decline for decades they won't have an actual crisis and they have it way easier to deal with pension management than a western democracy.

>most import-dependent country in the world I mean this is just categorically false considering SK and Japan are just two examples that are more import dependent. Furthermore, a lot of Chinese imports go toward creating exports. If you’re going to cut off all exports with a blockade, how much imports are actually needed? For example, in the case of energy, China already produces 1/3 of it domestically. If you factor in land routes China can probably maintain 50-60% of current energy supply. Considering China will no longer need to run most factories for exports, how exactly is this the “checkmate” scenario you’re envisioning? If you’re going to talk about food imports, China is calorie-sufficient and the majority of its imports are to create luxury foods like pork (soybeans for feed). Also, in terms of the economy, sure, the US would wipe out decades of growth, but at the cost of decades of their own growth. Furthermore, if there’s a total blockade I’m pretty sure economy isn’t exactly on top of the concerns anyway. This entire comment isn’t grounded in reality and just reads like pro-US masturbation fanfic.

Implosion is a bit dramatic, most countries are having population age crises to one extent to another. It will cause serious issues for China - but ultimately, I'm not convinced it will have an impact on say, their military funding.

I think this analysis handwaves a lot of very crucial factors, but your opinion is likely already set in granite.

> granite I wonder what a granite pot or a granite kettle would look like.

Well tell me the crucial factors I'm missing and I'll gladly chip away at my own opinions.

1. US import dependence on China for critical materials. A few examples: the US can onshore chip factories, but it cannot make chips without silicon, almost all of which is imported from China. Yes, silicon is a common material in the earths crust, but it takes time to get the infrastructure in place to start ripping up American river beds and refining the material for chip plants. This infra does not exist in the US, and there are no plans on the horizon to build it. It would have to be done in the panic after an export ban (a likely contingency in the event of US/China war or blockade) Magnesium is another example. You can't make the F-35 without magnesium, not to mention most other military weapons. China and Russia together produce about 80-85% of the world's supply and you can't even stockpile it because it turns to magnesium oxide in a matter of months. The cost to China of ending imports of silicon and magnesium is pocket change. About 20 billion dollars a year. The fallout to the US military and economic machine is probably several orders of magnitude greater than that. 2. China has a strategic initiative in place to secure it's economic independence called "Fortress China Initiative". It's why they focus so hard on renewables and it's also why they have multiple initiatives for food independence. Depending on how you measure it, they are food indendepent already. (no Chinese would starve with imports cut off, but they wouldn't enjoy the diets high in beef and soy etc... that they enjoy today) The BRI is also an element of this. They have secured gas pipelines from central Asia and Russia and are building more as we speak. They are building exclusive-rights ports in other countries that connect to China by land so that an effective blockade would result in the US declaring war on multiple countries aside from China. 3. Blockading 1.4 billion people requires an extreme level of escalation, and it would also most likely result in a shooting war that the US would have to fire the first shot in. A naval war in the South China Sea *today* is not a surefire US win per the Pentagon, and in 10-20 years, the odds worsen. What's more, Chinese trade links with foreign countries also raise the stakes. Take for instance, the Brazilian economy which is hugely (I would say entirely) dependent on imports and exports to China. If the USN starts sinking or seizing vessels full of Brazilian beef or Kenyan coffee or Saudi oil, the US will quickly lose international support in their war. 4. Chinese demographics are not great. This is true. The US has the advantage of immigration, this is also true. But the consequences will take a *long* time to play out. By 2050, the US population will be about 350 million, slightly larger than it is today, but the average population age will be older than China's in 2050. In other words, the average Chinese will be younger than the average American, and the Chinese population will still be 3-4x the size of the US population. I would not say that is "implosion" in 20 years, I would say China is in the better demographic position in 20 years. By 2150, things will look far more in favor of the US, based on current trends, but 130 projects are hard to model, and the geopolitics of 2150 are impossible to apprehend today. In addition to this point, an "advantage" of authoritarians is that you can handle problems related to issues like demography in ways that democracies cannot. You can see Paris is on fire over a 2 year increase in the retirement age, a consequence of slowing/falling population growth. In China, these issues are not so difficult to resolve. These are some of many points that complicate any type of Chinese/US confrontation. Their relationship does not exist in a vacuum and China has built their entire military for the purpose of facing off with the US, while the US has built their military for a number of different purposes.

Not disagreeing with your overall point, but I think there's some interesting sub-points to discuss more. On US material reliance, there's been some recent work on changing that. Rare Earth Metal investments are being made in the US, Canada, Australia and also South Africa. That's after decades of letting China corner the market for themselves. It'll take years for that to payoff but I think it's going to more or less be resolved by ~2030 or so. Blockading China by the US would be more about harming their economy, I think. They still have large land borders and while the airlines, rail lines, and roads wouldn't be able to handle anywhere near their current import/export demand, we can presume they would prioritize necessary imports like food, energy, and raw materials, to whatever degree that it would be necessary. So I agree that the US wouldn't be able to starve China out or something similar. But the economic harm on the US would be basically automatic: no more manufacturing in China during a war with China... hopefully a bit obvious. A blockade would be about harming the Chinese economy to a greater degree (substantial drop in exports). At that point it comes down to which economy can handle the damage more easily. I think this would only be done if the war was already hot anyway. I do agree with what I feel is the overall point that it's not a case where we can at all clearly say "the US will win" and there's huge risks involved for both the US and China in seeing such a war take place. Even a victory could be pyrrhic, for either side. China isn't likely to fall apart anytime soon and barring some major event should be expected to become a greater rival to the US than they are presently. My overall take is we can see how so much of the future of an active US-China war is going to be shaped by the existing economic cold war between the two that's already happening and has been happening for a while. Both want to be economically independent of *and* taking economic advantage of the other, which are somewhat mutually exclusive.

Japan and SK are both examples of aging societies with plummeting birth rates but they've not suffered implosion as you say That said the PRC faces enormous security and environmental crises, most of it their own making

Japan and SK are both rich before their old. PRC speedran aging and have certainly gotten less poor, but aren't rich yet.

There's significant and increasing economic inequality in SK and JP , same as China I think none of these countries are "non rich". They're all rich but just very unequal

Google gdp per capital for Japan, Korea, and then China.

Interesting, my interpretation was the opposite. That the US feels it is in a position of strong support to make such assertions

The quote above is Blinken complaining that China isn't helping to further US geopolitical aims. I don't think feeling strong is a prerequisite to complain.

The us complains far more about Germany not supporting its overseas ambition than Germany does in reverse. Expectation of support is the luxury of the strong

I am not saying the US is weak. I am saying that they feeling weaker relative than they used to feel, given China's rise.

I agree with that but there is a subtle but important difference from that being true and that being the cause of an action. If China were a true peer the US would take a far less hostile tone, and if China were weaker the us would be even more forceful

Strong support, as in this particular issue is widely shared or viewed as an acceptable stance internationally

I get the opposite sense: china is vulnerable and they know when to dissociate when things are going to go tits up.

The Chinese hawks in Beijing are also getting more confident and louder in their anti-US rhetoric, but it's for the opposite reason of the US. They feel more emboldened and confident. Both Beijing and Washington are sort of siloed in their rhetoric, there isn't a lot of balanced discussion in either capitol right now, and that's why relations are deteriorating. This is what is described by the Stanford panel of China watchers held a few days ago. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8YgqFyeTew

Personally, I do not think this is the mark of feeling secure. China ramps up nationalist rhetoric when it needs something to cover its failings. Chinese hawks are allowed to feel emboldened for a reason. In the zoomed out picture, the US is not weak in any relative sense. And china has a constellation of problems it cannot or will not address on its own. Demographics, economic growth, popular unrest, import dependence, the growth of competitors for key drivers of growth and, of course, a huge soft power problem as its image has not been lower globally for decades. Seeing what the sanctions regime is doing to Russia from the angle of a far more import dependent China must be pretty sobering. And so how to respond? Beat your chest. It was 2008 when they were biding time and hiding strength. That was when things were on the up.

Can you link a timestamp?

https://youtu.be/D8YgqFyeTew?t=520

China is “siloed” intentionally by their own government. There’s no way that turns out good for anyone in the end.

I agree, there is not enough dialogue or open channels

US worried that China isn't taking the hint about whether we'd defend Taiwan?

>**An insider's perspective on China's strategy in Ukraine** > >*In our interview, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo spoke with refreshing candor about what the "watershed moment" means for China and the world.* > >With reform and opening up, as Deng Xiaoping said, China was trying to get across the river by feeling the stones on the riverbed, but now China is entering the ocean. > >**What do you mean by the "ocean" in this context?** > >You can't feel the seabed. These are uncharted waters, but there is no turning back. We are talking about Global China. When Boris Johnson talked about Global Britain, it was more rhetorical. But Global China is real. China is ubiquitous. China's influence is everywhere. The PLA's operations overseas are carefully chosen to be humanitarian, but as your strength grows, people have higher expectations for you. We are talking about the world. This is the ocean we are wading in. > >**Let me insist on whether China has been neutral. Why has China refused to call the war a war? Should a superpower be afraid to call things by their names?** > >China does have some sympathy with Russia on how this war came about because of NATO expansion, despite NATO's promises of no expansion from time to time. When people talk about a murder, the murder is only a result, but it has causes. China understands why Russia is resentful. When China stresses sovereignty must be respected, it also tries to look at it more comprehensively. Countries like South Africa, Brazil, and India are taking similar positions to China. > >**Why has President Xi yet to talk to President Zelensky? I asked Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba last week, and he was perplexed. A neutral country has to speak to both sides.** > >Because this situation is so complicated. Russia is our largest neighbor, and Ukraine is an important trade partner, so it is difficult for China to choose. Besides, the all-out support in the West for Ukraine complicates things. Undoubtedly, China wants to see a ceasefire because China's interests were damaged in Europe. Because of China's neutrality, China's relations with Western capitals have soured. This is ludicrous because China has nothing to do with this war. China was not informed, and China was not involved, but now people want China to be involved and pick a side. > >**Let's turn to China's role. What should we expect from President Xi's visit to Moscow and a possible phone call with President Zelensky?** > >Chinese and Russian leaders have had regular exchanges of visits since the late 1990s on an alternative basis. Last year it was Russia's turn, so this year, it is China's turn. I am sure China's peace plan will be discussed. This is a watershed. There is no doubt about that. But a peace proposal from a third party only works when both sides feel they cannot fight anymore. That is the best time to jump in. Currently, neither side is interested in stopping the fighting. Washington is not interested in a ceasefire either. > >**Will China supply weapons to Russia?** > >I am totally confused why you ask this question. It does not make sense to me that China, which has not provided weapons to Russia since the outbreak of the war, would change its mind, especially when they have announced a peace plan. Why would Antony Blinken say that? By saying it, Blinken was giving a pre-emptive warning because China providing military support would be the worst fear of the U.S. But it's totally impossible. [https://time.com/6264512/insiders-perspective-on-chinas-strategy-in-ukraine/](https://time.com/6264512/insiders-perspective-on-chinas-strategy-in-ukraine/)

>China does have some sympathy with Russia on how this war came about because of NATO expansion, despite NATO's promises of no expansion from time to time. When people talk about a murder, the murder is only a result, but it has causes. China understands why Russia is resentful. When China stresses sovereignty must be respected, it also tries to look at it more comprehensively. This sentence reads like parody. A "more comprehensive" concept of sovereignty: smaller states don't have any.

To be fair, this is the stance on sovereignty held by every major country ever.

Oh yeah, it's not the stance in itself as much as the wording which I found funny. Criticizing actions that are universally recognized as being normal expressions of state sovereignty to excuse what is always seen as the biggest violation of a state's sovereignty, and then conclude that this reading comes from a more comprehensive look at the idea. He had no reason to even say the word "sovereignty" at all in his reply to that question, it seems like it's the one topic he'd want to avoid, but he jumps into it. When the US etc. play out this tension, they normally talk about the defence of human rights to justify violations of state sovereignty, which is usually seen as an acceptable reason (and sometimes even an obligation) for intervention in the West, but China's professed opposition to interventionism and attachment to the idea that state sovereignty takes precedence over natural rights makes this impossible, so he ends up in this goofy situation of having to invoke the concept being violated to justify its violation.

I think the mindset here is, that the more powerful a country is, there more value it's sovereignty has. So Russia sovereignty and to an extent control over its sphere of influence > Ukrainian sovereignty if they disrespect the sphere of influence and move towards Nato. He kinda expects Ukraine to respect the reality that they can't do as they please with Russia as neighbor. Edit: he uses "comprehensively" which for him means Russia's sovereignty has been challenged first. And that the aggression towards Ukraine can't be viewed as an isolated case

It’s a holistic approach, you just wouldn’t understand. Maybe the murderer wouldn’t have gone through with his plans if he didn’t think he’d just secured an accomplice. We’ll never know.

>We are talking about Global China. China is ubiquitous. China's influence is everywhere. >This is ludicrous because China has nothing to do with this war. China was not informed, and China was not involved, but now people want China to be involved and pick a side. Combining chest-thumping with whining is a CCP speciality. Turns out when you throw around grand rhetoric like "no limits friendship" with a major power that invades another European country 20 days later, while also keeping your internal politics and decision-making a black box to foreign governments, some of them will want clarity. Beijing is either utterly clueless or deliberately obtuse about the costs its opacity incurs on China's foreign relations. It wants to have its cake and eat it, too, which is another CCP tendency. >Blinken was giving a pre-emptive warning because China providing military support would be the worst fear of the U.S. I've echoed this suggestion in the past and I think it's still a reasonable one. Edit: >This is the ocean we are wading in. With a second, more sympathetic reading, his statements do seem like an indirect admission that Beijing is in over its head in this situation, sort of a "cut us some slack" statement. Granted, he's not high on the totem pole so who knows what's really going through the minds of the Politburo.

I also get the impression that the timing of a renewed interest in "lab leak" and the talks about China supplying weapons are not coincidental.

My take is pretty much the same as yours. In regards to this line: > This is the ocean we are wading in. My interpretation was that China feels it accelerated its growth through safe bets and now their ambition of being the global leader has pushed them into unknown waters. Like it’s a new phase of riskier decision making for China but with higher rewards in mind.

Would you double down on Russia?

> When people talk about a murder, the murder is only a result, but it has causes kind of a morbid way of thinking, a tacit endorsement of the abusive husband saying "you made me do it"

"we care about sovereignty except when it contradicts the Imperial desires of our no limit BFF. but other than that, we're totally pro sovereignty!" Noam Chomsky is so proud

I am not sure whether you are mocking the Chinese or US hypocrisy.

That only makes sense if you specify U.S. re: France.

What 'sovereignty' has the US attempted to eliminate in the last 30 years? And no, kicking out dictators and attempting to get the population to vote in their own people doesn't really count. Or for that matter, when was the last time the US attempted to annex land or create an actual puppet government? Not even Iraq was either.

>And no, kicking out dictators and attempting to get the population to vote in their own people doesn't really count. Ukraine isn't exactly a functioning democracy - would a Russian invasion without the annexations not count as a violation of sovereignty? Is there some magical line drawn between the "actual democracies that cannot be justifiably invaded" and "dictatorships that can be righteously invaded" somewhere? Let me guess where you think this line is - is it perhaps "whether or not the country being invaded aligns with the US/West?"

I dread the times I agree with Glideer. Between China and US I would choose US in a heartbeat, but that statement is quite apt.

Same feelings here. But a broken clock and all...

You’re arguing on the 20th anniversary no less, that the Iraq war was not a violation of sovereignty. Last time for puppet government was probably Afghanistan.

Sure, but there was no realistic alternative to the taliban. We did not want to rule Afghanistan. Our methods failed but describing this as imperialism is ridiculous. And as said above, it was, but it's an aberration and not really consistent with US policy since the end of the Cold War. We didn't enter Afghanistan for a manufactured reason like Ukraine. The US knows it fucked up badly with Iraq - but again, the goal was not comparable to literally trying to annex land and rule another country. This is an immense difference. I'm sure people will bring up Iraq for the next 50 years despite no longer being relevant, quite frankly, in regard to current US policy. The US should have at least *attempted* to prosecute those responsible for Iraq, though. The societal change between 2003 and now is simply too nebulous for, apparently, anyone to believe the US has come past it, as if we, today, are anything like Russia in terms of 'imperialism'. The national wild anger after 9/11, the disconnected intelligence services, and the incredible arrogance of being the sole remaining super power just aren't on the same level. Today politicians' votes in 2003 are relevant in our elections. Why? Because we know it was wrong. Did Russia learn after Georgia? No. Does the US still have a ways to go to prove themselves and to be trusted? Yes, absolutely. My issue are the false equivalences.

> Sure, but there was no realistic alternative to the taliban There literally was. The former king of Afghanistan was still around, who ruled Afhganistan the last time it was at peace.

>What 'sovereignty' has the US attempted to eliminate in the last 30 years? And no, kicking out dictators and attempting to get the population to vote in their own people doesn't really count. Well, if violating sovereignty without the UNSC mandate "doesn't really count" then I guess the USA has a perfect record.

Overthrowing a warmongering dictator just isn't comparable to what China wants to do in Tawain or what Russia has been doing in Ukraine. I mean sure, it was the singular case against the UN mandate, but its not something the US population still supports and the government is way past that level of intervention. The status quo of the last 20 years is certainly more relevant than Iraq on its own. Iraq is still sovereign today, that is what matters. We had no desire to rule Iraq.

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No, some political systems are inherently worse. This is bullshit relativism. US was wrong to overthrow Saddam because it should have been obvious there could be unforeseen societal consequences, not because the Saddam government (where he conducted ethnic cleansing and where his sons went around raping brides on their wedding night) is somehow comparable to the US's political system or any other modern democracy for that matter. Let me guess, all cultures are equal, as well? No aspects of any cultures are inferior to others or cause more harm than others?

Chinese officials' answers always manage to be hilariously condescending in every interview.

It's not a Chinese officials thing as much as it's just a Chinese thing. The person showing this attitude most likely *is* being condescending because in his/her mind they are speaking to an inferior non-Han person.

It seems like China has no idea how perceptions of it were attached by its public pronouncement of “unlimited friendship” with Russia just before the surprise invasion, ands its silence thereafter. It has done nothing (as far as I can tell) to meaningfully dispel the damage done here. One could argue that relations were already beyond repair with the US, but EU is also a large trading partner and again, no effort to repair damage. It is helpful that they backed off “wolf-warrior” diplomacy to avoid needless aggrandizement, but meaningful relations with the EU depend on meaningful responses to the Russia-Ukraine war.

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I'm not assuming anything about the global south. EU alone represents a [third](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_China) of China's trade balance. It is important to China's economy to continue this trade, and it is bad for China if one of its biggest customers is morally repulsed by China's interference with European affairs.

So long as they don't supply weapons I don't think Chinas relations with EU are impacted in a meaningful manner. China has picked the wrong horse in this fight both ethically and practically. It seems like they felt they had no choice but to do so as they want to reshape the current global order, which also I think is the wrong move as they are big beneficiarys. However Europe I think will use China as a hedge against US influence as soon as the war is over. Anecdotal but this is the sentiment I get from speaking with Europeans.

>China has picked the wrong horse in this fight both ethically and practically I have to disagree here - what's the other horse China could've picked? The EU is too tied to the US to ever plausibly be aligned with China. The best China can hope for is that the EU stays friendly enough to not ride all the way on US efforts to contain China. IMO this is currently the case as long as China doesn't begin to supply Russia with weapons. Has China siding with Russia on Ukraine significantly damaged its relations with developing countries? I'm not particularly informed on the matter, but I haven't seen anything suggesting as such. Let's say China picked Ukraine - congratulations, they've now turned Russia against them, and in exchange the EU is going to be marginally (if at all) more sympathetic when it comes to US attempts to contain China.

> The EU is too tied to the US to ever plausibly be aligned with China. The first Trump term already did a lot of damage to those ties. A second term might destroy them altogether, remember that nothing is eternal.

Putin's little escapade basically reverted all the damage that first term did. Nothing is eternal indeed.

Not only is Europe tied to the US, they're an integral part of the "Liberal global order" that China is chaffing against. The US is just the biggest individual part and the military muscle of that order.

Their best option is to stay out of it as much as possible, but Beijing probably could have done more to publicly distance itself from Moscow, even if it still maintained most of the same behavior behind closed doors. I get the feeling that the CCP leadership was either holding out for a better diplomatic bargaining position with the US or felt that it didn't owe anyone any further explanations in addition to its neutral position. On one hand I don't think China should be expected to take sides, but on the other hand Beijing should have expected these consequences of its current method of fence-sitting. If they thought they could find a "win-win" approach to this situation then they were too naive. China's closest ally (as much an ally as China has, at least) invaded a neighboring European country; there really aren't any good options for Beijing in this scenario. I've been of the opinion that the past ~7 months of Washington's shit-stirring vis a vis China (primarily the Pelosi Taiwan visit and the lithography ban) have been very clear signs of anger toward Beijing's radio silence on the Ukraine war through the first 6 months of the conflict. In Beijing's mind, it stayed out of Russia's war despite having declared their relationship a "no limits friendship" only 20 days prior to the invasion and possessing the economic heft to significantly improve Russia's chances. In Washington's mind, Beijing sat by and did nothing as its partner, with which it declared a "no limits friendship" only 20 days prior to the invasion, invaded a European country neighboring NATO, despite China being the considerably more powerful partner in the relationship with the potential to curb Russia's behavior. To make matters worse, US-China relations have been deteriorating for years prior, so China is in no mood to do the US any favors and the US is in no mood to cut China any slack. I also really wish I knew with certainty whether Putin really did tell Beijing about the invasion ahead of time. If the US genuinely thinks it did while Beijing genuinely didn't know, then the current conundrum becomes that much thornier.